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Abstract
Bus and other road-bound services like tram and light railway are the back-
bone of the German local public transport sector. Based on the characterization
of high deficits and fragmentation, five main research questions and hypotheses
are investigated in this dissertation. First, advanced Stochastic Frontier models
which account for unobserved heterogeneity and heterogeneous output variables
are used to study cost efficiency and its determinants such as the vehicle uti-
lization rate. Second, economies of scale and scope are evaluated. Third, based
on the finding of substantial economies of scale, potential gains from hypothet-
ical mergers are calculated using Data Envelopment Analysis. Fourth, I focus
on competitive tendering, another option to increase efficiency in this sector.
Analyzing operator changes, I find in majority regional bus services tendered
out and structural conditions significantly increasing the probability for opera-
tor changes, like tendering in bigger volumes. Fifth, internal and external cost
advantages for express coach services as a diversification option for public trans-
port are confirmed. In conclusion, the results of my research are relevant to the
strategic decision process of firm management as well as regulators.
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Part I
Overview
1

Chapter 1
Overview
1.1 The Issue
As a student of Business Engineering at the University of Karlsruhe, I had to
develop a sectoral focus by choosing an engineering minor. My choice was Trans-
portation, offered by the Institute for Transportation of Prof. Zumkeller at the
Department of Civil Engineering, Geo- and Environmental Sciences. Although
I was not able to take the economic counterpart courses at the Institute for
Economic Policy Research, Sector Transportation and Communication, Prof.
Rothengatter accredited my environmental, public, and macroeconomic courses
taken at Lund University, Sweden. After one more seminar about the Trans-
European Transport Network (TEN-T), I wrote my diploma thesis at his insti-
tute about European railway reforms.
My engagement with the sector could have led directly to a career in trans-
port. However, I wanted to gain experience in other sectors. The best possibility
appeared to be strategy consulting, in my case at Booz Allen Hamilton. After
two extensive projects in media (for an information service provider and pub-
lisher) and the public sector (for a pension insurance company), I was given the
opportunity to work in the transportation sector again. Evaluating the strategic
long-term options for railway reorganization in a European country was so ap-
pealing that I felt getting to know other sectors was no longer necessary. Hence, I
took the initiative and tried to get engaged in a new transport project. The first
was not carried out because the client, a provider of regional railway services, no
longer wanted to work with us. The second, with an airline, was carried out, but
without me, because my project manager left the company. The third, with a
transportation systems manufacturer, was postponed. I became somewhat anx-
ious, because I knew that they were intensively looking for consultants on a big
project for a mobile phone service provider. So the last chance was a project
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proposal which I co-presented in the Federal Ministry of Transport, Building and
Urban Affairs. We lost and my way for the next few months led to the mobile
phone service provider.
I decided to apply for a new job where I could focus and do fundamental and
strategic research on transport. Hence I hesitated to apply for a research position
at the Chair of Energy Economics and Public Sector Management at Dresden
University of Technology. But I was told that I could solely focus on public
transport research. How did it work out? I became the project manager for
the Chair in the GERNER IV project (Agrell et al., 2008a,b,c). In this project,
efficiency scores for the incentive regulation of gas transmission companies as
well as gas and electricity distribution companies in Germany were calculated.
My first paper published in a refereed journal was on benchmarking of water
companies (Walter et al., 2009a).1 At first glance, this may not look like a focus
on transportation, and not at all like a pure focus on transportation.
But, most important, I have to confess that this is the introduction to my
dissertation about efficiency and competition in public transport. To happily
resolve this story: There must have been a focus on research in transportation
economics in the past, and this focus is presented in the following thesis. Just
like other sectors, public transport is affected by the financial crisis. Although
there is uncertainty about the concrete effects, budgets will become far more
restrictive for German urban public transport, as it is dominated by subsidized
firms under municipal ownership. The major provider of regional bus services,
DB Stadtverkehr, will be affected by the struggles its mother company faces in
the sharp decline in freight transport. And all companies may have financing
problems during the global credit crunch.
Summarizing the situation, the problems public transport faces will be inten-
sified. Unfortunately the sector lacks an appropriate regulation which could give
some guidelines for the strategic development of firms. A goal of this thesis is to
analyze the sector’s characteristics, providing scientific and economic evidence
that can support strategic decision-making and effective regulation. Based on
empirical methods, the thesis finds one of its motivation points in the low level
of cost coverage across nearly all companies with a mean level of 73.8% (Ver-
band Deutscher Verkehrsunternehmen, 2008). This is still a very high estimate,
since it includes all non-user related transfers to the companies. Efficiency anal-
ysis is used to calculate cost efficiency over a panel of several hundred public
road transport companies from 1997 until 2006. To provide some evidence for
the management of local public transport companies, attention is paid to the
evaluation of two possible efficiency determinants: vehicle utilization rate and
1Engagement with the water sector resulted in other publications; see Hirschhausen et al.
(2009a,b).
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outsourcing share. Another motivating factor is the high fragmentation: There
are several hundred operators in the German market and nearly every city has
its own provider. Hence it appears necessary to evaluate possible economies of
scale and scope, and to propose and evaluate mergers. The European Union has
already provided a renewed overall framework via regulation (EC) No 1370/2007.
Competitive tendering for bus services is so far only used in Hessen (Hesse) and
around Hamburg and Mu¨nchen, but the question remains whether the design of
these tenders is optimal. Other legislation such as the Passenger Transport Act
(Personenbefo¨rderungsgesetz – PBefG) contains some antiquated rules, e. g., the
obstruction of regular express coach services. Therefore, a final motivating factor
of this thesis is to evaluate the economics of current regulation and to show the
necessity for change.
The thesis is organized as follows. Chapter 1 gives an overview. Section 1.2
is devoted to the local public transport sector, Section 1.3 introduces the main
methodology, scientific efficiency analysis, with a comparative review of the liter-
ature. Section 1.4 is dedicated to the detailed structure and summary of the fol-
lowing chapters as well as the contribution of this dissertation. Chapters 2 and 3
(Part II – Efficiency) apply Stochastic Frontier Analysis (SFA) to the German
local public transport sector, and Chapter 4 applies Data Envelopment Analysis
(DEA). Part III (Competition) applies econometrics to competitive tendering in
German local bus transport (Chapter 5) and to the prospects of express coach
services in Germany (Chapter 6). Each chapter ends with concluding remarks.
1.2 Sector Consideration
1.2.1 Public Transport
Mobility is seen as one key element of the prosperity of our society. The de-
mand for mobility is satisfied by both individual transport and public transport.
Through technological progress and tariff enhancements, public transport has a
unique role in increasing mobility. Public transport has even positive side-effects
on individual transport through avoiding congestion on roads and parking lots
(Parry and Small, 2009).
Public transport can be classified into long-distance passenger transport,
served by aircrafts, buses, ferries, and railways, and local public transport (O¨f-
fentlicher Personennahverkehr – O¨PNV), served by buses, ferries, railways, taxis,
and all types of aerial cableways, light railways, subway, and tramways. In Ger-
many rail operations in local public transport are called regional rail services
(Schienenpersonennahverkehr – SPNV). This includes suburban rail services (S-
Bahn). Bus, aerial cableway, light railway, subway, and tram operations fall
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under the category of road-bound local public transport, or public road trans-
port (O¨ffentlicher Straßenpersonennahverkehr – O¨SPV).
Politics plays a major role in public transport. Public service obligations (Da-
seinsvorsorge), regulatory approval, and the peculiarities associated with certain
types of infrastructure are all subject to public debate. Regarding the high pub-
lic sector infrastructure investments, mobility is suspected to be subsidized by
the society. Some members of society may also believe that public transport
is, in fact, subsidized too much, forgetting that the provision of local transport
services serves as a social right for the sector’s existence. It is true, however,
that transport services are often not as cost-efficient as possible.
During the 20th century Western Europe developed unique, complex, and ca-
pacious local public transport systems, perhaps only mirrored by Japan. There
are some characteristic differences among countries. These differences, for exam-
ple, result from regulation, ownership, or market structure. The United Kingdom
is a popular subject for liberalization and deregulation studies, whereupon ex-
perts often warn against immediate imitation. Sweden has long been at the
forefront of competitive tendering. Italy faces financial pressure on losses occur-
ring in local public transport, like so many countries. France is criticized for its
foreclosure. Switzerland retains the federal thought, particularly for transport
policy.
The European Union greatly influences change in this sector. Regulators
hope that local public transport will help to mitigate climate change. However,
Europe’s transport sector lags behind in reaching the targets set by the Kyoto
protocol. The EU is also concerned about the impacts of demographic changes
upon long-term transport planning. Competition concerns are raised through fi-
nancing and awarding problems. The concerns, the framework, and the structure
of public road transport in Germany are the subject to the next subsection.
1.2.2 Public Road Transport in Germany
The Regulatory Framework
Germany’s federal Passenger Transport Act provides the commercial principles
for the provision of road-bound transport services that use trams, trolley-buses,
and motor vehicles.2 Local public transport is defined as urban and regional
transportations with a journey distance not exceeding 50 kilometer or a journey
time not exceeding one hour in the majority of passenger transportations (§ 8
2Additionally, the German Ordinance on the Construction and Operation of Rail Systems for
Light-Rail-Transit (Verordnung u¨ber den Bau und Betrieb der Straßenbahnen (Straßenbahn-
Bau- und Betriebsordnung – BOStrab)) governs tram, light railway, and metro operations.
OVERVIEW 7
Section 1 PBefG).3
From a legal view, the PBefG generally assumes that the provision of trans-
port services occurs at a company’s own risk (§ 8 Section 4 PBefG and Verband
Deutscher Verkehrsunternehmen, 2007a). This is why it is also called com-
mercial transportation (Eigenwirtschaftlicher Verkehr), as distinguished from
non-commercial transportation (Gemeinwirtschaftlicher Verkehr, § 13a PBefG).
Both types of transportation can require subsidies, but non-commercial trans-
portation services receive direct subsidies which are not assessed as other oper-
ational revenues (Beck, 2009). According to the PBefG, the basic market access
for commercial transportation occurs during the licensing application process.
Should several companies apply for similar routes, this is called license competi-
tion (Genehmigungswettbewerb). To protect incumbents and the railways, the
PBefG specifies some limitations. For example, a concession for a new passen-
ger service will not be granted when an existing operator already serves actual
demand. Even if the new service is of superior quality, the law states that the
existing operator or operators must first be allowed to offer a comparable service
(§ 13 Section 2 no. 2. b) and c) PBefG). This provision functions as the major
legal barrier for express coach services, because Germany’s dense railway net-
work4 makes it almost impossible to establish express coach routes formerly not
served by railways.
In the legal exception of non-commercial transportation, the public trans-
port authority (PTA – Aufgabentra¨ger) procures the transportation service and
the European Regulation in force applies. Until recently this has been regula-
tion (EEC) No 1191/1969 and its amendment 1893/91, which require subsidized
services to be tendered out.5
In Germany, the Altmark Trans decision is a famous legal dispute concerning
the legality of subsidies. The European Court of Justice 20036 issued a judg-
ment that the following conditions must be satisfied for subsidies to comply with
European law:
1. The recipient operator has a clearly defined public service obligation.
2. The compensation criteria and parameters have been clearly and objec-
tively established.
3. The compensation just covers cost plus a reasonable profit margin.
3Parts of this subsection draw on Augustin and Walter (2009) and Walter et al. (2009b).
4The railway density in Germany reaches almost 100 kilometers per 1000 km2 area, but
only half this value averaged for the entire European Union (calculation based on data from
Eurostat and Railisa UIC Statistics Database).
5A transportation company either applies for the right for a service at the licensing authority
(LA – Genehmigungsbeho¨rde) or participates in a tender process initiated by the PTA.
6European Court of Justice, 24 July 2003, Case C-280/00.
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4. If competitive tendering is not used, the compensation must be equivalent
to a well run and adequately provided transportation company.
Direct awards, still representing the vast majority of service assignment in
Germany, fall under commercial transportation, at least from a legal point of
view. The latest regulation (EC) No 1370/2007 which took effect on 3 Decem-
ber 2009 provides detailed rules for transparent, fair competitive award proce-
dures. It strives to stimulate competition in public passenger transport through
compulsory competitive tendering, but it also allows for exceptions. It implies
no obligation for competitive tendering:
• as long as the transportation company is under control of a transportation
authority (Article 5 Section 2) and is not active outside the authority’s
area of responsibility (principle of reciprocity; Article 5 Section 2 (b));
or
• if the value of the service contract is less than one million EUR or the
annual passenger kilometers are less than 300 000 (Article 5 Section 4).
Nevertheless the duration of all contracts is limited to ten years (15 years in
case of an extension) (Article 4 Section 6). In Germany there is a legal obligation
to provide local public transport services. Therefore, the licensing authority
must collaborate with the public transport authority and the public transport
companies. Sufficient transport services under an economical regime must be
achieved through cooperation, integration of fares, and timetable matching (§ 8
Section 3 PBefG). Enforcement is delegated to the federal states through the Law
on the Regionalization of Public Transport (Regionalisierungsgesetz – RegG)7,
which states that serving the population with local public transport services is
a public service obligation (§ 1 RegG).
One consequence of regionalization is that several different policies now reg-
ulate local public transport. For regional rail services, competitive tendering is
used throughout the country, although the incumbent, DB Regio, still holds a
high market share. The use of competitive tendering in public road transport
differs from state to state. The most common scenario is that competitive ten-
dering goes unused; Hessen is the only federal state that has made competitive
tendering (Ausschreibungswettbewerb) for non-commercial services compulsory,
announced in 2002. First price auctions with bids in closed envelopes are usu-
ally used, where awards are articulated after one bid trial without negotiations
(Beck, 2009). Normally gross-cost contracts are used. In this case, the provider
7Gesetz zur Regionalisierung des o¨ffentlichen Personennahverkehrs, notably a two-page law
with only six articles.
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bears the production risk and the authority bears the revenue risk. Net-cost
contracts, under which both risks are borne by the provider, have rarely been
used. Both gross-cost contracts and net-cost contracts are variants of fixed-price
contracts (Roy and Yvrande-Billon, 2007). Management contracts, under which
both risks are born by the authority, correspond to cost-plus contracts.
The gross-cost contracts used in Hessen include constructive and functional
elements in the service specification (Achenbach, 2006). Constructive elements
describe the service provision in detail. The provider has little freedom of action.
Functional elements only define the targets, and the applicant must propose how
it plans to achieve them. The contracts contain price escalation clauses that are
attached to price indices (Rehn and Valussi, 2006).
In Bayern (Bavaria) and Schleswig-Holstein, competitive tendering is solely
used as an instrument to award regional bus services around the urban agglom-
erations of Mu¨nchen (Munich) and Hamburg, respectively. In the inner city
of Mu¨nchen, as elsewhere in Germany, the municipality represents the public
transport authority and at the same time owns the public transport company
(Schenck et al., 2003). Obviously, conflicts of interest can arise. Municipal own-
ership is seen as barrier to competition (Weiß, 2003), because then competitive
tendering is only seldomly used for such services. Interestingly, in Sachsen-
Anhalt (Saxony-Anhalt) the framework of commercial transportation is used to
introduce competition for services with stronger subsidy requirements (Karnop,
2007). The authorities provide a lump sum and the public transport companies
compete for the license through quality competition as opposed to price compe-
tition via competitive tendering. It is the opposite of the classical optimization
strategy in local public transport. Price competition aims at input minimization
whereas quality competition aims at output maximization. Named after a city
in Sachsen-Anhalt, the novel approach is called Wittenberger Modell.
Market Structure
Figure 1.1 classifies Germany’s bus companies by type, major strategic activi-
ties, and any additional passenger transport business segments apart from bus
operations. Urban public transport in Germany is dominated by domestic mu-
nicipal companies. In nearly all of the larger cities, there is a municipally-owned
company, leading to a high degree of fragmentation. Public ownership is fur-
ther represented by DB Stadtverkehr GmbH, a subsidiary of Deutsche Bahn
AG. It is the primary player in regional services, organized in 22 major sub-
sidiaries (Deutsche Bahn AG, 2009a). Market concentration and the presence of
multinational companies has not yet developed as in other countries, e. g., Great
Britain, although some companies like Arriva and Veolia have entered the market
through participation in competitive tenderings in regional rail transportation.
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Usually, neither the larger domestic municipal companies nor international firms
have enough bus service capacities for the network in which they operate. There-
fore, sub-contracts are negotiated with small-scale private bus companies. These
4992 small- and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) (Bundesverband Deutscher
Omnibusunternehmer, 2009) represent the third pillar (besides local public and
integrated international transport companies) of the local public transport mar-
ket. They also operate independently and take part in competitive tenderings.
Although the number of competitive tenderings is low compared to the overall
market size, the pressure on subsidies requires changes. To avoid too strongly
depending on their home markets, public transport companies are now looking
for alternative fields of business or expanding into other regions to strengthen
their market positions (Elste, 2007).
Municipal companies have reacted to the changing market structures with
mergers of special functions or entire companies. Thus, Essener Verkehrs-AG
founded a common subsidiary for transport operations with neighboring Mu¨l-
heimer Verkehrsgesellschaft, called Meoline. Together with Duisburg, the three
cities merged their transportation management functions into rhein ruhr partner
(rrp). In the Hannover area, a proposed intermodal joint venture (intalliance)
between the local urban operator, U¨stra, and the regional subsidiary of Deutsche
Bahn was halted by anti-trust legislation.8 Other companies, especially large and
multimodal operators, have acquired smaller firms in neighboring areas: Ham-
burger Hochbahn (HHA) bought 49.9% of Stadtverkehr Lu¨beck (before building
the expansion subsidiary Benex) and Dresdner Verkehrsbetriebe (DVB) acquired
Verkehrsgesellschaft Meißen in Sachsen (Saxony).
To reduce the higher operating costs resulting from higher salaries in public
enterprises, some urban transport companies have created sub-companies which
then operate economically challenging services using lower-paid drivers. Exam-
ples are Leipziger Verkehrsbetriebe (LVB) and its subsidiary Leobus, Berliner
Verkehrsbetriebe (BVG) and its subsidiary BT Berlin Transport, and Verkehrs-
gesellschaft Frankfurt (VGF) with In-der-City-Bus (ICB).
Furthermore, some public companies participate in competitive tendering be-
yond their home regions. Since the regulation (EC) No 1370/2007 only allows
direct tendering to city-owned companies that are not active outside the respec-
tive area, some firms have restructured into independent enterprises, i. e., a local
company allows the public owner to direct tenders to its own company, while
a second company participates in competitive tendering elsewhere in Germany.
A prominent example is Hamburger Hochbahn (HHA) which operates the local
8The joint venture was intended to efficiently encompass the whole of Hannover’s local and
regional passenger transport by regional rail, tram, and bus.
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bus network in Fulda.9
DB subsidiaries try to defend their incumbent position in rail and bus ser-
vices. As mentioned above, a few foreign companies have entered the market
in recent years. Most of them first acquired a local public or private transport
company and then began to compete with German incumbents in competitive
tenderings.10 A state-owned example is Dutch NedBahnen. SMEs are building
more bidding associations to participate in competitive tenderings. In the past,
they have also benefited from heavily subsidized student transportation.
In addition to the high market fragmentation, most public transport com-
panies have joined one of the 60 so-called public transport associations. The
associations are responsible for standardized ticketing, marketing, etc.
Financing
In 2006 VDV (Verband Deutscher Verkehrsunternehmen – Association of Ger-
man Transport Companies) member companies earned 8.8 bn EUR (according to
§ 275 HGB11). The figure includes sales revenues, inventory changes, capitalized
services on own account, other operating revenues, earnings from investments,
other financial earnings, interest, earnings from transfer of losses, and extraor-
dinary income. 6.1 bn EUR were earned by companies active in public road
transport with the remainder by regional rail operators, and 7.7 bn EUR origi-
nate from ticket sales of all local public transport companies (Verband Deutscher
Verkehrsunternehmen, 2008, pp. 7, 66).
The revenues of public transport come from many sources. Local public
transport companies receive compensation payments for student transportation
(§ 45a PBefG) and for transportation of handicapped persons (Social Security
Code, § 148 SGB IX).12 These compensation payments are part of securing
the public service obligation. Compensation payments and investment subsidies
originate from federal sources according to the RegG and the Local Authority
Traffic Financing Act (GVFG).13 Many local public transport operations are
further subsumed under holdings with electricity, gas, water, sewage and other
activities. Such cross-subsidization (Querverbund) gives tax advantages.
9With the commencement of regulation (EC) No 1370/2007 on 3 December 2009, it is
doubtful whether this legal unbundling will remain an accepted solution. Interestingly, the
constraint mentioned above only holds for line services and not, for example, maintenance
activities.
10A recent example is FirstGroup buying the private company Merl in Speyer near the French
border.
11German Commercial Code – Handelsgesetzbuch.
12Sozialgesetzbuch Neuntes Buch (IX) – Rehabilitation und Teilhabe behinderter Menschen.
13Gemeindeverkehrsfinanzierungsgesetz – Gesetz u¨ber Finanzhilfen des Bundes zur
Verbesserung der Verkehrsverha¨ltnisse der Gemeinden.
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Since expenditures generally are much higher than earnings, the level of cost
coverage reached only 73.8% in 2006.14 West German companies achieved a level
of cost coverage of 74.6%, while East German companies reached 68.4% (Verband
Deutscher Verkehrsunternehmen, 2008, p. 9). In 1997 (the first year covered in
the data set applied for efficiency analysis), these numbers accounted for 68.1%
and 58.1% respectively (Verband Deutscher Verkehrsunternehmen, 2002, p. 21).
Some of the losses can be attributed to the fact that local public transport is
considered as a public service obligation, and is subject to a high degree of
political influence (Aberle, 2009, p. 316). However, as public budgets tighten,
long-term losses will not be sustainable and subsidies are expected to decrease in
the future (Lasch et al., 2005). After a linear extrapolation of the recent levels
of cost coverage and with the assumption that these levels will increase in the
future, West German local public transport could reach profitability in 2042 and
East German local public transport at least in 2034.
I also note that it can be welfare enhancing to subsidize urban transit. This is
most probably the case if fares are subsidized, whereas the services are provided
in an economical and efficient way. Parry and Small (2009) find that subsidies of
more than 50% of operating costs improve welfare. Their results are derived for
three major metropolitan areas: Washington D.C., Los Angeles, and London.
1.3 Modern Efficiency Analysis Applied to Local Pub-
lic Transport
1.3.1 Outline of Literature
This section describes the approach used in this dissertation. Economic research
can concentrate on institutional and policy issues, without expectations that
readers are equipped with deeper knowledge of mathematics and formal expres-
sions.15 Economic research is often theoretical. Economic theory lays out the
principles of economic behavior and it is the indispensable connector between all
approaches of economic research. Economic research can also be quantitative.
In its simplest form it is descriptive, without allowing for well-founded inference
or predictions. Almost all qualitative research incorporates descriptive analysis.
Quantitative research can be based on numeric modeling with an emphasis on
the prognosis of future developments and scenarios. Quantitative research can
14There are different definitions of the level of cost coverage. The one cited here (Verband
Deutscher Verkehrsunternehmen, 2008) surely results in percentages on the upper end.
15One may be tempted to classify such research as qualitative. However, qualitative data
can itself be a major input to econometric research, in the absence of data, hypotheses can be
qualitative, yet highly theoretical.
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also be empirical, where the available data is the main input and focus of inter-
est. Backhaus et al. (2006, pp. 2 ff.) state that multivariate analysis is one of
the pillars of empirical research, and classify it by structure-verifying methods
and structure-detecting methods. In the former they include different types of
regression analyses; in the latter they include cluster analysis, factor analysis,
and so on.
This thesis is based on quantitative, more precise empirical, more precise
econometric methods. This may be more obvious in some chapters and less ob-
vious in others. Chapters 2 and 3 use Stochastic Frontier Analysis to evaluate
cost efficiency and some of its determinants and to evaluate economies of scale
and scope in Germany’s public road transport. SFA is known as the econometric
approach to efficiency analysis (Greene, 2008). Chapter 4 uses Data Envelopment
Analysis to calculate the potential gains from mergers. DEA is non-parametric,
meaning that no coefficients are estimated. Clearly, it is not a type of regres-
sion analysis. However, by incorporating noise, the availability of inference, the
extension to semi-parametric approaches, etc., the historical drawbacks of DEA
and the differences between it and SFA tend to blur. DEA no longer has to be
deterministic, since the stochastic DEA (SDEA – order-m) approach allows for
noise. This development has gone so far that in the XI European Workshop on
Efficiency and Productivity Analysis (EWEPA) in Pisa in 2009, non-parametric
models were classified as econometric models (Simar, 2009) without opposition.
Chapter 5 uses an econometric probit estimation to examine the structural con-
ditions and the probability of operator changes in local bus transport tenders.
Chapter 6, which evaluates the future prospects of express coach services, in-
cludes a conjoint analysis to estimate market share. Backhaus et al. (2006,
pp. 7 ff.) classify conjoint measurement as a structure-verifying method. Thus,
my basic scientific approach is econometrics. And it is microeconometrics be-
cause I always look at an individual level, i. e., firms in Chapters 2, 3, and 4,
tenders in Chapter 5, and people in Chapter 6.
The purpose of this section is to recall the basics of the methods of Chapters 2–
4, scientific efficiency analysis, and to give a comprehensive and comparative
review of the literature on efficiency analysis used in the public road transport
sector. The remainder of this section does not go deeper into the models and
literature used in Chapters 5 and 6. The reasons are twofold. First, the focus
of Chapters 2–4 is more methodological, and second, more specific literature is
available on the efficiency analysis of public road transport than, for example,
on structural conditions in competitive tendering in local bus transport.
Scientific efficiency analysis has been broadly applied to sectors such as agri-
culture (e. g., Lansink et al., 2002) to detect productivity differences, and to
electricity distribution (e. g., Cullmann and Hirschhausen, 2008) for the purpose
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of regulation. Recently, interest has revived about applying it to local public
transport. I am interested in the advancements in efficiency analysis applied to
local public transport since a review of the literature by De Borger et al. (2002)16,
i. e., bootstrapping and inference in non-parametric DEA and unobserved het-
erogeneity and panel data applications in parametric SFA, in the evaluation of
regulatory contracts, and in multi-output studies.
The advantages of efficiency analysis, or scientific benchmarking, over the
widely-used tool in business, managerial benchmarking, are many. It results in
only one indicator measuring the overall performance of a company, and it can
account for heterogeneity, stochasticity, and multi-dimensionality. Accounting
for heterogeneity means that the environmental characteristics not under man-
agerial control will be automatically considered when calculating efficiencies.
Stochasticity refers to the possibility of measurement errors in the data set and
exogenous shocks. Multi-dimensionality refers to multiple outputs that cannot
be aggregated in one measure of output.
The review of the literature consists of the following four subsections. Sub-
section 1.3.2 evaluates DEA applications of single-product bus companies and
the influence of structural variables.17 Subsection 1.3.3 looks at different kinds
of econometric studies on single-output companies. It is not based purely on
SFA studies, because there are cost-function estimations with average economet-
ric functions instead of frontier functions that address similar research questions
such as economies of scale. Subsection 1.3.4 looks at an increasingly large clus-
ter of SFA studies that analyze performance under different regulatory contracts.
Subsection 1.3.5 looks at empirical multi-output studies in which not all compa-
nies necessarily produce all of the considered outputs, hence zero outputs occur.
Some of these companies supply standard bus services as well as tram services,
trolley-buses and similar services. In this thesis, the word “output” means the
technical output variables in the model specification and the word “product”
means the services supplied. For example, an urban and intercity bus company
can be modeled through one summarized output, but provide two products.
1.3.2 DEA Single-Product Applications
DEA is a performance measurement tool that uses linear programming to find
the relative efficiency estimates of decision-making units (DMUs). Figure 1.2
16Under local public transport, the authors understand transport services to consist chiefly
of buses, but also other road-bound transport services such as tram or light railways. In the
following I use “local public transport” as a synonym for “public road transport” for conve-
nience.
17In contrast to the application order in Chapters 2–4 (I apply SFA twice, then DEA once),
the following review begins with DEA, because some of the basic concepts of efficiency analysis
are more intuitive in the context of DEA.
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illustrates the basic assumptions in DEA for a one input-one output case. Using
physical inputs and outputs, technical efficiency scores are assessed. Efficiency
scores can be calculated under constant returns to scale (CRS), variable returns
to scale (VRS), and non-increasing returns to scale (NIRS) (see Cooper et al.,
2007, pp. 131 ff., for other possible scale assumptions). Under CRS, all DMUs
are benchmarked against the one efficient DMU.18 Under VRS, DMUs are only
benchmarked against DMUs with similar size. NIRS evaluate all DMUs smaller
than the efficient DMU against the efficient DMU(s), whereas larger DMUs are
benchmarked against peers of the same size. DEA programs can be executed
under input or output orientation. Under input orientation, outputs are assumed
to be fixed and the efficiency score reflects the proportion of inputs that can
be saved. Under output orientation, inputs are assumed to be fixed and the
efficiency score reflects the extent to which outputs can be increased.
As applied to local public transport, consider firm F in Figure 1.2 under input
orientation. Under VRS, F is fully technically efficient, because it lies on the
frontier. Under CRS however, its technical efficiency score is determined by the
proportion of inputs that could be saved. This proportion is calculated as the
minimum input usage (a) divided by the actual input usage (b). Under input
orientation, the firms situated above firm E (including F ) exhibit decreasing
returns to scale, indicating that they are too large. Firms situated below firm E
exhibit increasing returns to scale, i. e., they are too small.
Table 1.1 lists the recent DEA studies of single-product local public transport
companies ordered by year of publication. The first column gives the author(s)
and the year of appearance. The second column characterizes the data set with
the number of observations, number of firms, country, type of operator, and
period. The third column gives information about the type of orientation, scale
assumption(s), and further methodological information. The fourth and fifth
columns give the inputs and outputs, and the sixth column summarizes the
studies’ significant results for comparison.
Three of the studies in the table are restricted to observations taken in a single
year, reflecting the appropriateness of DEA to cross-sectional data sets. Appli-
cations for panel data sets like Window Analysis (Cooper et al., 2004, pp. 42 ff.)
exist but the development of panel data models for DEA is not as advanced
as for SFA. The predominant orientation in DEA studies of local public trans-
port is input orientation because of predetermined route frequency (Odeck and
Alkadi, 2001). Input orientation is also examined when looking at cost mini-
mization. The corresponding calculation of cost efficiency (CE) evaluates how
much can be saved while maintaining current output levels. For the calculation
of cost efficiency, information about input quantities and prices is needed, which
18Several in the usual case of more than one input and output.
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Figure 1.2: Returns to scale and orientation in DEA
Source: Own illustration
is frequently absent in previous studies. From the studies in Table 1.1, only
De Borger et al. (2008) are able to use such information. As can be seen from
Figure 1.2, technical efficiency scores are defined as between larger than 0 and
1, with 1 indicating an efficient DMU. The same applies for CE. Whereas broad
consensus exists about the optimum input variables, there is constant discussion
about output variables. One group favors pure supply-oriented measures, vehicle-
kilometer or seat-kilometer, while another group favors demand-oriented mea-
sures, i. e., passengers and passenger-kilometer. The supply-oriented supporters
argue that demand is not under the control of management; the demand-oriented
supporters argue that it is actual carriage that counts; otherwise the firm run-
ning its buses empty through less-congested areas would be the most efficient.
Four studies rely on supply-oriented measures, with Odeck and Alkadi (2001)
taking passenger-kilometer into account in a second model. Only Boame (2004)
relies on a demand-oriented measure. All five studies are in fact semi-parametric
analyses because they carry out second stage regressions, mostly to determine
exogenous influences on the efficiencies.
The most recent study of De Borger et al. (2008) is at the methodological
forefront. The authors make use of the developments of DEA driven by the
18 OVERVIEW
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publications of Simar and Wilson (1998, 2000, 2002, 2007) which suggest pro-
cedures for bias correction and inference via bootstrapping methods19 in DEA.
Simar and Wilson (2008) show that DEA estimators are biased by construction,
stating that the true efficiency frontier is unknown. They propose to construct a
bias-corrected estimator with the help of pseudo data samples. De Borger et al.
find an average bias of 25% with the standard DEA CE measure often not lying
in the 95% confidence interval of corrected estimates. This finding points to the
importance of bootstrapping usage. Additionally, no average efficiency differ-
ences can be observed between Norwegian and French operators by De Borger
et al. when the sample size is taken into account.
Boame (2004) agrees with De Borger et al. (2008) that the standard DEA
measures are so much higher than the bootstrap estimates that they most often
do not lie in the bootstrapped 95% confidence interval. Boame (2004) finds that
56% of the firms operate under increasing returns to scale with an average output
level of 5.8 m revenue vehicle-kilometer. Additionally, average speed and a time
trend exhibit a positive impact on efficiency, according to the results of Boame’s
second stage tobit regression. However, a peak/base ratio has a negative impact
and bus age is found to be insignificant for efficiency.
In Great Britain a consolidation process emerged in response to competition
and liberalization (Cowie, 2002). Cowie finds that during 1992 and 1996, tech-
nical and managerial efficiency levels improved, but not scale efficiency. Odeck
and Alkadi (2001) find that the average bus company (161 m seat-kilometer)
in their sample of Norwegian bus companies is smaller than optimal, and the
average input savings potential is 28%.20
The influence of other variables on efficiency is also tested by Odeck and
Alkadi (2001). Type of ownership in particular is insignificant, a result confirmed
by Pina and Torres (2001) for Catalonia. This reinforces the finding of a recent
survey of studies on the performance of bus-transit operators (De Borger and
Kerstens, 2008). They conclude that the degree of competition and regulatory
issues are more relevant. Such a conclusion has also been drawn for other sectors
like water distribution. Thus, Walter et al. (2009a) find that institutional setting,
not ownership, is significant. Pina and Torres (2001), however, appear at odds
with the literature. First, partial productivity measures instead of pure inputs
and outputs enter their DEA model. Second, after a standard DEA procedure,
they regress efficiency scores on inputs to verify their explanatory power.
Summarizing the results of these semi-parametric DEA studies, structural
variables can play an important role in efficiency measurement, although no
19See Efron and Tibshirani (1993) for an introduction to bootstrapping.
20See Odeck (2003) and Odeck and Alkadi (2004) for further DEA studies on Norwegian bus
services.
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overall conclusion can be drawn on single variables, partly because of the different
environments in which the firms operate.
1.3.3 Econometric Single-Output Applications
SFA is a performance measurement tool that uses econometrics to establish rela-
tive efficiency estimates of decision-making units. It is closely related to standard
econometric estimations of average production and cost functions. Therefore it is
not unusual that one of the most popular application, the estimation of economies
of scale and density, is conducted with both average and frontier functions. Prac-
tically speaking, average functions represent scale and density economics for the
current industry structure, and frontier functions represent scale and density eco-
nomics for the optimal industry structure. However, the differences between the
two approaches have hardly been pursued in the literature. Table 1.2 illustrates
four standard econometric and SFA studies in chronological order that use data
sets from the 1990s and employ translog cost functions, the most popular func-
tional form in cost-function estimation. In contrast to the Cobb-Douglas func-
tional form, which is at best suitable for first-order approximations, the translog
functional form is a second-order approximation (Chambers, 1988, pp. 158 ff.).
The translog functional form does not result in the same economies of scale for
all observations as does Cobb-Douglas. Cambini et al. (2007) and Filippini and
Prioni (2003) rely on seemingly unrelated regressions (SUR). Farsi et al. (2006)
and Bhattacharyya et al. (1995) use sophisticated methods of SFA. The choice
of outputs is again reflected by the supply- vs. demand-oriented debate, with a
tendency to use seat-kilometer as the dominant output variable. To differentiate
between economies of scale and density, the single-output studies by Cambini
et al. (2007), Farsi et al. (2006), and Filippini and Prioni (2003) use the network
length as additional output variable.
There is more consensus about factor prices. A factor price for labor is
sometimes broken out by drivers and by administrative personnel. The energy
or fuel price is separated if data is available and significance during estimations
is given. Residual costs divided by some quantity measure form a material price
in the case of a variable cost function and a capital price in the case of a total
cost function. Cambini et al. (2007) pursue a more unique approach. First, the
input price for materials and services is calculated as the corresponding costs
divided by seat-kilometer. Hence, seat-kilometer represents output and at the
same time one of the inputs. Second, the capital price is calculated with the
help of an estimated cost of capital. This estimation is based on information
provided by companies about the purchase cost for new vehicles.
Modeling heterogeneity is important in modern efficiency analysis. The stud-
ies in Table 1.2 include additional structural variables in the cost functions, i. e.,
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average speed, load factor, etc., to account for observed heterogeneity in the
production model. Although I should add a critical note on the assumed ex-
ogeneity of some environmental variables that appear not only in local public
transport studies (why do airlines employ sophisticated yield management sys-
tems if the load factor is exogenous?), there is a nice intuition of their application
in SFA: Coefficients and standard errors of structural variables provide informa-
tion about the direction and the impact of influence, in contrast to traditional
one-stage DEA models, where the beneficial or harmful role of these variables
must be known a priori (Daraio and Simar, 2007, p. 98). The same intuition
applies for time trends which are included to account for technical change. A
new enhancement is given by Farsi et al. (2006) who account for unobserved het-
erogeneity in the sense that no data is available for this kind of heterogeneity.
Based on Greene (2004, 2005b)21 the so-called “true” models add an individ-
ual time-invariant random or fixed term to the prevailing inefficiency and white
noise terms. This allows better differentiation between inefficiency and other
unexplained factors. Farsi et al. (2006) conclude that the True Random Effects
model shows improved estimations of inefficiency and slopes. Pooled models fed
with panel data, Fixed (Schmidt and Sickles, 1984) and Random Effects models
(Pitt and Lee, 1981) may give imprecise results. The True Random Effects model
may also be used as a benchmark for the regulation of network industries. A
mechanical transfer of efficiency levels into individual X-factors must, however,
be avoided.
The Italian and Swiss bus industry evaluated by Cambini et al. (2007) and
Farsi et al. (2006) and Filippini and Prioni (2003) respectively appear to exhibit
increasing returns to density, and though to a lower extent, increasing returns to
scale. Increasing returns to scale and density are prevalent when the indicators
shown in Table 1.2 are greater than 1. The indicator for economies of scale mea-
sures the proportion of output increase to cost increase while extending output
and network. The indicator for economies of density measure the proportion of
output increase to cost increase while extending only the output with the network
held fixed. Filippini and Prioni (2003) also employ bus-kilometer and the net-
work length as alternative outputs.22 Interestingly, the measures for economies
of scale and density at the time were slightly higher in comparison to the original
output specification with seat-kilometer and the number of stops.
The results from Italy and Switzerland are confirmed by De Borger and Ker-
stens (2008) who find in an international survey that more intensive use of an
existing network reduces the per kilometer costs. For economies of scale, they
21Kumbhakar (1991) proposed a similar model.
22In Table 1.2, the network length is classified as an additional variable, but in the functional
specification it shows output characteristics because of the cross and squared terms.
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argue in favor of a U-shaped average cost curve with increasing returns to scale
for small companies followed by constant returns to scale and decreasing returns
to scale. The exact form of this curve again may depend on country and en-
vironmental characteristics. In an earlier version of their 2003 paper, Filippini
et al. (2001) additionally evaluate the influence of stop density and mountainous
regions on costs. Based on the same data set used in their later 2003 paper, they
find that higher stop densities and mountainous regions increase costs. Bhat-
tacharyya et al. (1995) taking a unique approach that allows for both hetero-
geneity and heteroscedasticity, are able to closely focus on a rather unattended
aspect of efficiency measurement: the internal sources of inefficiency. These de-
terminants are modeled as heteroscedastic variables of the inefficiency function.
The authors conclude that efficiency increases in the vehicle utilization rate and
decreases in the breakdown rate.
1.3.4 SFA Applications with Focus on Regulatory Contracts
Interest has arisen concerning SFA studies that compare the performance of
different regulatory contracts. In particular there is a debate about low-powered
cost-plus schemes vs. high-powered fixed-price contracts. Low-powered schemes
are expected to leave no additional rents to the regulated firms as excess profits,
because firms receive a predetermined return on their costs independent of how
high the real costs are. The major disadvantage is the low incentives given
to management to actually decrease costs. The underlying hypothesis of the
papers I review in this subsection is that firms with high-powered contracts have
more incentives to decrease costs and hence become more efficient. Under high-
powered contracts, firms are allowed to retain all achieved cost savings. However,
when costs are above the fixed price, no profits will be left to the firm (Joskow,
2007, pp. 1301 ff.).
Table 1.3 lists the most recent studies ordered by year of data availability, with
the exception of Gagnepain and Ivaldi (2002b) inserted after Roy and Yvrande-
Billon (2007), for easier comparison of the French experience. Table 1.3 only
contains studies from Europe. Local public transport as a public service obliga-
tion plays a comparatively higher role in Europe than elsewhere. Further, the
research intensity appears to be higher, although there are differences among
the European countries. The main model used in this subsection is Battese and
Coelli (1995) which allows the parametrization of the mean of the inefficiency
function. Exogenous variables are included as inefficiency determinants. In con-
trast to the inclusion of structural variables directly in the functional form like
outputs, the Battese and Coelli (1995) approach assumes that only the ineffi-
ciency is affected and not the entire production process. Hence, heterogeneity is
modeled in the inefficiency, not in the production. This appears to be a suitable
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approach for the variables characterizing the regulatory scheme, because there is
no obvious reason why firms under different regulatory contracts should operate
with different production technologies.
Roy and Yvrande-Billon (2007) estimate a production function to determine
the influence of regulation and ownership. As output they use bus-kilometer,
and as inputs, proxies for capital, labor, and energy. Two additional control
variables are included: network length and population. Both have positive im-
pacts on production choice. Returns to scale are found to lie around 0.92 which
indicates slightly decreasing scale economies for a mean output level of 2.462 m
bus-kilometer. This contrasts with the Italian case evaluated by Cambini et al.
(2007) who find increasing returns to scale for a much higher production level.
Turning to the core of Roy and Yvrande-Billon (2007) private companies appear
to be most efficient followed by public companies and semi-public companies.
Since competitive tendering is used in France only for private operations, this
result is not surprising. For semi-public companies, the higher inefficiency is
explained by the difficulties in responsibility attribution. Noteworthy, although
significant, The inefficiency differences between the mean-efficient semi-public
and the mean-efficient private company are in fact significant, but only 2%. The
superior efficiency of private operators can also be attributed to the type of regu-
latory contract. Roy and Yvrande-Billon (2007) differentiate net-cost contracts,
gross-cost contracts, and management contracts. The first two are fixed-price
contracts, the third is a cost-plus contract. A useful differentiation can be made
via the risk exposure of the franchisee. Under a net-cost contract, the oper-
ator faces production risk associated with the cost of providing an amount of
transport, and revenue risk associated with the sale of the transport services.
Under a gross-cost contract, revenue risk is assumed by the transportation au-
thority. Under a management contract, both risks are assumed by the trans-
portation authority. Roy and Yvrande-Billon (2007) find that firms operating
under fixed-price contracts are more technically efficient than those operating
under cost-plus contracts. Within fixed-price contracts, gross-cost contracted
firms are more efficient than net-cost contracted firms. The authors explain this
by the possible focus of net-cost contracted firms on revenue increase rather than
on cost-minimization and technical efficiency.
The superiority of fixed-price contracts in comparison to cost-plus contracts
in France is also determined in a study by Gagnepain and Ivaldi (2002b). They
evaluate short-run cost efficiency with seat-kilometer as output, taking the size
of vehicles into account.23
23See also Gagnepain and Ivaldi (2002a) for more information on their approach. It should be
noted that short-run cost functions must not be confused with variable cost functions. Short-
run cost functions can include both variable and fixed costs (Coelli et al., 2005, p. 27); it is
merely that some inputs are held fixed for the short run.
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Piacenza (2006) evaluates cost efficiency under fixed-price and cost-plus con-
tracts using a sample of 44 urban, intercity, and mixed operators in Italy; 6
also provide tram and railway services. Simplifying the supply structure, the
rail-bound services are included in the common bus output seat-kilometer. The
authors find increasing returns to scale (1.93 in the short-run, 1.83 in the long-
run) for a mean output level of 997 m seat-kilometer.
Concerning structural variables, mixed operators tend to have lower costs
than pure intercity operators, and pure intercity operators have lower costs than
pure urban operators. Increasing speed also brings cost reductions and costs are
decreasing over time. Piacenza (2006) and Roy and Yvrande-Billon (2007) also
find lower cost distortions for operators that are subject to fixed-price mecha-
nisms. This effect becomes stronger the more that time has elapsed since the
introduction of the contractual scheme. However, inefficiency in general increases
over time. The authors argue that some laxity of government accompanied by
extraordinary funds to cover old deficits support this regress.
Whereas Piacenza (2006) include dummies for urban and intercity operators,
Dalen and Go´mez-Lobo (2003) use two output variables for Norway to differen-
tiate between these two types of services. This differentiation is already justified
by the finding of stronger economies of scale in intercity services compared to ur-
ban services. The results indicate diseconomies of scope and that overall returns
to scale are 1.038.24 By contrast, Di Giacomo and Ottoz (2007) find economies
of scope and hence fixed cost savings for urban and intercity bus operators in
Italy.
Dalen and Go´mez-Lobo (2003) state that higher population densities and
industrialized areas exhibit higher costs whereas costs decrease in a centrality
index and for NSB ownership. They conclude that the introduction of high-
powered contracts based on yardstick regulation reduces operating costs. The
yardstick character is emphasized by the fact that the standard cost model is
then applied to all firms within a county. No clear conclusion can be drawn
about whether subsidy caps with decreasing subsidies are more efficient than the
original individual-bargaining scheme, due to the scheme’s recent introduction.
Summarizing the results of this review of SFA studies of regulatory contracts,
high-powered fixed-price schemes clearly have a significant positive impact on
costs. This is affirmed by a mixed DEA-SFA study by Margari et al. (2007)
using a panel of Italian companies. The authors separate inefficiency caused
by exogenous factors like regulation and network from management skills, and
conclude that pure managerial skills play a minor role.
Further research is necessary to analyze the different forms of high-powered
24The exact average output level for which the scale economies are calculated is not given in
the paper.
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schemes, e. g., gross-cost vs. net-cost contracts. As revenues play an important
role in net-cost contracts, it is important to rethink the traditional way of cal-
culating cost efficiency based on supply-oriented output measures.
1.3.5 Empirical Multi-Output Applications
Until now, I have reviewed only one study with multiple outputs: Dalen and
Go´mez-Lobo (2003). Each company in their sample produced both kinds of
urban and intercity bus services. In many cases, the local public transport
sector is far more complex. Rail-bound services play a major role, and not all
companies supply all kinds of output. The approach of Cambini et al. (2007) to
sum the output of bus and tram services in one variable is only possible when the
share of tram output is very low. The technology of rail-bound systems is unique
to each European city, e. g., London’s Underground and Paris’s Me´tro. German
cities are generally served by multi-product companies with tram systems as the
major transportation mean. In comparison to the role of rail-bound services, the
multi-product companies have not been mirrored in efficiency analysis. Table 1.4
lists some of the few existing multi-output studies sorted by date of publication.
In all studies, the data set contains some zero outputs. This implies that the
popular translog functional form is not suitable.
Evangelinos and Matthes (2009) describe the results of two separate analyses
for pure bus companies and bus and tram companies in Germany. The ease of this
approach is accompanied by the missing possibility of evaluating synergy effects.
The calculation of total factor productivity (TFP) shows a superior productivity
growth for multi-output companies. The authors find minor efficiency differences
between East and West German pure bus companies, but stronger differences for
multi-output companies, with the Western companies performing better.
Farsi et al. (2007) estimate a quadratic cost function for 16 Swiss urban
multi-output operators. The use of a quadratic function allows the consideration
of zero outputs without Box-Cox transformation. The authors’ cross-sectional
heteroscedastic regression model with autoregressive errors estimates an average
function, not an SFA frontier function. The results indicate decreasing costs
over time and the number of stops contributes to cost increases. Focusing on
the estimation of economies of scale and scope, the authors find product-specific
and global economies of scale and economies of scope.
Pioneering studies of multi-product local public transport providers have been
carried out by Viton (1992, 1993, 1997). Viton (1997) uses DEA to evaluate the
efficiency of US motor-bus and demand-responsive output providers. First, he
states that public and private systems share the same distribution of techni-
cal efficiency, but considering the high efficiency levels (80% of firms are fully
efficient), a critical note should be assigned to the high number of inputs and
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outputs used in his study. Since it is sufficient in DEA to outperform other firms
in one input-output ratio to reach an efficiency score of one, more inputs and
outputs used increase the mean efficiency.
Viton (1992, 1993) evaluates economies of scale and scope and gains from or-
ganizational restructuring in San Francisco’s Bay Area. Viton applies a quadratic
cost function to enable the inclusion of companies with zero outputs for some
of the outputs for motor-bus, rapid and commuter rail, streetcar, trolley-bus,
demand-responsive, and other means of public transport. The cost frontier is
estimated based on a pooled data set with observations from 1984 until 1986
following the cross-sectional model by Aigner et al. (1977), who first introduced
SFA. Viton finds that product-specific economies of scale with the exception of
motor-bus support the formation of larger entities. However, the exact effects
of consolidation depend on the resulting systemic wage, the output mix, and
the firm size. Whereas no potential merger would yield more than 8% savings,
a complete consolidation of all the San Francisco Bay Area’s seven operators
would increase costs.
1.3.6 Recommendations
The preceding subsections provide a descriptive overview of modern efficiency
analysis and its applications to local public transport. Brons et al. (2005) have
conducted a meta-regression analysis to identify determinants of efficiency of
local public transport operators. Using ordinary least squares (OLS), they con-
clude that efficiency values in time series and panel data applications are signif-
icantly higher than in cross-section studies. US studies report higher efficiency
predictions than European studies. DEA studies on the contrary report lower
efficiency predictions. The use of the outputs, passengers, vehicles, and seats
leads to lower efficiency predictions than the use of revenues. The number of in-
puts appears as a positive determinant of efficiency. Using weighted least squares
(WLS) with weighting for sample size as an alternative, US studies and the out-
put seats lose significance. In contrast the estimation of cost frontiers and the
sample size appear to be negative determinants of efficiency.
The results of this meta regression also appear valid for the more recent stud-
ies, e. g., the high efficiency values of Roy and Yvrande-Billon (2007) can be
attributed to the fact that the authors estimate a production function. While
production functions can be a useful alternative in cross-border benchmarking,
to avoid problems with different accounting rules, depreciations, exchange rates,
price deflators, and the like, it appears preferable to use monetary data in single-
country studies. Consistent efficiency analysis actually demands the use of price
deflators that correspond to the nature of the data, for example, using pro-
ducer price indices when cost efficiency is measured and, if available, price de-
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flators that correspond directly to the local public transport sector. There is a
general need for superior data quality and availability. Information about the
number of seats can take into account vehicle size. Lack of data may partially
explain the many blank spots on the map of efficiency analyses in local public
transport. Some Western European countries (Italy, Switzerland, and possibly
France and Norway) can be regarded as recent benchmarks for study availability
and methodological progress. For all intended studies, a careful collection of
variables, especially structural and environmental variables, is necessary to take
different production environments into account. Careful interpretation is impor-
tant, e. g., average speed has (justifiably) often been a network characteristic.
The vehicle utilization rate, closely related to average speed, can be seen as a
variable in the influence of management, because it considers vehicle deployment
times, repair times, scheduling, etc.
Methodological enhancements are also needed. Referring to environmental
variables, the use of conditional measures of efficiency in non-parametric studies
may be useful even compared to sophisticated two-, three-, or four-stage boot-
strapping approaches, because it does not assume separability between the input
and output space and the space of environmental variables (Daraio and Simar,
2007, pp. 95 ff.). According to the significant influence of panel data and non-
parametric methods on efficiency scores (Brons et al., 2005), the use of panel
data and the comparison of SFA and DEA studies must also be encouraged.
Additionally, the lack of multi-output studies is troublesome. Much research
is necessary to evaluate product-specific economies of scale and the different
kinds of economies of scope. The literature on cost savings from the combined
operation of bus and tram services is scant, and it is difficult to find evidence on
cost savings from the combined infrastructure and transport provision of tram
services in one company. Although economies of scale have been a natural point
of interest for researchers, as of yet no final conclusion has been reached on this
issue. I reiterate that much additional analysis is required to evaluate product-
specific economies of scale and identify all possible cost savings.
1.4 Structure of the Thesis
1.4.1 Contribution Part II: Efficiency
The efficiency analysis is the first scientific study in Germany that addresses
the market structure problem of inefficiency, particularly through small-scale
operations and the opportunities through mergers. I create a unique panel cost
data set with several hundred observations which was culled from firms’ financial
reports and statements.
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Cost Efficiency and Some of its Determinants
In Chapter 2, I use Stochastic Frontier Analysis to evaluate cost efficiency and
some of its determinants. A translog functional form, combined with different
econometric models, is applied on a reduced data set. A Random Effects model
pays tribute to the panel aspect of my data. A True Random Effects model
allows for the consideration of unobserved heterogeneity, likely to exist through
unobserved network characteristics. A Random Parameter model acknowledges
differences in products, in particular for tram and light railway services.
Mean efficiencies lie between 0.849 and 0.952, depending on the applied panel
data model. The inefficiency levels correspond to a savings potential between
1.40 and 4.43 bn EUR based on the 28.23 bn EUR total costs (in 2006 prices)
for 254 observations of 39 companies 1997–2006. I find a high degree of tramcar
utilization and a high outsourcing degree to be positive managerial determinants
of influence.
The result points to a successful outsourcing strategy of many companies
which have set up subsidiaries to benefit from lower wages. The significance
of the vehicle utilization rate points to network congestions that many firms
face. On tracks without separate railroad embankments motorized individual
traffic blocks trams. Main stops in the inner cities are overloaded. Political
support for measures against congestions is missing. The improvement potential
in management lies in the introduction of express lines, better scheduling and
maintenance, and so on.
Economies of Scale and Scope
The inefficiency levels found in the analysis of cost efficiency cannot fully explain
the low level of cost coverage in German local public transport. The obligation
to provide certain services in sparsely populated areas may play a role. I also
suspect the small-scaled market structure as another cause.
In Chapter 3, I use Stochastic Frontier Analysis to estimate economies of scale
and scope in German local public transport. The estimations are hence aligned
at optimal cost curves rather than econometric average curves. The analysis is
based on 573 observations of 82 single-product bus companies and multi-product
bus, tram, and light railway companies in 1997–2006. The results derived from
the quadratic function are consistent for both a Random and a True Random
Effects model: I find both bus-specific and rail-bound-specific increasing returns
to scale along with slight diseconomies of scope between the provision of bus and
tram and light railway services. Overall, there are substantial global economies
of scale, the main decision factor when mergers are considered.
Although the finding of slight diseconomies of scope supports that bus and
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rail-bound services should not be integrated on the cost side, there may be polit-
ical opposition to the cost of separation of services. The presence of rail-bound
increasing returns to scale and diseconomies of scope points to a structural prob-
lem for small tram and light railway systems in Germany, with the “Karlsruher
Modell” as solution.25 Two more conclusions can be drawn, directly relating to
two other chapters of the thesis. First, the presence of economies of scale has to
be kept in mind when competitive tendering is used (Chapter 5). Second, merg-
ers and acquisitions should be politically supported, particularly for companies
in geographical proximity. This proposal is pursued in Chapter 4.
Potential Gains from Mergers
In 2005, Bogetoft and Wang proposed a calculation scheme to analyze poten-
tial gains from hypothetical mergers using Data Envelopment Analysis. The
approach specifically addresses different firm characteristics and the fact that
mergers must be evaluated on a case-by-case basis.
Merger gains following Bogetoft and Wang (2005) are decomposed into indi-
vidual technical efficiency, synergy, and size effects. All three are summed into
overall merger gains, the latter two into real merger gains. From a methodologi-
cal point of view, I extend the framework to the use of bias correction by means of
bootstrapping when calculating merger gains and to alternative decompositions
of real merger gains.
I choose Nordrhein-Westfalen (North Rhine-Westphalia) as Germany’s most
densely populated region to represent the area where mergers could be most
promising. Forty-one companies are evaluated in 80 geographically meaningful
mergers. As the data set also contains small companies, the analysis is based
on physical data (in contrast to cost data such as in Chapters 2 and 3). I
form larger units by merging companies that operate partially on a joint tram
network, and select 14 as the ones with the highest real merger gains. The
empirical findings suggest that substantial gains up to 16% of factor inputs are
present, mainly resulting from synergy effects.26 Prominent examples for mergers
are the consolidation of municipal companies from Ko¨ln, Bonn, and Siegen, from
Du¨sseldorf, Krefeld, and Neuss, or from Duisburg, Mu¨lheim, Essen, Oberhausen,
and Moers.
25Karlsruhe, a city with 290 000 inhabitants in South-West Germany, was the first city that
connected its inner-city tram system with the regional rail network to provide direct connections
between rural locales and the city center.
26The definition of size and synergy gains is different from economies of scale and scope.
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1.4.2 Contribution Part III: Competition
Whereas efficiency analysis proves to be useful to analyze the problems of local
public transport in Germany and to suggest solutions, its application in practice
lags, in contrast to the energy and water distribution sectors. The regulation
discussion is driven by the state, federal, and European legislation. In Part III
of this thesis, I select two competition issues for further evaluation.
Operator Changes in Competitive Tendering
Absent the implementation of a yardstick regulation based on scientific effi-
ciency analysis, competitive tendering is another instrument to increase effi-
ciency in a sector. Competitive tendering of bus services in Germany is lim-
ited to Hessen and other areas such as the public transport associations around
Mu¨nchen (Mu¨nchner Verkehrsverbund – MVV) and around Hamburg (Ham-
burger Verkehrsverbund – HVV). The first results of competitive tendering in
bus service provision suggest decreasing subsidy requests, with the quality re-
maining stable or even increasing (Beck and Wanner, 2007, 2008; Wanner and
Zietz, 2008). However, typically for network industries in Germany, I diagnose
a lack of transparency. I access a 196 observations-data set with incumbent op-
erator, winner, the number of bidders, and several structural variables such as
the volume in terms of vehicles and the operation period. The data set makes
it possible to analyze the market structure and to identify structural conditions
that have a significant influence on the number of bidders and on an operator
change.
I show that the focus has been on regional services, which led to a loss in
market share for DB Stadtverkehr companies and gains for private companies,
whereas municipal companies have been spared. The high average number of
bidders (5.1) and the high probability of an operator change (58.2%) is positively
influenced by tendering in bigger volumes. With a mean of 11.4 and a maximum
of 58 vehicles, the tenders are rather small-scale compared to a mean fleet size of
184 buses in Chapter 3. Longer operation periods and tender in early years have
also been positively influencing an operator change. By contrast, complexity,
such as the number of lines and mixed urban and regional transports negatively
influence competition.
Prospects of Express Coach Services
Concerning the low level of cost coverage in German local public transport, the
problem is likely to be not only on the cost side but also on the revenue side.
This could entail higher fares and/or the development of new business segments,
such as express coach services. In Germany, these services historically have been
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heavily restricted by regulation to protect the national railway from competition.
The facilities and skills for the service provision are existent in local public and
integrated transport companies. In other countries, such as Great Britain or
Sweden, express coach services have shown higher profitability rates than other
transport services.
My analysis of external and internal costs shows that express coaches have
significant cost advantages that are intensified by the possible internalization
of external costs. To determine the possible demand, a survey of customers is
evaluated with a conjoint analysis. The results suggest a market share for express
coach services in Germany of at least 5.3%.
1.4.3 Concluding Remarks
The main contributions of this thesis are the application of state-of-the-art sci-
entific benchmarking methods to Germany’s local public transport and the en-
richment of the international discussion on efficiency in this important economic
sector. I apply Stochastic Frontier models which can account for unobserved
heterogeneity. The analysis is based on a unique cost data set with 573 obser-
vations specifically collected for this dissertation. I also combine a merger gain
decomposition based on Data Envelopment Analysis with bias correction. To
my knowledge, the econometric analysis of competitive tendering of bus services
is the first of its kind for Germany. The supply and demand analysis for express
coach services contributes real data to a policy debate that to a large degree
has been based upon anecdotal evidence. The dissertation supports five main
hypotheses:
1. Stochastic Frontier Analysis can serve as a useful tool to evaluate the effi-
ciency and its determinants of Germany’s local public transport.
2. Substantial economies of scale favor the formation of larger companies.
3. Nordrhein-Westfalen is one of the most appealing region for mergers and
substantial size and synergy gains can be expected.
4. Significant structural conditions in competitive tendering of bus services
favor operator changes, i. e., a long operation period and tendering in larger
volumes.
5. Express coach services have substantial external and internal cost advan-
tages compared to other means of transport, paired with a demand poten-
tial that is sufficient for the introduction of regular line services.
Part II
Efficiency
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Chapter 2
Cost Efficiency and Some of its
Determinants
2.1 Introduction
As local monopolies public transport networks are a natural point of interest
for researchers conducting efficiency analysis. The results of such analyses can
be very useful for yardstick competition among the transportation companies.
However scientific benchmarking has not yet found its way into practical reg-
ulation in Germany. Instead, competitive tendering, which is encouraged via
regulation (EC) No 1370/2007, is used to provide incentives for efficient trans-
port services, but only in some regions. Hence the question is what conclusions
can be drawn from applying efficiency analysis to local public transport. Two
possibilities emerge: evaluation of market structure and supporting strategic firm
decisions. This chapter focuses on the second point and evaluates cost efficiency
and some of its determinants for multi-output companies. Multi-output compa-
nies are those which provide bus services and tram, light railway, and metro (in
the sense of underground) services – aggregated as rail-bound services.1
The method used in this chapter is Stochastic Frontier Analysis. SFA is a
parametric benchmarking method which compares decision-making units rela-
tive to the best-practice peer. It does not assume, as does neoclassical theory
(Samuelson, 1983), that all players act optimally. I prefer SFA instead of Data
Envelopment Analysis mainly because of the applicability of panel data models
with SFA that incorporates the time horizon into the analysis. Furthermore,
SFA is very useful because of the possible derivations from the deployment of a
functional form, for example, significance levels, and because it can handle data
1The subsequent chapter is based on Walter (2009b).
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errors.2 Three SFA models are used in the following analysis because there is sub-
stantial difference in how they allow for unobserved heterogeneity and observed
heterogeneous output characteristics. Additionally, the vehicle utilization rate
and the outsourcing share are suspected to be determinants of efficiency which
are under the control of management. For these reasons the usual assumption
of independent and identically distributed inefficiencies may not be justifiable.
Since these managerial determinants are endogenous it may not be appropri-
ate to allow them to directly affect the mean of the inefficiency function, unlike
the treatment of exogenous variables in Battese and Coelli (1995). I therefore
follow the approach of Bhattacharyya et al. (1995) and Hadri et al. (2003b) who
include these managerial determinants as heteroscedastic variables in the ineffi-
ciency function, and then compare efficiency levels. The analysis is conducted
on a unique panel data set which has been collected for this research project and
represents the first of its kind for local public transport in Germany. For this
chapter, it consists of 254 observations for 39 multi-output companies from 1997
until 2006.
The importance of unobserved heterogeneity is emphasized by Cullmann et al.
(2009). They conduct international benchmarking on a Swiss-German data set.
Whereas I allow for heterogeneous output characteristics, they allow for hetero-
geneity in each variable of the distance function.
The remainder of this chapter is structured as follows: Section 2.2 provides
the functional form with its specification as well as the econometric models. Sec-
tion 2.3 describes the data in combination with the activity in the German local
public transport sector. Section 2.4 gives the results as well as their interpreta-
tion and Section 2.5 concludes.
2.2 Methodology
2.2.1 Cost Function
The application of a cost function requires the assumption of cost-minimizing
behavior with given input prices and output quantities (Coelli et al., 2005, p. 21).
Transport economists have typically applied a cost function3 instead of a profit
function, probably also due to data constraints. Nowadays, it is more difficult to
determine whether local public transport companies in Germany minimize costs
or maximize profits because of the increasing policy demands for fewer subsidies.
The exogeneity of output quantities can be justified with the definiteness of
2I am aware that the a priori assumption of a special functional form imposes some re-
strictions on the analysis. See Greene (2008) for an in-depth introduction of the econometric
approach to efficiency analysis.
3See Berechman (1993, pp. 111 ff.) for an introduction.
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the supplied area, typical for a local monopoly, and the requirement to supply,
because local transport is a public service obligation. In this case, a total cost
(C) function can be written as
C = f(Y,Q,wL, wK , ID,Dt) (2.1)
dependent on two outputs, the number of seat-kilometers for buses (Y ) and the
number of seat-kilometers in trams, light railways, and metros (Q),4 on two input
prices, for labor (wL) and capital (wK), on an inverse density index (ID) which
is beyond the firm’s control and on the time, represented by year dummies Dt5.
Seat-kilometers is preferred as output over vehicle-kilometers, because the size
of vehicles, a substantial cost driver, is then included. Both measures however
represent a pure supply side consideration of output. In contrast, passenger-
kilometers, passengers, or revenues also take demand into account. In the liter-
ature there is an intensive debate on the appropriate output specification (see
e. g., De Borger et al., 2002, or De Borger et al., 2008, in recent years). Man-
agement’s limited control over network and frequency planning, and political
considerations predominate today. The first competitive tenderings carried out
in the last decade have also mostly relied on gross contracts, leaving the revenue
risk to the public transport authority. Since this chapter evaluates management
performance, the use of demand-oriented output measures would punish man-
agement for requirements imposed by authorities. Hence, I follow Farsi et al.
(2006), Farsi et al. (2007), Margari et al. (2007), Piacenza (2006), and Roy and
Yvrande-Billon (2007) and use the supply-oriented measure, seat-kilometers. I
note that demand-oriented measures are only available as aggregates in the data
set and the cost of applying an aggregate for losing one output is too high and
would inadequately reflect the production technology of local public transport.
The year dummies capture technical progress and other unobserved year-
specific factors like changes in collective labor contracts. In contrast to a linear
time trend, year dummies assume that technical progress does not follow a lin-
ear trend, which is an unrealistic assumption in many cases. The effects of
technical progress are assumed to be neutral, thus affecting all firms equally.
The most commonly applied flexible functional forms are the first-order flexible
Cobb-Douglas and the second-order flexible translog functions. Both allow the
variables to enter the estimation in logs in contrast to the quadratic function,
which makes them linear in parameters and less fragile to extreme data points.
Increased flexibility is usually preferred if the function remains estimable. Ad-
ditionally, the Cobb-Douglas function follows the same returns to scale for all
4Including both sitting and standing room.
5Following Farsi et al. (2005a) and Farsi and Filippini (2009).
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company sizes. As economies of scale have proven to vary across output levels
in central European local public transport studies (see for example Farsi et al.,
2007), this restriction should be avoided if possible. The translog function ap-
plied here requires the approximation at a local point which is chosen to be the
mean following Farsi et al. (2008). The median is less influenced by extreme
outliers, whereas the mean reflects better the actual position of all data points
in the sample. Hence, all variables have been corrected at the point of approx-
imation (Farsi et al., 2005b). After imposing the linear homogeneity in input
prices of degree one by dividing costs and the capital price by the factor price
for labor,6 the function can be written as
ln C∗it = ln
Cit
wLit
= α+ βY ln Yit + βQ ln Qit + βK ln
wKit
wLit
+
1
2
(
βY Y (ln Yit)2 + βQQ(ln Qit)2 + βKK
(
ln
wKit
wLit
)2)
+ βY Q ln Yit ln Qit + βY K ln Yit
wKit
wLit
+ βQK ln Qit
wKit
wLit
+ βID IDit +
10∑
t=2
βtDt
(2.2)
with α representing an intercept term, i = 1, 2, ..., 39 denoting the company and
t = 1, 2, ..., 10 denoting the year (for the year dummies, t = 1 (1997) is the
omitted year to avoid collinearity).
2.2.2 Econometric Models
The focus here is on Stochastic Frontier models exploiting the panel structure of
the data. The first proposed models were the Random Effects (RE) model (Pitt
and Lee, 1981) and the Fixed Effects (FE) model (Schmidt and Sickles, 1984).
Since the amount of within variation in the data is considerably low (at most 6%
within variation based on overall variation for costs, outputs, and the remaining
factor price)7 and the Fixed Effects model does not allow the incorporation
of efficiency determinants as heteroscedastic factors in the inefficiency function
(Kumbhakar and Lovell, 2000, p. 123), I do not consider the Fixed Effects model
6The other properties of the cost function, e. g., that all costs have to be strictly positive,
are verified in Sections 2.3 and 2.4.
7I calculated the within variation following Farsi et al. (2005a). For further discussion see
also Farsi et al. (2005b).
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in the following.8 This chapter uses the RE model and its advancements. The
Stochastic Frontier RE model as suggested by Pitt and Lee (1981) interprets
the panel data random effects as inefficiency. Thus it does not account for firm
heterogeneity and the inefficiency measure is time-invariant. Moreover it assumes
the explanatory variables to be uncorrelated with the firm-specific effects. The
details of the RE model estimated in this chapter are as follows:
ln C∗it = α+ x
′
itβ + vit + ui (2.3)
with x′itβ representing the parameters and the coefficients to be estimated from
Equation 2.2 and a normal-half-normal distribution of the stochastic term. The
time-variant, firm-specific error part vit ∼ iid N (0, σ2v) is independently and
identically distributed. ui represents the non-negative, time-invariant, firm-
specific inefficiency component. The usual assumption is that ui is also indepen-
dently and identically distributed, particularly when there is no evidence about
internal firm determinants. In this case, the outsourcing share and the vehicle
utilization rate are suspected to be such factors. Including these factors directly
in the mean of the inefficiency function as Battese and Coelli (1995) for environ-
mental factors would raise the endogeneity discussion in applied econometrics,
although endogeneity does not appear to have the same effect in SFA compared
to the econometric estimation of average functions (Coelli, 2000). The approach
followed here is to include the managerial determinants zi as heteroscedastic
variables in the inefficiency function, directly parameterizing the variance of the
inefficiency. Formally, σ2ui = exp(γ
′zi) with γ′ including an estimated coefficient
for an intercept.9 Such an approach is used by Bhattacharyya et al. (1995).10
zi are the degree of tramcar utilization and the outsourcing grade and should
be “... variables related to characteristics of firm management ...” according
to Hadri et al. (2003b, p. 206). These authors combine the approach with the
Battese and Coelli (1995) model, not followed here.
Introducing heteroscedasticity, the mean of ui then becomes to E(ui) =
σui
ϕ(0)
φ(0) = 0.798 · σui (where ϕ is the probability density function of the nor-
8I will also discard a pooled model (Aigner et al., 1977, and Meeusen and van den Broeck,
1977) and the so-called time-varying inefficiency model (see Kumbhakar, 1990, and Battese
and Coelli, 1992). The pooled model considers each observation as independent and does not
allow for firm heterogeneity which is obviously not suitable to the data set. The time-varying
inefficiency models assume inefficiency to change systematically over time, which is often not
the case in reality, for example due to technological or economic shocks.
9I also estimated a RE model in which I allowed for heteroscedasticity in the stochastic
error term by letting the variance of it being dependent on the total volume of seat-kilometers.
However, this parameter has not proven to be significant.
10See also Wang (2003), for an application of heteroscedastic variables to financing-
constrained investment using SFA.
42 COST EFFICIENCY AND SOME OF ITS DETERMINANTS
mal distribution and φ is the cumulative distribution function of the normal
distribution) (Greene, 2007a, pp. E33-38 ff.).
This approach is especially useful when the instrumental variable approach
is not suitable, for example due to data constraints. Two-stage estimations also
have not proven to be a generally accepted solution in such cases.
This RE model is estimated using the maximum likelihood method. From
the composed error term, the inefficiencies are attained through the Jondrow
et al. (1982) estimator which uses the conditional mean of the inefficiency term
E[ui|ui+vit]. Disadvantageous to the RE model, the inefficiency is time-invariant
and unobserved heterogeneity (likely to exist through the omittance of structural
variables for network shapes, altitude differences, environmental conditions, etc.)
is not accounted for.
The limitations of the RE model can be overcome with the True Random
Effects (TRE) model proposed by Greene (2004, 2005b). The details of the TRE
model (also known as Random Constant model) estimated in this chapter are as
followed:
ln C∗it = α0 + αi + x
′
itβ + vit + uit (2.4)
with α = α0+αi, α0 representing the firm-invariant intercept, αi ∼ iid N (0, σ2α)
and representing a firm-specific random intercept term to capture unobserved
heterogeneity, vit ∼ iid N (0, σ2v) and uit representing the non-negative, time-
variant, firm-specific inefficiency component. There are major differences to
the RE model. First, the TRE model has a random intercept being normally
distributed and capturing unobserved time-invariant heterogeneity. Second, the
inefficiency term is time-variant, allowing a much more realistic image of reality.
Third, it also assumes the explanatory variables to be uncorrelated with the
firm-specific effects, which may be an unrealistic assumption. However, as Farsi
et al. (2005b) point out, at least time-variant efficiency measures are not very
sensitive to such a correlation because such correlations may be captured by the
coefficients of the cost function and do not affect residuals.
The conditional expectation of the inefficiency term E[uit|rit] with rit =
αi+uit+vit is calculated by Monte Carlo simulations (Greene, 2005a) in order to
be able to approximate the maximization of the log-likelihood (Greene, 2005b).
All estimations for this model are done in one step. Apart from this, the model
is very similar to that proposed by Kumbhakar (1991), also applied by Kumb-
hakar and Hjalmarsson (1995), who use a two-step estimation. The estimations
presented in the following again allow for heteroscedasticity in the inefficiency
component, so that σ2uit = exp(γ
′zit). The model is a special case of the Random
Parameter (RP) model. An RP model with not only random intercept, but also
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random output parameter is the third model estimated in this chapter. The ran-
domness of output parameters is justified by the different technological systems
summarized in the rail-bound output category. A relatively slow overground
tram in Dresden definitely uses a different technology than a metro-similar light
railway system in Stuttgart, with lots of tunnels and a railroad embankment sep-
arated from motorized individual transport (MIT). Furthermore, the track gauge
of tram systems differs from 1000 mm (Meterspur) to 1435 mm standard railway
gauge in Germany. A gauge of only 1000 mm leads to a constant disadvantage
in service provision as vehicles have to be smaller with smaller gauges. The
heteroscedastic specification is the same as for the TRE model. All the models
estimated here assume that the regressors are uncorrelated with the explanatory
variables.11
2.3 Data
The data set consists of an unbalanced panel of 254 observations of German
multi-output local public transport operators from 1997 until 2006. In total, 39
companies are included with a mean of 6.5 observations per company.12 The
physical data (output quantities, input quantities, etc.) was taken from the
annual VDV statistics (Verband Deutscher Verkehrsunternehmen, 2007b, and
preceding years). All monetary data was extracted separately from annual re-
ports. Table 2.1 shows the descriptive statistics for the data set. The monetary
values are given in 2006 prices and inflated by the German producer price index
(Statistisches Bundesamt, 2008). Total expenditures include: labor, materials,
other operating expenses, depreciation, interest on borrowed capital, and oppor-
tunity costs of capital. Cost of equity was not directly available from the data
set, and was calculated by taking the equity base for each company and year
and multiplying by the interest rates for corporate bonds at that time plus 2%
risk premium (source for interest rates: Deutsche Bundesbank, 2007). Notably
this approach treats all companies equally. This may be justified by the public
ownership of the vast majority of Germany’s local public transport companies.
For the purpose of calculating factor prices, all cost items except labor costs
are included into capital and operating expenses. The shares for personnel costs
as well as capital and operating expenses show a relatively wide range from 0.19
to 0.62 and 0.38 to 0.81, respectively. The reason for this is outsourcing of
services to private partners and particularly to privately organized subsidiaries,
11For a more detailed and structured overview of panel data models see the publications by
Farsi et al., for example 2006.
12The exact data structure is as follows: 1997: 22 obs. (observations), 1998 and 1999: 23 obs.,
2003: 24 obs., 2004 and 2006: 25 obs., 2000 and 2005: 26 obs., 2002: 29 obs., and 2001: 31 obs.
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Table 2.1: Descriptive statistics for multi-product companies
Suma Min. Mean Median Max. Std. dev.
Total cost (C) 2823 12 111 70 363 87
[m EUR]
Share personnel costs . 0.19 0.46 0.46 0.62 0.08
Share capital costs . 0.38 0.54 0.54 0.81 0.08
Labor price (wL) . 30 639 49 636 50 409 82 610 8714
[EUR/FTE]
Capital price (wK) . 934 1917 1679 5064 766
[EUR/seat]
Output [m seat-km]
Bus (Y ) 17 122 4 656 459 2303 503
Rail-bound (Q) 27 482 50 1018 644 4800 974
Inverse density . 138 862 787 2958 458
index (ID)b
Outsourcing share . 0.00 0.16 0.12 0.59 0.19
(OUT )c,d
Railcar utilization . 47.33 135.66 128.11 250.23 39.27
rate (UR)d,e
Vehicles
Bus 3650 2 146 103 470 106
Rail-bound 2855 6 124 85 513 106
aSum values for 2006, bInhabitants per km network length, cBased on total costs, dCalculated over 254
observations (note that the Random Effects model uses group means in z-variables), eVehicle-km per day and vehicle
Source: Own calculation
which often employ significant amounts of transport labor. In the profit and loss
accounts, expenses for such employment are classified as expenses for purchased
services.
The labor price is calculated as personnel costs divided by the number of
full-time-equivalents (FTEs). The high range from 30 639 to 82 610 EUR is
related to regional wage differences, different age structures, outsourcing of low-
paid functions, and different handling of pension accruals. The capital price
is calculated as residual costs (total costs minus personnel costs) divided by a
measure of capital quantity, the number of seats in buses and rail-bound cars
(both standing and sitting), following Farsi et al. (2007). The number of seats
was not directly available from the VDV statistics, but approximated by the
number of seat-kilometers multiplied by the number of buses and cars divided
by the number of vehicle-kilometers. The underlying assumption is that the
deployment of each bus and railcar is uniformly distributed.
Assuming a common factor price for capital and operations for both kinds
of outputs has two shortcomings. First, buses and rail-bound cars are treated
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equally which may diverge from actual fixed and variable costs proportions.
Second, dividing by the number of seats is a pure capital measure neglecting
operational costs like energy costs. However, absent more detailed information
about the structure of non-personnel costs, this is the best approach available.
The two outputs are seat-kilometers in buses and seat-kilometers in rail-bound
cars. Tram, light railway, and metro services are not split into different outputs
because there is no clear definitional separation between these services and tran-
sitions are smooth.13 The inverse density index is defined as population in the
supplied area divided by the sum of bus line length and rail-bound track length.14
Turning to the heteroscedastic variables, the outsourcing share is defined as
purchased services (part of material costs) divided by total costs. According to
the German Commercial Code, purchases, e. g., for energy or line services, are
always considered material costs. The outsourcing share has steadily increased
from 0.09 in 1997 to 0.24 in 2006.15 Some companies like Leipziger Verkehrs-
betriebe and Verkehrsgesellschaft Frankfurt have founded subsidiaries for bus
and tram operations. The subsidiaries Leobus and Leipziger Stadtverkehrsver-
triebe (LSVB) and In-der-City-Bus pay lower wages that are not bound to civil
service tariffs.16 These subsidiary operations have been classified as purchased
services. This can also be seen in the correlation matrix in Table 2.2. The cap-
ital price and the outsourcing share show a relatively high correlation (0.663)
because outsourcing shifts personnel costs into the capital block. With the cap-
ital quantity remaining unchanged, a higher capital price without any real price
increases results. This favors companies with higher outsourcing shares almost
automatically because the capital price is assumed to be exogenous in the cost-
function specification. Hence, a higher capital price explains the variation of the
dependent variable and firms become more efficient.
This potential bias could be overcome with the introduction of a third factor
price for purchased services. Unfortunately no information is available for the
quantity of purchased services and the only price index would be a country-wide
13Tram services are usually characterized as pure overground services often with no sepa-
rate railroad embankment (from MIT). Examples include the major East German cities like
Dresden and Leipzig and the smaller West German cities. Light railway services are typically
characterized by higher average speeds and inner-city tunnels, although their overall operations
are similar to suburban tramways. In the 1970s, many bigger West German cities invested in
new infrastructure for light railways to transform their existing tram services.
14In a preliminary estimation I introduced the network length as alternative network variable.
This resulted in significance problems.
15I am aware that, in an unbalanced panel, this increase can also be due to the data structure,
e. g., firms in early years with low outsourcing share and firms in late years with high outsourcing
share. However, a closer look on the data provides no evidence to defend this hypothesis.
16LVB achieved an outsourcing share of approximately 59% in 2006 with 133 m EUR of
purchased services.
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Table 2.2: Data correlations
Y Q wL wK ID OUT UR
C 0.837 0.920 0.242 0.218 0.227 0.208 0.357
Y 0.707 0.253 0.007 0.060 0.131 0.342
Q 0.105 0.061 0.239 0.110 0.335
wL 0.201 0.083 0.268 0.226
wK 0.154 0.663 0.501
ID -0.123 0.082
OUT 0.391
Source: Own calculation
one assigning a common factor price to all companies. Therefore, the results must
be interpreted with care. On the other hand, some concurrent tendencies in the
covered period may partially explain the high correlation, e. g., the capital price
includes purchased energy which showed a steady price increase in past years,
corresponding to an increasing outsourcing share. Furthermore this is a luxury
problem in comparison to the evaluation of technical efficiencies with production
or distance functions which very often neglect the presence of outsourcing.
The second heteroscedastic component is the vehicle utilization rate of rail-
cars per day defined as vehicle-kilometers divided by the number of railcars and
365 days. The broad range from 47.33 for Jena in 199717 to 250.23 for Ober-
hausen (STOAG – Stadtwerke Oberhausen) in 2005 indicates an improvement
potential. The indicator is a measure for the actual deployment time and for
the average speed of these transport systems.18 The low correlation coefficient
between the utilization rate and the inverse density index (0.082) shows that
a low utilization rate is mostly unrelated to congestion costs, and may be re-
lated instead to technological constraints and network characteristics which are
supposed to be manageable, at least in the long-term, especially for the munic-
ipal owners of local public transport firms. The utilization rate is furthermore
also related to pure managerial factors like maintenance time planning, vehicle
scheduling, and to a certain degree peak demand levels, which are outside the
influence of the management. For these reasons I use the utilization rate as in-
1747.33 relies on construction activities in Jena’s inner city in 1997, though many tram services
were replaced by bus services in that year. The second-lowest value is 72.98 with similar other
values in the near range.
18A similar vehicle utilization rate could be calculated for bus operations. However, I was
not able to estimate a model in which all managerial variables, outsourcing share, utilization
rate for railcars and vehicle utilization rate for buses, were significant. This may be due to
the high dependency between outsourcing and bus utilization. Many firms employ small- and
medium-sized bus companies from the surrounding areas that can be called up on short notice
as subcontractors.
COST EFFICIENCY AND SOME OF ITS DETERMINANTS 47
fluenceable by management, acknowledging that it could also be interpreted as
exogenous (e. g., Piacenza, 2006).
It would be nice to have data on the quality of services. Nowadays, many
buses are low-floor buses for ease of entry and exit. No consistent data basis for
amenities such as the availability of air conditioning exists. I can deduce from
the data that speed matters, causing many potential customers to choose private
auto over local transport.
Although the data offers rich interpretation possibilities, there are some as-
pects to consider. First, the asset valuation excludes subsidies from the public
sector (and hence distorts the opportunity cost of capital) and second, the land
for stops and the road bed is very often public property. Still, it is valuable to
examine total costs instead of variable costs, because the measure of efficiency
can be biased when looking only at parts of the total costs.
2.4 Results and Interpretation
2.4.1 Regression Results
Table 2.3 shows the regression results for the Random Effects (RE), for the
True Random Effects (TRE) and for the Random Parameter (RP) models.19
All first-order coefficients show the expected signs and are significant at the
1% level. The positive coefficients of output quantities and input prices verify
the non-decreasing-conditions of the cost function. All model parameters are
in logs, so the output coefficients can be interpreted as cost elasticities at the
local point of approximation, which is represented here by the mean. Across
all models, the cost elasticities for rail-bound services are substantially higher
(between 0.493 and 0.500) than for bus services (between 0.387 and 0.430).20
An additional seat-kilometer in a bus is hence approximately 25% cheaper than
in a tram, light railway, or metro. This may be reflected by the high fixed-cost
proportion in rail-bound services for the network and the cars which are mostly
custom-made for each single operator. These higher cost elasticities accompany
the greater comfort of rail-bound cars which are wider and quieter.
The capital price coefficient varies slightly around 0.47, closely representing
19I have conducted the estimations with Limdep 9.0, using 1000 Halton draws for the RP
models after initial estimations using 50 Halton draws. Accuracy, as Train (2003) points out,
improves with an increasing number of Halton draws.
20The random output coefficients of the RP model hereby should be interpreted with care,
because, through the randomization, there is no unique parameter to assess, only a mean
coefficient given.
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Table 2.3: Regression results for the translog cost function
Model RE TRE RP
Parameter Estimate Estimate Estimate
α −0.105∗∗ 0.036 0.013
(0.044) (0.022) (0.020)
σα . 0.095∗∗∗ 0.096∗∗∗
. (0.004) (0.004)
βY 0.430∗∗∗ 0.406∗∗∗ 0.387∗∗∗
(0.053) (0.008) (0.007)
σβY . . 0.103
∗∗∗
. . (0.005)
βQ 0.494∗∗∗ 0.500∗∗∗ 0.493∗∗∗
(0.026) (0.007) (0.006)
σβQ . . 0.030
∗∗∗
. . (0.003)
βK 0.464∗∗∗ 0.467∗∗∗ 0.473∗∗∗
(0.040) (0.011) (0.010)
βY Y 0.145∗∗ 0.165∗∗∗ 0.159∗∗∗
(0.071) (0.007) (0.006)
βQQ 0.151∗∗∗ 0.150∗∗∗ 0.162∗∗∗
(0.038) (0.008) (0.007)
βKK 0.381∗ 0.276∗∗∗ 0.252∗∗∗
(0.230) (0.047) (0.044)
βY Q −0.098∗∗ −0.149∗∗∗ −0.152∗∗∗
(0.049) (0.008) (0.008)
βY K 0.061 0.019 0.024
(0.059) (0.019) (.018)
βQK −0.058 −0.058∗∗∗ −0.059∗∗∗
(0.040) (0.018) (0.017)
β1998 −0.058 −0.033 −0.032
β1999 −0.057 −0.041 −0.041
β2000 −0.098∗∗ −0.074∗∗ −0.073∗∗∗
β2001 −0.126∗∗∗ −0.091∗∗∗ −0.091∗∗∗
β2002 −0.160∗∗∗ −0.121∗∗∗ −0.122∗∗∗
β2003 −0.212∗∗∗ −0.162∗∗∗ −0.161∗∗∗
β2004 −0.235∗∗∗ −0.186∗∗∗ −0.186∗∗∗
β2005 −0.236∗∗∗ −0.182∗∗∗ −0.183∗∗∗
β2006 −0.237∗∗∗ −0.184∗∗∗ −0.185∗∗∗
βID 0.064∗∗ 0.047∗∗∗ 0.050∗∗∗
(0.029) (0.008) (0.008)
γ0 . 6.072∗∗∗ 6.134∗∗∗
. (1.616) (1.563)
γOUT . −0.260∗ −0.252∗
. (0.145) (0.134)
γUR −2.744 −6.749∗∗∗ −6.722∗∗∗
(2.331) (2.037) (1.970)
σu 0.714 0.035 0.036
λ = σu/σv 12.948 0.799 0.888
∗∗∗Significant at 1%, ∗∗significant at 5%, ∗significant at 10%; Standard errors in
parentheses, omitted for year dummies for reasons of space
Source: Own calculation
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the 54% share of capital and operational costs.21 The year dummies are signifi-
cantly negative from 2000 on, suggesting cost decreases because of technological
progress between 7 and 10% in comparison to 1997. Further cost decreases are
observable until 2004 when cost savings between 18 and 23% are established. Af-
terwards the level remains stable. This trend is obviously not linear, leading my
preliminary estimations with a linear time trend to implausible results. Applying
the approach by Saal et al. (2007) and allowing for technical change to vary with
input and output levels did not produce significant interaction terms between
independent variables and time. The technological progress may be represented
by new buses and tramcars, e. g., East Germany’s old Tatra tramcars have been
replaced. The use of innovative information technology may also play a role.
The coefficient of the inverse density index is significantly positive indicating
that higher population per network length leads to higher costs, for example
through reduced speed in urban areas, wait times at traffic lights, higher wages,
and so on. The inverse density index can be seen as an efficiency determinant
outside the influence of management.
The coefficient of the second derivative of the cost function with respect to
the capital price is positive across all models, violating the concavity property of
the cost function (Cornes, 1992, p. 106). According to Farsi et al. (2005b) and
Farsi and Filippini (2009), this may originate from some constraints in the cost-
minimizing strategy. For instance, competitive pressure may not be too strong
and responses to input prices are quite small. The reasons are that publicly
owned local transport firms are vulnerable to political concerns and the transfer
of losses from municipalities and affiliated energy companies.
I will next consider the model-specific heteroscedastic (z-) variables and the
random parameter. There are two heteroscedastic variables: outsourcing rate
and tramcar utilization. These variables are not significant for the RE model. I
conducted likelihood-ratio tests in order to check the explanatory power of the
heteroscedastic variables. A model with tramcar utilization rate (UR) as only
heteroscedastic variable is preferred to a basic model without heteroscedastic-
ity at a p-value of 1.4%. Adding the outsourcing share does not lead to any
improvement and is rejected at a p-value of 99.1%. The coefficient for UR is
negative suggesting that firms with high utilization rates tend to have less vari-
ability in efficiency; hence it appears to introduce planning reliability (see Hadri
et al., 2003a, on how to interpret heteroscedastic variables). For the TRE and
RP models, Wald tests have been used to check for the explanatory power of the
heteroscedastic components. The hypothesis that the coefficient of the tramcar
utilization rate is equal to zero is rejected at a p-value of 0% for both models.
21Through imposing the linear homogeneity in input prices, a labor price coefficient of 0.53
follows.
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Table 2.4: Descriptive efficiencies
Model RE TRE RP
Minimum 0.650 0.855 0.844
Mean 0.862 0.952 0.949
Median 0.866 0.960 0.954
Maximum 0.990 0.993 0.993
Standard deviation 0.090 0.031 0.032
No. of efficiencies 39 254 254
Source: Own calculation
The hypothesis that the coefficient of the outsourcing share is zero is rejected
at p-values of 7.3 and 6.7% respectively. The coefficient for both models is also
significantly negative, meaning that a higher outsourcing share leads to less vari-
ability in efficiency. The delegation of services to third parties on short notice
appears to reduce risks and introduces stability in economic efficiency.
The random output parameters for the RP model are both significant, sup-
porting the use of this model. The variation for bus services appears to be even
higher than for tram, light railway, and metro services. This can be related inter
alia to the deployment of standard and articulated buses.
2.4.2 Efficiencies
Table 2.4 shows statistics for the efficiency predictions. Efficiency predictions
are given as levels in a range between greater than 0 and 1. The cost savings
potential is given by the difference from 1, that is, a global minimum efficiency
level of 0.650 means 35% excess costs.
As expected, the mean for the RE model is much lower than for the TRE
model, because the latter treats all persistent inefficiency (as Kumbhakar, 1991,
calls it) as unobserved heterogeneity. From the descriptive statistics, the TRE
model and the RP model appear quite similar with a slightly higher standard
deviation of efficiency predictions for the RP model which allows more diversity.
As Farsi and Filippini (2009) point out, the true efficiencies should lie somewhere
between the RE model, which is supposed to underestimate efficiency, and the
TRE model, which is supposed to overestimate efficiency. The happy medium is
around 0.9, which is in a realistic albeit relatively high range. Restructuring and
increased cost efficiencies throughout Germany appear to be somehow success-
ful. An example for substantial efficiency differences between the two models is
Bremer Straßenbahnen AG (BSAG) with an efficiency prediction of 0.768 in the
RE model and up to 0.957 for 2005 in the TRE model. The question remains
whether this is related to unobserved heterogeneity (Bremen’s tram system does
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Table 2.5: Efficiency correlations
Model RE TRE RP
RE 100.00% 95.58% 96.11%
TRE 100.00% 98.52% [98.75%]
RP 100.00%
Based on average firm values (39 obs.), in brackets based on all observations
Source: Own calculation
not rely on a sophisticated infrastructure with tunnels, etc.) or if it is persis-
tent inefficiency. Interestingly, in 2005 BSAG achieved a very low level of cost
coverage of only 50.95%.22
The value of 0.9 also corresponds to the mean efficiency at the outset of in-
centive regulation for German electricity and gas distribution companies (Agrell
et al., 2008a,b, taking a best-of value of SFA and DEA values), which makes
this number a reasonable value for local network monopolies. The inefficiencies
refer to a savings potential of 1.40 to 4.43 bn EUR in 2006 prices, depending on
the applied panel data model, for all 254 observations from 1997 until 2006. I
note that for the TRE model at least 117 m EUR could have been saved by the
25 firms considered in 2006.23
Table 2.5 shows the efficiency correlations with high consistencies. The rank
correlations shown in Table 2.6 show similar results. However, a comparison of
individual efficiency levels (mean over years) in Figure 2.1 shows that unobserved
heterogeneity plays an important role for some specific firms with differences up
to 20% between the RE and TRE models.
A detailed look at the Kernel Density Estimate in Figure 2.2 also shows that
the distribution of efficiency predictions differs most between the RE and the
other two models. All curves suggest the efficiency to be negatively skewed
which is the usual assumption in Stochastic Cost Frontier models. The bimodal
distribution in the RE model however goes against the assumption of a half-
normally distributed inefficiency. As Farsi and Filippini (2009, p. 313) point out,
this may be explained by “... cost differences that are not due to inefficiencies but
to other external factors.” In such a case, a RE model would not be appropriate
for the given data.
I now look at the efficiency determinants under managerial control, the out-
sourcing share and the vehicle utilization rate. To check whether observations
22Calculated as revenues (corrected from subsidies) divided by the total cost definition applied
here.
23Savings potential is calculated as the sum of individual inefficiency scores multiplied by
individual total costs.
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Table 2.6: Rank correlations
Model RE TRE RP
RE 100.00% 94.99% 95.50%
TRE 100.00% 97.70% [98.77%]
RP 100.00%
Based on average firm values (39 obs.), in brackets based on all observations
Source: Own calculation
Figure 2.1: Comparison of efficiency predictions
Source: Own calculation
with low values of these indicators really are less efficient, I split the sample into
values below and values equal or above the median (for both indicators). Mean
efficiencies for these sub samples are given in Table 2.7. In all three models,
mean efficiencies for low outsourcing shares and low vehicle utilization rates are
significantly lower. For the outsourcing share the differences in mean efficien-
cies are somehow lower (between 0.007 and 0.019) resulting in p-values between
0.0002 and 0.0198. These p-values are still low enough to reject the hypothesis
of equal distribution of efficiency values in the groups with low respectively high
outsourcing share. Outsourcing therefore appears to increase efficiency. Still,
this variable has to be interpreted carefully. Compared with the vehicle utiliza-
tion rate, higher values do not necessarily mean better values, for there could be
an optimal outsourcing grade.
The results are even clearer for the vehicle utilization rate. Differences in
mean efficiencies of the group with a low vehicle utilization rate compared to the
group with a high vehicle utilization rate account for approximately 0.03-0.07,
depending on the applied panel data model. These distribution differences are
all significant with very low p-values. Higher values of the railcar utilization rate
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Figure 2.2: Kernel density of efficiency predictions
Source: Own calculation
have a positive influence on efficiency, as expected. This is related to higher
average speeds, better deployment times, and lower maintenance and stop times
and costs. The effect on efficiency also appears to be stronger than for the
outsourcing share.
2.5 Conclusion
In this chapter, I estimated state-of-the-art models of Stochastic Frontier Analy-
sis incorporating unobserved heterogeneity and allowing for heteroscedasticity in
the inefficiency function. Incorporating unobserved heterogeneity is important
when the data set omits environmental/structural variables which are likely to
influence the production process. This is an important application, although I
also showed that observed heterogeneity plays a significant role as well. The
inverse density index defined as population living in the network area has a
cost-increasing influence.
Two efficiency determinants under managerial control were included as het-
eroscedastic variables in the inefficiency function. I conducted tests on the in-
fluence of these managerial determinants on mean efficiencies of groups with
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Table 2.7: Efficiency comparisons and Kruskal-Wallis tests
Model RE TRE RP
Outsourcing (OUT )
Mean efficiency for low OUT 0.837 0.948 0.944
Mean efficiency for high OUT 0.855 0.955 0.953
χ21-value 5.432 9.712 14.353
Probability 1.98% 0.18% 0.02%
Vehicle utilization (UR)
Mean efficiency for low UR 0.811 0.936 0.934
Mean efficiency for high UR 0.881 0.967 0.963
χ21-value 34.979 63.114 52.008
Probability 0.01% 0.01% 0.01%
Low and high groups with 127 obsservations each, split at the median of the efficiency determinant
Source: Own calculation
high vs. low outsourcing and high vs. low vehicle utilization. All Kruskal-Wallis
tests indicated that the high values show a higher efficiency distribution. This
implies great potential for improvements. Optimization of outsourcing should
be in focus for businessmen emphasized for firms that have neglected it in the
past. The options include establishing subsidiaries or cooperating with small-
and medium-sized firms. The vast differences in the vehicle utilization rate for
railcars (shown in the descriptive data statistics) are somewhat surprising. Im-
provement options can be related to enhancing speed through infrastructure
measures (separate rail embankments, prioritization at traffic lights, tunnels in
inner-city areas, new tracks, express trains similar to those in Karlsruhe, etc.).
Furthermore maintenance times could be reduced and procurement optimized.
In an international context, the analysis shows how cost efficiency and hence
economic success of local public transport relates to the utilization degree of
vehicles. For example, local public transport must achieve intermodally com-
petitive average speeds, supported by adequate transport planning and policy
measures.
Considering Germany’s low mean level of cost coverage with 73.8% (Verband
Deutscher Verkehrsunternehmen, 2008), the problem is likely to extend beyond
the cost side. I found mean efficiencies roughly about 0.9, meaning that full
efficiency would also imply a negative level of cost coverage. Some past improve-
ments have often been attributed to wage reductions. The revenue side should
bear further optimization potential and should be analyzed in the future. These
results impact corporate strategies and point to the need for a comprehensive,
national regulation.
Chapter 3
Economies of Scale and Scope
3.1 Introduction
Germany’s urban public transport is undergoing industry consolidation at the
same time that changes in structure and market rules are occurring. A frag-
mented market comprising several 1000 companies has begun to alter due to
the mergers and acquisitions of neighboring companies and efforts by firms with
strong capital bases seeking opportunities for growth. Moreover, tenders have
become an instrument for introducing market competition. In the past, large
shares of local public transport services have been financed by subsidies from
public authorities. However, in the present budgetary crisis, public transport is
under pressure to operate as efficiently as possible.1
The purpose of this chapter is to determine these efficient structures from
two angles: First, to evaluate scale economies, i. e., if existing services in larger
entities could be produced at less cost; second, to determine the appropriate
economies of scope, i. e., the cost savings from the combined services or prod-
ucts. There are various types of economies of scope in transport. Here I refer
to economies of scope from producing bus services on the one hand and tram
and light railway services on the other hand together.2 The approach to the
estimation of economies of scale and scope applied in this chapter follows three
guidelines:
1. Econometric cost functions are applied. The major requirement for such
an analysis is the availability of a consistent and sufficiently large enough
panel data set containing information about cost items and production
1The subsequent chapter is based on Walter (2009a).
2This chapter does not address economies of scope in the sense of potential savings between
the tram network and the actual service provision, as is often performed for railways. This
chapter assumes integration (status quo in Germany).
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quantities of urban public transport operators. Such a data set has not
been available in the past. This thesis is the first empirical application of
this kind for Germany.
2. Historically, analysis relied on the estimation of average functions with ordi-
nary least squares or panel data models (see Berechman, 1993, pp. 111 ff.,
for an introduction). Employing Stochastic Frontier Analysis allows re-
searchers to estimate for the optimal (frontier) cost levels and acknowledge
the presence of firms’ inefficiency. Since economies of scale and scope are
used to determine the optimal market structure, it appears natural to do
this with optimal cost curves.
3. SFA also allows the use of panel data models. These models should be pre-
ferred to a pooled model (Aigner et al., 1977) because a pooled model treats
each observation independently from other observations which is obviously
not satisfied in a panel data set. In such a case, panel data models exhibit
estimation advantages over techniques for cross-sectional data (Kumbhakar
and Lovell, 2000, p. 255). A basic SFA panel data model is the Random
Effects model by Pitt and Lee (1981) which treats all heterogeneity as in-
efficiency. The results can then be compared to a True Random Effects
model by Greene (2004, 2005a) which is able to account for unobserved
heterogeneity and separates this effect from inefficiency. Unobserved het-
erogeneity is not recorded through structural variables in the data set but
is likely to be present in local public transport through network complex-
ities, i. e., differences in network configurations, stop densities, altitudes,
etc.
An econometric study relying on an average cost function on economies
of scale and scope in Switzerland’s local public transport was carried out by
Farsi et al. (2007). Their results for the provision of trolley-bus, motor-bus,
and tramway systems indicate such significant increasing returns to scale and
economies of scope that the authors favor integrated operations over unbundling.
Viton (1992, 1993) evaluated economies of scale and scope for different means
of transport in the San Francisco Bay Area with a cross-sectional SFA, and de-
termine that the extent of the savings potential depends on firm size, type of
transport modes, and level of wages.
The investigation of scale economies and cost efficiency of single-mode trans-
port systems appears more frequently in the literature because of the ease of
modeling and data availability. Farsi et al. (2006) emphasize the need to distin-
guish between inefficiency and heterogeneity and therefore also apply Greene’s
TRE model (2004, 2005a).
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This chapter is structured in the following way: Section 3.2 provides the model
specification and the econometric methods and Section 3.3 presents the calcu-
lation scheme for economies of scale and scope. Section 3.4 describes the data,
Section 3.5 discusses the results and interpretations, and Section 3.6 concludes.
3.2 Model Specification and Econometric Methods
The total cost (C) frontier
C = f(Y,Q,wL, wK , N, t) (3.1)
applied in this chapter is dependent on the two outputs (Y ) and (Q), on two
factor prices for labor (wL) and capital (wK), on the network length for rail-
bound services (N), and on a time trend (t). To evaluate the economies of scope
the output is split into output of bus services (Y ) and output of rail-bound
services (Q), i. e., tram and light railway services. I do not differentiate among
the different rail-bound services since there are no distinctive criteria available for
separation; e. g., one could use average speed as well as the existence of tunnels.
The outputs are represented by the number of seat-kilometers (including both
sitting and standing room). Using seat-kilometers is preferable to using vehicle
kilometers because the latter does not account for size of vehicles. Both measures
represent a pure supply side consideration. Other applicable output variables
are passenger-kilometers, the number of passengers, or even revenues. In order
to estimate economies of scope between different types of services, the outputs
have to be available separately for each transport mode. In the data set at
hand, passenger-kilometers and revenues are only available as aggregates, the
number of passengers is not at all reported.3 If output-oriented measures were
available, a comparison to supply-oriented output measures would be interesting.
This chapter gives full intervention possibilities by management only for the
input side; thus, the estimation of a cost function with assumed cost minimizing
behavior4 and supply-oriented output measures appears reasonable (Gagnepain
and Ivaldi, 2002b; Farsi et al., 2007). Nevertheless, passenger-kilometers and the
3Whereas local public transport companies know the number of vehicle- and seat-kilometers
from their operation schedules, there is limited knowledge about the other measures. Customers
who buy single tickets do not reveal their destinations because the tariff system is organized in
zones with fixed payment tariffs. Moreover, buying a bus ticket can involve transfers. Monthly
and seasonal passes do not report the actual trips taken. This distinguishes local public trans-
port from airlines and to a lesser extent, from railways. Additionally, buses do not distinguish
between classes of service, unlike rail and air.
4This implies input orientation. Outputs and input prices are assumed to be exogenously
given.
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number of passengers are further important indicators, and the same number of
seat-kilometer can generate different amount of revenues, depending on the tariff
system, the percentage of monthly tickets, the subsidies for transporting pupils
and disabled people, the amount of paid advertising on vehicles, etc. However,
demand would take me far from measures of cost efficiency and productivity, to
measures of effectiveness (De Borger et al., 2002), and further to the question
whether the companies actually achieve to maximize their revenues. Though, the
purpose of this chapter is to evaluate the adequate supply structures for local
public transport. Demand and revenues are beyond the scope of this chapter.
Generally, transport studies identify one input as personnel expenditures.
Farsi et al. (2005a) suggest two additional inputs: energy expenditures and cap-
ital expenditures, with the latter calculated as residual costs after subtracting
personnel costs and energy costs from total costs. When the share of energy
costs is low, and thus coefficients of parameters could be insignificant, the litera-
ture suppresses the energy input and summarizes capital costs and energy costs
as a common second input (e. g., Farsi et al., 2007). Since this chapter’s data
set lacks information about energy consumption, I use two factor prices: one for
labor (wL) and one for capital (wK).
From an economic point of view, other factor price specifications may be
useful, e. g., the substantial difference in capital costs for bus services and rail-
bound services could be modeled. Usually, the provision of rail-bound services is
preferred to the provision of bus services, because of increased customer attrac-
tiveness and increased capacity. On the other hand rail-bound services clearly
have higher infrastructure costs. However, in the absence of detailed information
about the companies’ cost structure concerning bus and rail-bound capital costs,
it is difficult to implement such a differentiation. A common allocation with the
same split for all companies can lead to collinearity problems in the estimation
procedure. This chapter omits this possibility.
In addition, I am confident that reliable results are produced by the accepted
approach that introduces two factor prices for labor and capital, the assumed
exogeneity of factor prices, and the rich data set.
However, I do include track length of the tram and light rail network (N)
as an additional network characteristic and control variable because it heavily
influences a company’s cost. This variable can also serve as a quality proxy be-
cause users often prefer trams because of their superior comfort. I also tested the
influence of two other possible structural variables: network length including line
length of bus services and track length of rail-bound services and a density index
calculated by the number of inhabitants in the influence area divided by the net-
work length. Neither showed significant coefficients in the estimation procedure.
However, it is probable that more network heterogeneity (different shapes, num-
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ber of stops, etc.) is of substantial influence. This makes it important to model
this unobserved heterogeneity with the TRE model explained below. A linear
time trend (t) captures the shift in technology representing technical change.
To evaluate economies of scope in a multi-output context, it is crucial to use
a quadratic cost function because it allows the incorporation of zero outputs.5
This is not possible with a logarithmized Cobb-Douglas nor translog functional
forms where all outputs are given in logs.6 The quadratic cost function can be
written as:
Cit = α+ βY Yit + βQ Qit + βK wKit + βL wLit
+
1
2
(
βY Y (Yit)2 + βQQ(Qit)2 + βKK (wKit)
2 + βLL (wLit)
2
)
+ βY Q Yit Qit + βY K Yit wKit + βY L Yit wLit
+ βQK Qit wKit + βQL Qit wLit + βKL ln wKit wLit
+ βN Nit + βt t+ it
(3.2)
with subscript i denoting the company and subscript t denoting the year. The βs
are the coefficients to be estimated. The specification of α and it are dependent
on the applied econometric model, explained below. Linear homogeneity in input
prices is an important property of cost functions. For the actual estimation,
the linear homogeneity can be imposed by dividing all cost measures (i. e., the
dependent variable total costs and the factor prices) by an arbitrarily chosen
factor price, here the price for labor (Featherstone and Moss, 1994; Mart´ınez-
Budr´ıa et al., 2003; Farsi et al., 2007):
C∗it =
Cit
wLit
= α+ βY Yit + βQ Qit + βK
wKit
wLit
+
1
2
(
βY Y (Yit)2 + βQQ(Qit)2 + βKK
(
wKit
wLit
)2)
+ βY Q Yit Qit + βY K Yit
wKit
wLit
+ βQK Qit
wKit
wLit
+ βN Nit + βt t+ it
(3.3)
5The name “quadratic” refers to the presence of quadratic terms of outputs and factor prices;
it does not impose any a priori assumption of the trend of the cost curves. As Equation 3.11
shows, the estimation of economies of scope demands cost predictions where specific outputs
are set to zero.
6I follow Baumol et al. (1988, p. 453) and Mayo (1984). See Pulley and Humphrey (1993) for
an explanation of why a quadratic specification should be preferred to a translog specification
when some outputs can be zero. See Farsi et al. (2007, 2008) for a technical discussion on the
choice of the functional form.
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Additionally, flexible cost functions like the quadratic or the translog require
the approximation at a local point, here chosen by the mean. Consequently, all
explanatory variables except the time variable are divided by their means before
the estimation.
The evolution of SFA can be summarized in the following steps (see also
Coelli et al., 2005, Greene, 2008, and Kumbhakar and Lovell, 2000). Aigner et al.
(1977) propose a pooled model ignoring the possible panel characteristic of data.
Its composed error term () includes noise (v) and inefficiency (u). Disregarding
firm-specific unobserved factors can lead to inaccurate results (Farsi et al., 2006).
Treating each observation independently is eliminated by using the Random
Effects model developed by Pitt and Lee (1981) and with the Fixed Effects model
developed by Schmidt and Sickles (1984). In contrast to the RE model, the FE
model allows correlation of firm-specific effects with the explanatory variables.
I perform a Hausman test that confirms the non-correlation in favor of the RE
model at a significance level of 1%. Hence the cost function’s coefficients (my
major determinant for estimating economies of scale and scope) of the RE model
can serve as an unbiased benchmark. The FE model is therefore not used in the
following. The RE model parallels the random effects panel data model, which
estimates average functions, and can be specified as:
C∗it = α0 + x
′
itβ + vit + ui (3.4)
with x′itβ standing for the parameter vector and the coefficients to be estimated
(cp. Equation 3.3). Together with α = α0 it represents the deterministic part
of the cost function. In this model, the composed error term is defined so that
it = vit + ui. vit ∼ iid N (0, σ2v) is normal distributed and represents a time-
variant, firm-specific stochastic error term (also called noise, e. g., data mea-
surement errors). ui ∼ iid N+(0, σ2u) represents the time-invariant, firm-specific
inefficiency and is truncated normal distributed. Because of this, the model is es-
timated using maximum likelihood. The inefficiency is estimated calculating the
conditional mean of the inefficiency (ui) as proposed by Jondrow et al. (1982),
i. e., E[ui|ˆi1, ˆi2, ..., ˆiT ] = E[ui|¯i], with ¯i = (1/Ti)
∑Ti
t=1 ˆit.
The TRE model avoids at least two shortcomings of the RE model. As
Greene (2005a) noted, the assumption of time-invariant inefficiency might be
questionable in long panels, and the RE estimator forces any time-invariant
heterogeneity in the inefficiency term which is likely to result in an overestimation
of inefficiency. The TRE model can be specified as:
C∗it = α0 + αi + x
′
itβ + vit + uit (3.5)
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with α = α0 + αi and αi ∼ iid N (0, σ2α) being independent and identically nor-
mal distributed and representing a time-invariant, firm-specific random intercept
term introduced to capture unobserved heterogeneity separate from the actual
production technology (e. g., firms situated in geographically unfavorable regions,
network complexities, etc., for which data is not available). The composed er-
ror term is again made up with noise and inefficiency it = vit + uit. Precisely,
vit ∼ iid N (0, σ2v) is independent and identically normal distributed and repre-
sents the time-variant, firm-specific stochastic error term and uit ∼ iid N+(0, σ2u)
is independent and identically truncated normal distributed representing the
time-variant, firm-specific inefficiency. The cost of having a third stochastic
term for unobserved heterogeneity is that the inefficiency is underestimated. The
“true” inefficiency might hence lie somewhere between the prediction of the RE
model and the TRE model. The TRE model is estimated using Simulated Max-
imum Likelihood. The conditional expectation of the inefficiency term E[uit|rit]
with rit = αi+ uit+ vit is calculated by Monte Carlo simulations (Greene, 2004,
2005a) to be able to approximate the maximization of the log-likelihood (Greene,
2005b). The differences of the RE and the TRE model in treating heterogeneity
and inefficiency make it necessary to estimate both models to get a consistency
check.
3.3 Definition of Economies of Scale and Scope
This chapter follows Baumol et al. (1988, pp. 50, 68, 73). Global economies of
scale in the two outputs case are defined as:
SLGlobal =
C∗(Y,Q)
Y (∂C∗/∂Y ) +Q (∂C∗/∂Q)
(3.6)
with Y representing the amount of seat-kilometers provided in buses and Q
representing the accumulated amount of seat-kilometers provided in trams and
light railways.7 The derivatives used are deduced from Equation 3.3 as:
∂C∗
∂Y
= βY + βY Y Y + βY Q Q+ βY K
wKit
wLit
(3.7)
and
7I do not differentiate between economies of scale and density. This would require network
variables to be included with cross and squared terms in the cost function which, for a quadratic
function, heavily affects the estimatability of the model.
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∂C∗
∂Q
= βQ + βQQ Q+ βY Q Y + βQK
wKit
wLit
(3.8)
The production technology implies increasing global returns to scale if Ex-
pression 3.6 is greater than one and decreasing global returns to scale if the
expression is smaller than one. When global returns to scale are equal to one,
the technology exhibits constant returns to scale. Increasing returns to scale
imply decreasing average costs when increasing outputs whereas decreasing re-
turns to scale imply increasing average costs with increasing outputs. Global
economies of scale indicate the ratio of a proportional increase in all outputs to
the increase in costs.
Bus-specific economies of scale are defined as:
SLY =
C∗(Y,Q)− C∗(0, Q)
Y (∂C∗/∂Y )
(3.9)
They indicate the ratio of an increase in bus output (with rail-bound output
fixed) to the increase in costs. The numerator hereby represents the incremental
costs of producing bus services. The interpretation of results proceeds equally
to global returns to scale. Rail-bound-specific economies of scale are defined and
interpreted similarly:
SLQ =
C∗(Y,Q)− C∗(Y, 0)
Q (∂C∗/∂Q)
(3.10)
Economies of scope in the two-output case are defined as:
SC =
C∗(Y, 0) + C∗(0, Q)− C∗(Y,Q)
C∗(Y,Q)
(3.11)
Economies of scope display savings from the joint production of several out-
puts. Economies of scope exist if the expression above is greater than zero. SC
then report the relative increase in cost from a separate production. For values
smaller than zero there are diseconomies of scope.
Obviously there is interaction between global economies of scale, product-
specific economies of scale, and economies of scope. The extent of global econo-
mies of scale depends on the specific measures of economies of scale as well as on
economies of scope. A consideration of a simultaneous increase in both outputs
implies that some of the scope effect is picked up. Whereas product-specific
economies of scale can be used to evaluate whether a firm is a natural candidate
for mergers in the single-product case, global economies of scale is a measure in
the multi-product case.
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Table 3.1: Data structure: observations
Year Total Multi-output Single-output
1997 46 26 20
1998 51 27 24
1999 50 27 23
2000 63 32 31
2001 71 37 34
2002 68 38 30
2003 58 35 23
2004 53 31 22
2005 59 34 25
2006 54 29 25
Total 573 316 257
Source: Own calculation
3.4 Data
The unbalanced panel data set consists of 573 observations for the years 1997 to
2006. The majority of observations (316) are from multi-output companies. The
exact data structure is given in Table 3.1. In total the data set includes informa-
tion on 82 companies from all federal states in Germany except Berlin, resulting
in approximately seven observations per company on average. All except five
of the smaller companies8 are organized in regular public transport associations
with zone tariffs. Although these public transport associations usually share
marketing and ticketing, the exact assignment of tasks differs among the federal
states.
All cost data is collected separately for each observation from annual reports
and from balance sheets published in the Federal Bulletin (Bundesanzeiger).9
All physical data is obtained by extracting the yearly published VDV statistics
(Verband Deutscher Verkehrsunternehmen, 1998, also for the following years).
Total costs comprise material costs (also called purchases, consisting of ex-
penditures for raw materials and supplies, purchased goods, inter alia energy,
and purchased services), personnel costs,10 depreciations, other operating ex-
penses, and interests on borrowed capital as well as hypothetical interests on
equity. These interests on equity are estimated as interest on corporate bonds
8These companies are situated in Arnstadt, Eisenach, Gera, Mu¨hlhausen, and Magdeburg
in the federal states of Thu¨ringen and Sachsen-Anhalt. They are organized in less-sophisticated
tariff associations that mainly charge for kilometers traveled.
9For recent years there is an online version: https://www.ebundesanzeiger.de .
10Including salaries and wages as well as social insurance contributions and expenditures for
pensions.
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plus two percentage points of risk premium (source for interest rates: Deutsche
Bundesbank, 2007). All companies considered in 2006 exhibit costs of over four
billion EUR (see Table 3.2). Cost and price information are given in 2006 prices
and are deflated with the German producer price index (Statistisches Bundes-
amt, 2008). The factor price for labor is calculated as personnel costs divided
by the number of FTEs. As capital prices are not directly observable, capital
costs have to be divided through some measure of capital quantity, i. e., assets
or capital stock (Coelli et al., 2003, p. 85). The majority of capital costs paid
by local public transport firms relate to rolling stock, i. e., buses and railcars.11
An even more accurate measure is the number of seats in buses and railcars.
Again, this includes the size of vehicles in the analysis. Hence, capital costs are
calculated as residual costs (total costs subtracted by personnel costs) divided
by the number of seats. This implies that material costs and other operating
expenses are assumed to represent payments for capital services (Friedlaender
and Chiang, 1983). Establishing one more factor price for operations would be
another option. This factor price could be calculated as material costs and other
operating expenses divided by some measure of operations which is obviously
output. But output in turn is already included in the cost function and, in
the presence of cross terms with factor prices, this will lead to multicollinearity
problems if additionally employed for calculating factor prices.
3.5 Results and Interpretation
3.5.1 Regression Results
Table 3.3 shows the regression results for the RE model and the TRE model.
The coefficient estimates across the two models are quite similar. This similarity
confirms observations by Farsi et al. (2005a,b). All coefficients, in particular for
outputs and the capital price, show the expected signs and are significant. The
results for the TRE incorporate an additional estimate σα characterizing the
random intercept term. The output coefficients for bus services are much higher
than for rail-bound services which is explained by the positive and significant
coefficient of the rail-bound network in both models, and shows that the network
is a substantial cost factor and that network extensions produce higher total
costs. This variable picks up some of the costs related to tram and light railway
services. The time trends show negative significant signs, suggesting that the
11For rail-bound services, the network is a further source of capital commitment. Costs
however could be misleadingly reported because the land for stops and the road bed is very
often on public property. Furthermore in the companies’ profit and loss accounts, costs are
not broken down into expenses for railing stock and network expenses. Hence, the network is
included as a structural variable assumed to be fixed at least in the short run.
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Table 3.2: Descriptive statistics for bus and multi-product companies
Suma Min. Mean Median Max. Std. dev.
Total cost (C) 4313 1 85 60 391 86
[m EUR]
Share personnel costs . 0.05 0.46 0.46 0.69 0.11
Share capital costs . 0.31 0.54 0.54 0.95 0.11
Labor price (wL) . 17 135 48 388 49 298 164 079 11 689
[EUR/FTE]
Capital price (wK) . 544 1704 1514 5078 784
[EUR/seat]
Output [m seat-km]
Bus (Y ) 34 256 0 705 586 2402 486
Rail-bound (Q) 34 716 0 1212c 654c 6187 1347c
Network length (N)b 1656 0 58c 39c 155 43c
Vehicles
Bus 8745 0 184 148 1003 148
Rail-bound 3525 0 137c 85c 605 125c
aSum values for 2006, bFor tram and light railway services, cCalculated for all non-zero observations
Source: Own calculation
restructuring that has already occurred12 is successful and that total costs tend
to be lower in recent years.13 Furthermore, σu relates to the standard deviation
of the inefficiency and σv to the standard deviation of the noise. For both models,
σu is reasonably higher, as indicated by λ in Table 3.3.
3.5.2 Economies of Scale and Scope for Representative Output
Levels
Table 3.4 shows all defined measures of economies for the RE model and the
TRE model. The results are given for four hypothetical firms: a firm producing
outputs at the 25%-quartile of all sample firms, a firm producing at the median
of all sample firms, a firm producing at the mean output, and a firm producing
at the 75%-quartile.14 The network variable is also set at the corresponding
quartile and mean levels. The firms in the sample with no rail-bound services
are excluded from the quartile calculation of rail-bound output and network.
According to Farsi et al. (2007) the capital price and the time trend are kept at
12Particularly in some of the larger companies like Rheinbahn (Du¨sseldorf).
13A detailed strategic efficiency analysis of individual firm scores could further evaluate these
trends.
14The determination of an output at the 25% quartile means that 25% of all firms in the
sample produce less output.
66 ECONOMIES OF SCALE AND SCOPE
Table 3.3: Regression results for the quadratic cost function
Model RE TRE
Parameter Estimate Estimate
α −29.89∗∗∗(6.32) −27.61∗∗∗(2.29)
σα . 10.51∗∗∗(0.36)
βY 45.75∗∗∗(5.60) 51.58∗∗∗(1.97)
βQ 23.74∗∗∗(4.73) 31.66∗∗∗(1.37)
βK 27.87∗∗∗(4.96) 27.21∗∗∗(2.52)
βY Y −12.60∗∗∗(3.24) −14.22∗∗∗(1.23)
βQQ −1.57∗(0.89) −4.23∗∗∗(0.27)
βKK −8.13∗∗∗(1.79) −7.89∗∗∗(1.25)
βY Q −4.08∗∗∗(1.40) −0.06(0.38)
βY K 3.71∗(2.14) 2.13∗∗(0.99)
βQK 8.05∗∗∗(0.60) 8.25∗∗∗(0.38)
βt −1.40∗∗∗(0.11) −1.15∗∗∗(0.07)
βN 15.28∗∗∗(3.08) 7.20∗∗∗(0.98)
σu 22.35∗∗∗ 15.33∗∗∗
λ = σu/σv 2.34∗∗∗ 4.72∗∗∗
∗∗∗Significant at 1%, ∗∗significant at 5%, ∗significant at 10%; Standard errors in parentheses
Source: Own calculation
their mean values. The intercept term for the TRE model is not varied and kept
constant at α.15
Looking at the specific scale economies one can observe increasing returns
to scale for bus and for tram and light railway services (see Table 3.4). These
results are in line with Farsi et al. (2006, 2007). While the bus-specific economies
of scale are increasing from low to high output levels, the rail-specific economies
of scale are decreasing. Further calculations for output levels beyond the 75%-
quartile (not shown in Table 3.4) suggest a threshold around the 85%-percentile
of output where rail-bound-specific economies of scale turn into diseconomies
of scale. For bus-specific economies of scale this is not the case. However, as
an econometric estimation always attempts to reflect the data as accurately as
possible, the boundaries should be interpreted with care. The increasing returns
to scale indicate the savings potential resulting from an increase in output levels
or by a merger of adjacent single-output companies. The savings potential can
be increased by sharing maintenance facilities or by a joint procurement that
extends the existing cooperation among operators. An exact identification of
the sources for these economies of scale is beyond this chapter.
15Since the constant appears to exhibit a huge influence on the calculation of economies of
scale and scope, I also experimented with an additional dummy variable for pure bus operators.
The results did not change in any substantial way.
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Table 3.4: Economies of scale and scope for representative output levels
Fleet size Bus-specific SL Rail-bound-specific SL
Output level Bus Rail RE TRE RE TRE
25% quartile 83 46 1.21 1.18 2.04 1.46
Median 148 85 1.35 1.32 1.74 1.31
Mean 184 137 1.48 1.41 1.32 1.11
75% quartile 237 189 1.62 1.62 1.29 1.08
Fleet size Economies of scope Global economies of scale
Output level Bus Rail RE TRE RE TRE
25% quartile 83 46 -0.35 -0.26 1.16 1.04
Median 148 85 -0.15 -0.14 1.35 1.16
Mean 184 137 -0.06 -0.09 1.29 1.11
75% quartile 237 189 -0.02 -0.07 1.39 1.15
Source: Own calculation
The estimates for economies of scope are negative for both models at all
output levels, i. e., it is more costly to operate bus and rail-bound services as one
company than as separate entities. This, in connection with lower rail-bound
economies of scale for higher output levels, would also encourage competitive
bidding for tram and light railway services. Diseconomies of scope are present
to a greater extent for low output values. Thus, it appears more complex for
smaller firms to operate bus and rail-bound services as one company, especially
when ticketing and marketing are already centralized in the local public transport
associations. Another possible explanation is the lack of specialization in firms
where employees are unable to focus on one mode of transport. Farsi et al. (2007)
on the other hand find positive economies of scope for urban public transport
in Switzerland. The observational difference can partially be explained by the
authors’ data set that includes only one single-output company. A considerable
part of the German observations consists of single-output bus companies, giving
a realistic image of their cost structure. The Swiss data set differentiates between
motor- and trolley-bus services. While determining costs of single-output tram
companies Farsi et al. (2007) as well as this chapter’s application must rely on
the econometric predictions.
Global economies of scale are present for both model specifications. Since they
depend on both product-specific economies of scale and economies of scope, it is
obvious that larger companies with zero economies of scope will exhibit greater
global economies of scale. Two implications follow: First mergers of multi-
output companies should be enhanced. Second, in the short term, assuming
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the existing industry structure as fixed, large multi-output companies can still
realize savings potential by increasing their output. Developing new customer
segments, for example, will increase demand.
3.5.3 Economies of Scale and Scope for Real Firms
Comparing the results for the RE model and the TRE model for representative
output levels reveals no substantial differences. One reason may be that the firm-
specific random intercepts (αi), one characteristic for the TRE model, did not
enter the calculations, because the only meaningful estimate for representative
output levels is the constant α for all firms. It is however meaningful to use the
firm-specific random intercepts when looking at real companies. Table 3.5 shows
quartile and mean levels of economies of scale and scope of the real multi-output
companies included in the data set. Hence, for each single observation with dif-
ferent output levels, factor prices, network lengths, points in time and random
intercepts, economies of scale and scope have been calculated. This calculation
is only performed for multi-output companies because the defined measures for
economies of scale and scope apply only to them and adding hypothetical tram
outputs to pure bus companies would not give a true picture. The comparison
between the estimates of economies of scale and scope for representative output
levels on the one hand and real companies on the other hand is somewhat diffi-
cult because the order structure is dissimilar. For representative companies, it is
output levels, for real companies, it is scale and scope levels. However, some ten-
dencies are comparable. The general implication holds also for real companies:
Global economies of scale are driven by substantial product-specific economies of
scale and slight diseconomies of scope. The product-specific economies of scale
appear to be present in lower amplitudes compared to the representative compa-
nies (e. g., an interquartile range of 0.21 for bus-specific economies of scale of real
companies in the RE model compared to 0.41 for representative companies). For
economies of scope and global economies of scale it is the reverse: Higher ampli-
tudes for real companies compared to representative companies. Comparing the
results for the RE and the TRE model, one can observe that the quartile range
is always greater, except for bus-specific economies of scale for representative
companies, for the RE model. Following this, unobserved heterogeneity appears
to remove a prediction bias in differentiating the companies.
Interestingly, a detailed look at the individual estimates for real companies
(not shown here) reveals some patterns: Strong diseconomies of scope in particu-
lar can be observed for smaller East German companies like Gera, Jena, Plauen,
or Schwerin. Strong global economies of scale driven by economies of scope are
present for larger municipal companies in the Ruhr area like Du¨sseldorf, Essen,
or Ko¨ln. But other large companies like those in Stuttgart in the West or Dres-
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Table 3.5: Economies of scale and scope for real companies
Bus-specific SL Rail-bound-specific SL
Scale and scope level RE TRE RE TRE
25% quartile 1.05 1.06 1.71 1.30
Median 1.10 1.11 1.83 1.39
Mean 1.19 1.26 1.91 1.96
75% quartile 1.26 1.25 2.03 1.51
Economies of scope Global economies of scale
Scale and scope level RE TRE RE TRE
25% quartile -0.33 -0.39 1.06 0.88
Median -0.15 -0.16 1.28 1.06
Mean -0.25 -0.30 2.27 1.23
75% quartile 0.03 -0.04 1.81 1.37
Source: Own calculation
den in the East also exhibit substantial global economies of scale. One more
observation is of interest: Some mean values above the upper quartile levels
(e. g., global economies of scale of 2.27 for the RE model compared to 1.81 for
the upper quartile level) are driven by some very strong values above the upper
quartile level.
Based on the results given, companies can manage their mergers and ac-
quisitions (M&A). For single-output companies, a value of economies of scale
above one indicates that the business should be expanded by either M&A or
generic growth. For multi-output companies a corresponding negative value for
economies of scope at the new output level should not prevent such mergers but
is an indication that separation of divisions would be useful even if this is po-
litically unenforceable. The savings potential should always be compared with
the cost of merging, i. e., economies of scale should substantially exceed one for
mergers to be pursued.
3.6 Conclusion
In this chapter, I estimated both Random Effects and True Random Effects
Stochastic Cost Frontier models for urban public transport in Germany, to eval-
uate the extent of economies of scope and global and product-specific economies
of scale. The RE model can serve as a benchmark for unbiased coefficients while
the TRE model supplies unobserved firm heterogeneity. Rich data sets with a
time frame of at least five to six years, and including as many firms as possi-
ble, are a prerequisite for useful estimations to represent the dynamic nature of
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the economies of scale and scope. The models applied in this chapter evaluate
general industry trends. The product-specific estimates for economies of scale
and, even more important, the global economies of scale, are positive, suggesting
that the high fragmentation in the German market is not economically justified
and that mergers and acquisitions should be politically supported, particularly
for companies in geographical proximity. In an international context, the results
can enrich the discussion about the optimal firm size in local public transport,
e. g., there are no bus-specific diseconomies of scale observable in this chapter,
favoring large companies. From the finding of slight diseconomies of scope I
conclude that bus and rail-bound services should not be integrated on the cost
side. This encourages the use of a competitive bidding process for tram and light
railway services. An oligopoly structure appears preferable since high fragmenta-
tion will again lead to the unexploited economies of scale problem. The presence
of rail-bound increasing returns to scale and diseconomies of scope points to a
structural problem for small tram and light railway systems in Germany. Small
tram networks with few lines are expensive to operate; any expansion can prove
too costly when demand fluctuates. Small networks can be replaced by bus ser-
vices (as has happened often in the past) or can be connected with the regional
rail network according to the “Karlsruher Modell”, where the traction units are
equipped with two power systems, one for inner-city operations and the other for
interurban operations. Few crossovers between the rail and the tram network,
e. g., near the main stations, enable direct connections from the rural areas to
the inner cities. Such systems can resolve the unexploited economies of scale
problem of small tram networks where rail and tram gauge is consistent.
Chapter 4
Potential Gains from Mergers
4.1 Introduction
For regional bus companies in Germany, there is evidence for increasing returns
to scale. Two studies explicitly deal with this aspect: Based on a data set of
179 bus companies with physical inputs and outputs, Hirschhausen and Cull-
mann (2008) use DEA extended to bias correction and inference. A test on the
returns to scale technology rejects the hypotheses of constant and non-increasing
returns to scale. The authors conclude that smaller companies are characterized
by increasing returns to scale.1 Nieswand et al. (2008) use SFA to study cost
efficiency and economies of scale and density in German bus transport. The cost
data is estimated using a bottom-up approach. They find increasing returns to
scale and density, independent from supply- and demand-oriented output speci-
fications and the level of heterogeneity comprehension.
Also for multi-product companies in German local public transport, the pre-
ceding chapter has shown the presence of global economies of scale. Hence, the
fragmentation in Germany appears to be inefficient and more cooperation, if not
outright mergers, is likely to lead to significant cost reductions. This underlines
the importance of a deeper analysis of merger gains, the approach pursued in
this chapter.
The management of public transport provision in Germany at the local level
has been justified on the grounds that strong cooperation with local authorities
is necessary and that local circumstances must be considered. Therefore it is
doubtful whether a “random” acquisition strategy with acquisitions in geograph-
1The subsequent chapter is based on Walter and Cullmann (2008).
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ical distance would be successful.2 I model the potential gains from mergers in
public transport in Germany’s most densely settled region, Nordrhein-Westfalen,
whose attributes make the realization of merger gains feasible:
• Cities are close to each other so that combined operation is possible.
• Light railway and tram networks with connecting lines exist, e. g., in Ko¨ln
and Bonn or in Du¨sseldorf and Krefeld; until now there have already been
two or more public transport companies operating on a common network.
Some companies in Nordrhein-Westfalen have either launched mergers (Duis-
burg, Essen, and Mu¨lheim) or at least proposed them (Ko¨ln and Bonn in 2003
and 2007). My empirical analysis is based on non-parametric Data Envelopment
Analysis with bias corrections through bootstrapping. To model the potential
gains, I apply a methodology proposed by Bogetoft and Wang (2005). Within
this framework, a decomposition of the overall potential gains into three differ-
ent effects is possible: a technical efficiency effect, a synergy effect and a size
effect. Therefore, the results allow the quantification of overall potential gains
from mergers for German public transport companies as well as the separate
role and magnitude of each of the three components. The framework also allows
identifying the most promising merger combinations and their respective charac-
teristics. Possible merger cases that I analyze include cooperative efforts among
up to five neighboring public transport companies. I also test the robustness of
my calculations by applying different scale properties and introducing structural
variables.
The remainder of this chapter is structured as follows: The next section gives
an overview of the methodology. Section 4.3 introduces the data and model
specification and introduces the proposed mergers. Section 4.4 presents aver-
age efficiencies for the unmerged firms, compares merger gains under variable
and constant returns to scale, with and without incorporating differences in the
production of tram and light railway services, and calculates alternative decom-
positions of synergy and size gains. In Section 4.5, I present conclusions and
policy recommendations.
2Failures of such “random” acquisitions include the example of Hamburger Hochbahn with-
drawing from their shareholding in WiBus in Wiesbaden, almost 500 kilometers distant from
Hamburg, in 2007.
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4.2 Methodology
4.2.1 Data Envelopment Analysis
My focus in this chapter is on non-parametric linear optimization using DEA.
It relies on a production frontier where the individual efficiencies of the firms
relative to the frontier are calculated by distance functions.3 DEA involves the
use of linear programming methods to construct a piecewise linear surface or
frontier over the data and measures the efficiency for a given unit relative to the
boundary of the convex hull of the input output vectors (see Simar and Wilson,
2008).4 The determination of the efficiency score of the i-th firm in a sample of N
firms in the constant returns to scale model under input orientation is equivalent
to the following optimization (see Coelli et al., 2005, p. 163):
min
θ,λ
θ
s.t. − yi + Y λ ≥ 0
θxi −Xλ ≥ 0
λ ≥ 0
(4.1)
with λ being an N×1 vector of constants, X representing an input matrix and Y
an output matrix. θ measures the radial distance between the observation (x, y)
and a linear combination of efficient points, representing the efficiency target
for this observation. λ determines the weights of these peers for the evaluated
firm’s inputs and outputs. A value of θ = 1 indicates that a firm is fully efficient
and thus is located on the efficiency frontier. To determine efficiency measures
under the assumption of variable returns to scale a further convexity constraint∑
λ = 1 must be added.
DEA can be carried out with either input or output orientation. Under input
orientation, outputs are held fixed when contradicting inputs. Under output ori-
entation, inputs are held fixed when increasing output. Here input orientation is
applied, a realistic assumption for Germany’s local public transport when consid-
ering the supply obligation of the public transport sector (the output volume is
3The concept of distance functions used to measure efficiency and productivity is closely
related to the concept of production frontiers. The framework was independently proposed
by Malmquist (1953) and Shepard (1953). By defining these functions the concept of radial
contradictions and expansions is used, thus an input distance function considers by how much
the input vector may be proportionally contracted with the output vector held fixed. See Fa¨re
and Primont (1995) for mathematical derivation of distance functions.
4Another technique is the free disposal hull (FDH) estimator, which only assumes free dis-
posability and no convexity constraint. I limit myself in this chapter to DEA.
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mostly predetermined by contracts between local authorities and the companies).
Thus the companies’ intention is to use the fewest possible resources.
4.2.2 Decomposing Merger Gains
Following a framework proposed by Bogetoft and Wang (2005) for agricultural
offices and applied by Bagdadioglu et al. (2007) to the energy sector I decompose
efficiency gains from mergers5 into technical efficiency gains, synergies from joint
operation, and size gains. The results allow me to quantify both the overall
potential gains from mergers and the separate role of the three effects.
Assume that utilities that are geographically close merge into larger units.
The merged unit is denoted DMUJ where J determines the number of merged
units. By summing inputs and outputs I obtain a unit that has used
∑
j∈J x
j
to produce
∑
j∈J y
j . Based on Bogetoft and Wang (2005), a radial input-based
measure of the potential overall gains from merging the J DMUs under an input
orientation is:
min
θJ ,λ
θJ
s.t. −
∑
j∈J
yji + Y λ ≥ 0
θJ
∑
j∈J
xji −Xλ ≥ 0
λ ≥ 0
(4.2)
θJ is the maximal proportional reduction in the aggregated inputs
∑
j∈J x
j
i
that allows the production of the aggregated output
∑
j∈J y
j
i . A value below
one indicates that merging can reduce costs or input requirements.6 Since I
consider a radial measure of input contradiction, each input is reduced in the
same proportion. As shown by Bogetoft and Wang (2005) the measure θJ of
the potential overall merger gains can be decomposed into the following three
effects.
Technical Efficiency Effect (T)
The technical inefficiency of the individual utilities in J may be captured in θJ .
These inefficiencies could be eliminated by the new management processes, e. g.,
5It should be noted that merger gains are only feasible for a perfect technology, e. g., that
bus services are transferable and scalable.
6See Bogetoft and Wang (2005) for sufficient conditions about feasible solutions and the
requirement of weak gains for arbitrary mergers.
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by imitating the better performers of the same size without any utilization of
scale or synergy effects. This effect is defined as the technical efficiency effect
and it is useful to adjust the overall gains caused by mergers to identify the pure
merger effects. Note that a merger is not ultimately necessary to realize these
effects.
Bogetoft and Wang (2005) propose to project the original units to the pro-
duction possibility frontier and use the projected units as the basis for evaluating
the remaining gains from the merger. Thus, for example, I may project (xj , yj)
into (θjxj , yj), where θj is the standard technical efficiency score under an input
orientation for a single decision-making unit. In a second step the projected
units (θjxj , yj) are used as the basis for calculating the adjusted overall or real
merger gains:
min
θ?J ,λ
θ?J
s.t. −
∑
j∈J
yji + Y λ ≥ 0
θ?J
∑
j∈J
θjxji −Xλ ≥ 0
λ ≥ 0
(4.3)
Letting T J = θJ/θ?J I obtain θJ = T J · θ?J . T J indicates what can be saved
by individual adjustments in the different units in J . I now describe the two
most interesting “production” effects of a merger: the synergy effect (H)7 and
the size effect (S).
Synergy Effect (H)
As a merger typically involves different input and output combinations, it may
prove advantageous when the result is a more productive use of the product
space and hence savings can be increased by a more efficient joint production
of several outputs. This is termed the synergy effect (H). Bogetoft and Wang
(2005) propose to capture the synergy gains by examining how much of the
average input can be saved in the production of the average output, i. e., by the
measure (H), which can be expressed in the DEA optimization by:
7Bogetoft and Wang (2005) refer to the synergy effect as harmony, scope, or input mixture
effects.
76 POTENTIAL GAINS FROM MERGERS
min
HJ ,λ
HJ
s.t. − α
∑
j∈J
yji + Y λ ≥ 0
HJα
∑
j∈J
θjxji −Xλ ≥ 0
λ ≥ 0
(4.4)
where α ∈ [0, 1] is a scalar determining the size of the firm evaluated with the
synergy measure. To eliminate the size effect, α is typically chosen to be equal to
|J |−1. As shown by Bogetoft and Wang (2005), the mean input and the average
output reveal what can be saved at most by a pure reallocation of inputs and
outputs. Other values for α can be used for sensitivity testing. HJ < 1 indicates
a savings potential due to improved harmony, while HJ > 1 indicates a cost of
harmonizing the inputs and outputs. This cost of harmonizing can only occur
when not looking at the mean input and average output because of the assumed
convexity.8
Size Effect (S)
To analyze the scale effects I must consider the properties of the underlying
production technology. A merger results in a unit that operates at a larger scale.
The outcome depends on the scale properties of the underlying technology. A
positive size effect is characterized as follows: Assuming that the original input-
output combinations of firm A = (x1, y1) and firm B = (x2, y2) are efficient and
improvement potentials are present in the merged unit A + B using x1 + x2 to
produce y1+y2, it is sufficient for unit A+B to use θ(x1+x2) in the production
process to produce y1 + y2, cleaned from any synergy effects.
In the next linear optimization program I can capture the size gains by asking
how much is saved by operating at full scale rather than at α-scale. This can be
reflected by the measure SJ :
8However, there is one merger shown in the following with a synergy effect for average inputs
and outputs slightly higher than one. This results from the bias correction obtained through
the use of bootstrapping in the merger gains decomposition because this value is below one
when applying standard DEA.
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min
SJ ,λ
SJ
s.t. −
∑
j∈J
yji + Y λ ≥ 0
SJ
HJ∑
j∈J
θjxji
−Xλ ≥ 0
λ ≥ 0
(4.5)
SJ < 1 indicates that rescaling is advantageous given the synergy improve-
ments, whereas SJ > 1 shows that the returns to scale property does not favor
larger units and thus the merger is costly.
Summarizing the effects using the definition from the linear optimization leads
to θ?J = HJ ·SJ and by means of θJ = T J ·θ?J I obtain the basic decomposition
θJ = T J · HJ · SJ . In turn it corresponds to a decomposition of the overall
potential gains into a technical efficiency index T J , a synergy index HJ , and a
size index SJ .9
4.2.3 Bias Correction with Bootstrapping
The deterministic non-parametric frontier models offer the great advantage of
flexibility. Some of the drawbacks are the sensitivity to outliers and extreme
values, and the disallowance of noise in the data (see Simar and Wilson, 2000,
2008). Related to this is the conduction of statistical inference using bootstrap-
ping to correct for the bias in my empirical deterministic efficiency estimates.
I begin by briefly summarizing the statistical properties of the non-parametric
DEA estimators.10
With respect to consistency it is sometimes difficult to prove convergence of
an estimator in non-parametric statistics and to obtain its rate of convergence
(Simar and Wilson, 2008).11 The rates of convergence depend on the dimen-
sionality of the problem. When there are large numbers of inputs and outputs,
the imprecision of the results will be reflected in large biases, large variances,
and wide confidence intervals (Simar and Wilson, 2008). As I dispose of a rela-
tively small number of observations it becomes important within my framework
to conduct bias correction.
9For alternative decomposition concepts see Bogetoft and Wang (2005).
10A detailed discussion about statistical inference appears in Simar and Wilson (2000, 2008).
11The convergence properties for the DEA estimators for the univariate input and multivari-
ate output case have been shown by Korostelev et al. (1995); the convergence rates for the
multivariate input and multivariate output case have been established by Kneip et al. (1998).
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To make inferences about empirical applications, the asymptotic sample dis-
tributions of the envelopment estimators are required (Simar and Wilson, 2000,
2008). The bootstrap algorithm remains the only practical way of making in-
ferences when using the multivariate DEA approach (Simar and Wilson, 1998,
2000, 2008, provide an extensive discussion). This chapter applies the bootstrap
algorithm established in Simar and Wilson (1998) that is based on the bootstrap
idea by Efron (1979, 1987) and Efron and Tibshirani (1993) who approximated
the sampling distributions of interest by simulating, or mimicking, the data gen-
erating process (DGP). Its use for non-parametric envelopment estimators was
developed by Simar and Wilson (1998, 2000). The following discussion is based
on Simar and Wilson (2008).
Simulating by means of bootstrapping provides approximations of the sam-
pling distributions of θˆ(x, y)−θ(x, y), the difference of the estimated score θˆ(x, y),
and the true value θ(x, y). The true values are expected to be lower, also because
the data set can only be a sample of observations, and thus misses some of the
best performers. The logic is then as follows: DGP generates the original data
Xn and is completely characterized by knowledge of ψ, the production possibility
set, and the probability density function f(x, y). Assume Pˆ (Xn) to be a con-
sistent estimator of the DGP. The true P , ψ, and θ(x, y) are unknown (I only
observe the data Xn, and this set must be used to construct estimates of P , ψ,
and θ(x, y)). Assume also that the simulated world, i. e., the bootstrap world, is
analogous to the real world, but that estimates take the place of the real world.
Thus in the simulated bootstrap world, a new data set X∗n = {(x∗i , y∗i ), i = 1...n}
can be drawn from the estimated DGP. By using the usual linear program an
estimator θˆ∗(x, y) based on the new sample can be computed. θˆ∗(x, y) is an
estimator of θˆ(x, y) based on the pseudo sample X∗n = {(x∗i , y∗i ), i = 1...n}. The
sampling distribution of θˆ∗(x, y) is approximated by Monte Carlo simulations
(see Simar and Wilson, 1998, 2000, 2008, for an in-depth discussion). I use the
bootstrap algorithm by Simar and Wilson (1998) known as the smoothed homo-
geneous bootstrap to conduct bias correction in each step of the different linear
programming problems of merger gains decomposition.
DEA estimators are biased by construction as follows:
BIAS(θˆ(x, y)) = E(θˆ(x, y))− θ(x, y) (4.6)
The same relation holds for the bootstrap bias estimate for the original esti-
mator:
B̂IASB(θˆ(x, y)) = B−1
B∑
b=1
(θˆ∗b (x, y))− θˆ(x, y) (4.7)
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Following Simar and Wilson (1998) I construct a bias corrected estimator of
θ(x, y) by computing:
ˆˆ
θ(x, y) = θˆ(x, y)− B̂IASB(θˆ(x, y)) = 2 · θˆ(x, y)−B−1
B∑
b=1
θˆ∗b (x, y) (4.8)
4.3 Data and Model Specification
4.3.1 Data Set
The data set consisting of 43 local public transport companies in Nordrhein-
Westfalen in 2006 was retrieved from the annual VDV statistics. Since the data
set does not include the degree of personnel outsourcing by which the compa-
nies may have organized their operations, the number of employees (full-time
equivalents) in the data set may be underestimated. The data set does include
the number of chartered buses which can be used as a proxy for the degree of
outsourcing, and on this basis the number of FTEs can be updated. Following
Leuthardt (1986, 2005) I assume two additional FTEs per chartered bus.12 Af-
ter the adaptation of the data set two of the 43 companies were identified as
outliers due to a very low ratio of FTEs to employed vehicle capacity. For these
companies the FTE numbers are apparently not correctly stated in the statistics.
Of the remaining 41 companies, 38 are under complete private ownership
and three are under mixed, public and private, ownership; 12 are multi-output
companies (in addition to bus services they also offer tram, metro-similar light
railway, and, in Wuppertal, aerial cableway services); and 29 are purely bus
operators (including trolley-buses in Solingen).
To evaluate the efficiency of mergers under a VRS technology, the data set
must contain firms of at least similar size in comparison to the mergers. To
study merging of larger firms, I therefore collected additional data points of local
public transport firms that are larger than those in the original 43-company data
set.13 After eliminating outliers, I arrived at a data set of 44 companies for the
reference technology. The requirement of peers of similar size for mergers limited
my maximum evaluated number of merged companies to five.
12The analyses have also been conducted with 1.5 and 2.5 additional FTEs per chartered
bus. No significant different results could be observed.
13I do not want to extend the data set to all of Germany because different demographic,
geographical, and political circumstances could bias the results of an analysis with physical
inputs and outputs. Therefore I only included three additional companies: BVG (Berlin),
HHA (Hamburg), and MVG (Mu¨nchen).
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Table 4.1: Possible input-output specifications
Specification 1 Specification 2
Inputs
Full-time equivalents
√ √
Number of seats in bus fleet
√
-
Number of seats in railcars
√
-
Number of buses -
√
Number of railcars -
√
Outputs
Seat-kilometers in buses
√
-
Seat-kilometers in railcars
√
-
Vehicle-kilometers in buses -
√
Vehicle-kilometers in railcars -
√
Structural variables
Density index (
√
) (
√
)
Tram index (
√
) (
√
)
Source: Own illustration
4.3.2 Model
My model specifications were limited by data availability, e. g., the data set
does not include cost and input factor prices, particularly for the smaller bus
companies. Thus I examine only the companies’ technical efficiency. Under input
orientation two different input-output specifications are possible and summarized
in Table 4.1:
1. The first specification contains the inputs number of seats in the bus fleet
and number of seats in the railcar fleet (both include standing room) and
the outputs seat-kilometers in buses and seat-kilometers in railcars.
2. The second specification contains the inputs pure number of buses and
number of railcars and the outputs vehicle-kilometers for buses and vehicle-
kilometers for railcars.
Additionally, both input-output specifications have in common the input
FTEs.
I now evaluate the possible input-output specifications. The first input-output
specification with seat-kilometers is the most appropriate because the variables
incorporate as much information as possible. In comparison to the second input-
output specification with vehicle-kilometers, the capacity of vehicles is included.
This capacity can differ substantially, e. g., between articulated buses in urban
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areas and normal buses in rural areas, or between large light railways in Dort-
mund and the aerial cable cars in Wuppertal. I note that a public transport
company may have little influence over capacity utilization, since it is not di-
rectly responsible for marketing, ticketing, traffic planning, and the like. Thus
my model’s supply side focus is economically justified.
Companies may also have little control over structural variables representing
environmental conditions or those representing additional specifications of input
or output variables beyond the scope of management during a merger. Follow-
ing Coelli et al. (2005, p. 192), my analysis includes two structural variables
introduced on the output side:14
• Some companies may have lower costs because of the network’s dispersion
connected with low population in that area (see Chapter 2). These costs
are not covered because of the use of physical input data. A density index
is defined as total track length for trams and light railways and line length
for buses divided by the number of inhabitants in the operation area of a
local public transport provider. With my approach companies operating
in these areas will obtain a better efficiency score, because they obtain
additional “output”.
• The provision of metro and possibly light railway services requires greater
infrastructure investments that cannot be discussed in this chapter due to
the lack of cost data. On the other hand the average speed of tram services
is much lower and therefore output production is more difficult with given
inputs.15 A tram index measures the tram capacity as the percentage of all
rail-bound capacity. Hence the model supports companies offering tram16
services in comparison to those offering light railway or metro services.
4.3.3 Mergers
In general, proposed mergers should fulfill two criteria:
1. A tram or light railway network with connecting lines, operated by more
than one company at present, should be operated by only one company
after the merger in order to facilitate operations planning and to encourage
the use of shared facilities.
14Within the DEA framework there is also another approach to capture conditions which are
not under the control of management. It was first proposed by Banker and Morey (1986) who
formulated a DEA model in which one only seeks radial input reductions over some variables
of the input vector, the discretionary set.
15The data for the non-discretionary variables is obtained from Verband Deutscher
Verkehrsunternehmen (1999, 2007b), validated by company information.
16Also aerial cableway because the average speed is similar to trams (approximately 30 km/h).
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2. All other companies are assigned to mergers where it makes geographi-
cal sense, since the realization of efficiency gains from mergers in public
transport relies on the geographical nearness of the cities and companies.
Only under this constraint will gains in the production process, e. g., from
combined operations, appear feasible (Nordrhein-Westfalen in comparison
to the rest of Germany best fulfills this constraint).
Based on the results of the merger gain calculation, I selected 14 out of 80 po-
tential mergers as shown by the patterns in Figure 4.1. For Herten, Lu¨denscheid
and the two companies from Mu¨nster, no adequate merger combinations could
be found; thus these four remain unmerged. I achieve three mergers with trams
and light railways operating on a network with connecting lines;17 four mergers
of one tram and light railway operator with several pure bus operators; and seven
pure bus mergers.
4.4 Results and Interpretation
I first calculate average efficiency estimates for the unmerged companies and
analyze the impact of structural variables on company performance. Second,
I present merger gains under variable and constant returns to scale. Third, I
compare technical efficiency and real merger gains with/without a structural
variable and calculate alternative decompositions of the real merger gains into
synergy and size effects. The robustness of the results is checked and guaranteed
by means of bias correction.
4.4.1 Average Efficiencies for the Unmerged Firms
Table 4.2 shows the average efficiencies for the unmerged firms with seat-kilometer
as output for different model variations. In addition, I compare standard DEA
results with bias-corrected results based on bootstrapping.18 In general the
bootstrapping results show the expected lower average efficiencies (e. g., 0.792
bias-corrected in comparison to 0.851 standard DEA of overall efficiency under
VRS without structural variables) because I assume the true frontier to be on
a higher efficiency level than the estimated frontier with standard DEA. The
17These three networks are comprised of the companies from Ko¨ln and Bonn, Du¨sseldorf and
Krefeld as well as Essen and Mu¨lheim. Duisburg with its connecting lines to Du¨sseldorf and
Krefeld is assigned to Essen and Mu¨lheim because of an ongoing actual merger process. Apart
from these mergers, there is only one additional tram network in Germany with connecting lines
between different cities. Interestingly, the joint-venture Rhein-Neckar-Verkehrsgesellschaft (the
public transport companies of Mannheim, Heidelberg, and Ludwigshafen in the Rhein-Neckar
area) has already been set up on this network.
18Bootstrapping was conducted with 2000 replications.
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Figure 4.1: Geography of local public transport mergers in Nordrhein-Westfalen
Source: Own illustration
ranking and the proportional magnitude of results between the models under
standard DEA and bias-corrected DEA do not differ. Therefore, and because
of the superior theoretical properties, I focus on the bias-corrected values in the
following explanation.
I begin with the base model (Model 1) absent the inclusion of any structural
variables. The average efficiency for the unmerged firms is 0.792 for VRS and
0.769 for CRS. The average firm therefore would be able to save 20.8% of its
inputs for VRS and 23.1% of its inputs for CRS if produced on the efficiency
frontier.
Models 2 and 3 introduce structural variables in order to compare the overall
efficiency of Model 1. Model 4 includes both structural variables at the same
time. Following Hollingsworth and Smith (2003), the use of ratios within the
CRS formulation can lead to incorrect efficiency results. A peer firm can be
constructed by the input and the output vector of a real firm times a scalar
greater than one. Thus, when using ratios, a peer firm would be able to have
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Table 4.2: Average efficiency estimates with seat-kilometers as output
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
without with with with tram
structural density tram and density
variables index index index
VRS
Standard-DEA 0.851 0.877 0.863 0.889
Bias-corrected 0.792 0.816 0.799 0.824
CRS
Standard-DEA 0.806 0.830 . .
Bias-corrected 0.769 0.784 . .
VRS = variable returns to scale, CRS = constant returns to scale
Source: Own calculation
a ratio value greater than one although this may lie outside the realistic range.
Therefore, I only use the VRS formulation for Models 3 and 4. The impact of
the density index is slightly higher than that of the tram index. Including both
leads to even higher efficiency values.
4.4.2 Merger Gains under Variable and Constant Returns to
Scale
The following discussion of the merger gains omits the density index included in
Models 2 and 4 to avoid over-specifying of the general DEA model regarding the
relatively small data set. I hence focus on Models 1 and 3.
I calculate the overall potential merger effects for VRS and CRS absent struc-
tural variables (Model 1), based on the bias-corrected efficiency estimates. I
decompose these overall effects into real merger effects (synergy and size effect
together) and technical efficiency effects. Table 4.2 presents the mergers in de-
scending order by merger size. The most important result is the existence of
significant real merger gains, i. e., gains that are only possible when merging the
operational processes. Under VRS and CRS the largest merger 1 with two large
bus, tram and light railway operators and one bus operator shows significant real
merger gains of 12%. Under VRS only, I also find mergers with negative real
merger gains (the mergers result in increased inefficiency in terms of synergy and
size). However, mergers 6, 7, 9, and 11 can still have a positive overall impact if
the technical efficiency is brought to the frontier level. The negative real merger
effects can be explained by looking at the specifics. Merger 6 is of an economic
nature: Wuppertal has an aerial cableway with which synergies to bus services
are not probable, at least not for maintenance, technology, and substitutability.
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Mergers 7, 9, and 11 are big bus companies which do not yet exist in the German
market.19 Therefore the negative effects could stem from the missing references.
In reality, however, real merger gains appear possible.
In the following I adhere to the VRS assumption because it allows me to
further decompose the real merger gains into synergy and size gains.
4.4.3 Merger Gains with/without Incorporating Differences in
the Production of Tram and Light Railway Services
Figure 4.2 shows the VRS results from Table 4.3. I observe substantial real
merger gains (synergy and size) for the mergers of companies operating on a
common tram and light railway network (dark-shaded) and mergers of bus, tram
and light railway operators (light-shaded) with the exception of merger 6. The
mergers of companies operating on a common tram and light railway network
are at the same time the largest in terms of output seat-kilometers (bus, tram,
and light railway; indicated by the size of the bubble). The results for smaller
pure bus mergers vary and must be evaluated on a case-by-case basis.
I now include the tram index as structural variable. Since the mergers con-
sist of companies of different sizes, the tram index is input-weighted. Comparing
Figures 4.2 and 4.3, I observe some heterogeneity and can thus group the merg-
ers into four clusters: pure bus mergers 7 and 9-14 with no changes (reasonable
because the tram index itself is not directly affecting the results for the bus
companies); bus, tram, and light railway mergers 1, 4 and 8 with no significant
changes (the level of tram services differs little in comparison to their bench-
marks and hence the incorporation of the structural variable does not change
the results); bus, tram, and light railway mergers 2a and 3a that are still favor-
able (but with few firms – Krefeld removed from merger 2 and Oberhausen and
Moers removed from merger 3); and mergers 5 and 6 that are no longer beneficial
(hence not included in Figure 4.3).
All of the mergers in Model 1 (except merger 6) are highly beneficial without
including the tram index. However, not all the non-beneficial mergers in Model
3 are likely to be really disadvantageous. As Table 4.2 shows, the individual
efficiency increases with the number of structural variables. Hence a careful
interpretation and evaluation of these mergers is necessary.
4.4.4 Alternative Decompositions of Synergy and Size Gains
So far I have only looked at the real merger gains generally. I did not differentiate
between a synergy effect from a better input mixture and the common provision
19The integrated transport company Deutsche Bahn with its bus subsidiary DB Stadtverkehr,
which would be big enough to serve as a benchmark, is not included in my data set.
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Figure 4.2: Bias-corrected merger gains decomposition for variable returns to scale without
structural variables (Model 1)
Source: Own illustration
of different outputs and a size effect resulting from the production at a larger
scale. I want to calculate this decomposition with three different values for α,
the scalar determining the size of the firm evaluated with the synergy measure
(see Subsection 4.2.2). First I follow Bogetoft and Wang (2005) with the default
value of 1/n where n is the number of firms merged. As the tram index has
been recalculated for the mergers and is not just the sum of the original unit
values, there is an additional technical rationale for this robustness check on the
synergy and size allocation of gains. For inputs and outputs only, it is natural to
divide the number of units being merged since this corresponds to the maximum
of what can be gained by a pure reallocation. I therefore halve and double the
default value of 1/n for a sensitivity analysis. This also gives some indication
about the magnitude of the merger effects if there is a very small firm operating
with this input mixture, or if the merger consists of a very big firm and additional
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Figure 4.3: Bias-corrected merger gains decomposition for variable returns to scale with tram
index (Model 3)
Source: Own illustration
smaller firms.
Table 4.4 gives the result for the described decomposition. The most obvious
result is the much more advantageous status of synergy gains, in particular for
mergers 1 and 4 where the conclusion of superior and positive synergy gains
holds for all three different values of α. For the scalar value of 2/n, the majority
of the synergy gains are greater than the size gains. However, the fact that these
input mixtures in the mergers seem beneficial is not purely related to synergy.
Size over a specific threshold can be conditional in order to reach this beneficial
input mixture, e. g., for automated maintenance activities. Furthermore, the
question remains which input mixture and output combination best determines
the synergy gains. I leave this to further research.
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4.5 Conclusion
Local public transport in Germany faces increased calls for reform, primarily
because the companies still operate in monopolistic, historically defined, regional
market structures.
This chapter has applied recent methods of DEA to evaluate the potential
efficiency gains from mergers in Germany’s local public transportation sector.
I motivated the approach with prior research indicating inefficiency, the high
fragmentation of public transport, and the suitable geography of the proposed
mergers. I found that the incorporation of differences in rail-bound local public
transport services is necessary, but must be analyzed on a case-by-case basis.
Population and network density play no substantial role in this already very
densely populated area. I determined that substantial merger gains can be ex-
pected for bus, tram, and light railway mergers and smaller bus mergers and
that larger bus mergers deserve further research. A sensitivity analysis for de-
composition of real merger gains revealed the importance of synergy gains over
size gains. Nevertheless the two effects can only be addressed together.
Following my analysis, the implementation of mergers with companies operat-
ing on a common tram and light railway network should be a high priority from
both political and operational perspectives. The merger process assists compa-
nies to prepare for a market environment defined by an increasing number of
tenders. Companies that are active in several cities learn to diversify their risks,
and are no longer dependent on contracts with one city. It is furthermore a goal
of transport and competition policy to aim at a framework and measures for a
new industry structure. Increasing financial pressure and changes in demography
as well as settlement structures will also raise the topic again.
Part III
Competition
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Chapter 5
Operator Changes through
Competitive Tendering
5.1 Introduction
Local public transport in Germany has long been characterized by local operator
monopolies for bus and other road-bound operations like tram and light railway
services and the national monopoly for regional rail service, DB Regio, subsidiary
of Deutsche Bahn AG. For regional rail services, increased competitive tendering
has been introduced throughout Germany and has been scientifically analyzed
(e. g., Lalive and Schmutzler, 2008). The introduction of competitive tendering
for bus services lags behind. It has not yet started for other road-bound trans-
ports. However, there have been tenders for bus services in the entire federal
state of Hessen, and in two of Germany’s largest transport associations, MVV
and HVV, and occasionally in some other districts. Whereas the MVV in Bayern
was the first public transport association that introduced competitive tendering
in 1997,1 Hessen with its economic heart Frankfurt is surely the most impor-
tant region for competitive tendering of bus services. Competitive tendering is
also called competition for the market, in contrast to competition in the market,
when bus lines are served by more than one operator simultaneously (competi-
tion on the road). In Hessen, competition for the market has been introduced
for all kinds of bus services, in particular for urban services in Frankfurt. In
Munich and Hamburg, the focus is on regional bus services in the surrounding
area only. In Hessen, competitive tendering started in 2002 after an initial phase
of preparation.2
Each tender for bus services in Germany can contain several line bundles,
1Start year according to Schenck et al. (2003).
2The subsequent chapter is based on Augustin and Walter (2009).
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called batches. These batches are usually operated by different companies be-
fore the tender process and batches can be assigned to different operators when
tendering.
Now, that a three-digit number of batches have been tendered out, the out-
come is of interest. Several research areas can be identified when evaluating the
results of competitive tendering:
• Monetary savings from competitive tendering,
• Quality aspects,
• Market structure,
• Tender setup, structural conditions, and competition.
This chapter aims to analyze the last two aspects, market structure, and
with an empirical focus, tender setup, structural conditions, and competition. I
evaluate the impact of structural conditions like operation period, volume of the
tender, point of time, etc., on an operator change and on the level of competition,
measured by the number of bidders. I apply a unique data set with 196 batches
using a probit analysis.
One of the hypotheses is that a new entrant will be more likely to win if
the volume of the tender is high and the tendered batch hence exhibits higher
revenue possibilities. Due to data constraints, I do not look at the managerial
factors contributing to successful bids, and at monetary and quality effects of
tendering. But I can give recommendations for the future design of competitive
tendering, in order to foster competition and attain a better market outcome with
decreasing operating costs and decreasing public subsidizing while maintaining
or even improving the quantity and quality of services.
Although there is a wide body of international literature on competitive ten-
dering of bus services, econometric studies are rare. Since competitive tendering
was introduced relatively early in Scandinavia (Sweden in the 1980s and Norway
1994, all Hensher and Wallis, 2005), studies from these countries are among the
few available.
Mathisen and Solvoll (2008) evaluate the market structure of the bus indus-
try in Norway. They use OLS to regress the percentage share of bus-km offered
for tendering in 18 counties from 1991 until 2004 on the percentage reduction in
the number of bus companies. The share offered for tendering shows a signifi-
cantly positive impact on the reduction in the number of companies, explaining
the 45% decrease in the number of bus companies in that period. Naturally,
the average company size increases, by 65%, and increased market concentration
follows. The ownership structure changes, from private and local public compa-
nies to foreign private and non-local public companies. Furthermore, there are
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strong ownership links in the Norwegian bus industry. This has contributed to
an average number of bidders between three and five companies.
Alexandersson et al. (1998) evaluate deregulation in Sweden, which was ac-
companied by competitive tendering of 70% of all bus services. The authors
show a positive impact on costs in tendering areas. However, no neighborhood
effects could be observed, meaning that introducing competitive tendering has
no positive impact on adjacent regions. The authors conduct a regression based
on a data set with 24 Swedish counties pooled over 7 years to 168 observations.
As dependent variable, Alexandersson et al. (1998) use changes in costs. The in-
dependent variables are represented by changes in the share of tendering in year
of interest, the preceding and the following year, the accumulated share of traffic
subjected to tendering, the change in bus-km, and yearly dummies. The changes
in tendering shares in the current and the preceding year show a significantly neg-
ative effect on changes in costs. In fact, boosting the share of tendered services
from 0 to 100% appears to have a cost-dampening effect of 13.4%. Privatization
in turn appears to have no effect. Furthermore, market concentration increases
from the end of the 1980s until 1994. Privately- and state-owned companies
gained market shares whereas municipally-owned companies lose.
Other noteworthy studies are by Amaral et al. (2009), Hensher et al. (2007),
Stoelinga and Hermans (2005), and Yvrande-Billon (2006). Whereas Hensher
et al. (2007) reflect theory and empiricism on contracting regimes, asset own-
ership, and partnerships between government and operators applied to several
countries, Amaral et al. (2009) and Yvrande-Billon (2006) focus on France (and
London) in more detail. For France, they find a decreasing number of bidders,
from 2.5 in 1993 to under 1.5 in 2005 and for London, to a lesser extent, from
over 4 in 1996 to under 3 in 2006. Based on an evaluation of 123 bidding proce-
dures from 1995 until 2002, no operator change is observed in 88% of the French
cases. In London, this key indicator is 63.5% with 115 renewed contracts between
1999 and 2006. Whereas tenders are executed on entire networks in France, bid-
ders apply for any number of routes or route packages in London. In France, unit
costs and labor productivity do not show a positive tendency while in London
the results appear ambiguous (Yvrande-Billon, 2006). The main reason for the
negative development in France is however said to be low transparency, a lack
of capacity, and expertise with the authorities, and the first signs for possible
collusion and corruption.
Preliminary results from Italy (Boitani and Cambini, 2006) have also demon-
strated some potential problems in competitive tendering such as a limited num-
ber of participants and a low percentage of operator changes leading to negligible
subsidy savings. The authors conclude that the tender organization should be
improved, e.g., through the assignment of independent agencies with the tender
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procedure to avoid any potential conflict of interest at local authorities.
Evidence from the Netherlands shows that in 26 tenders from 2001 to 2004,
66.6% lead to a renewal of the incumbent. The average number of bidders is
equal to 3 (Stoelinga and Hermans, 2005).
The remainder of this chapter is structured as follows. Section 5.2 is dedi-
cated to the theoretical and regulatory framework and the data set concerning
competitive tendering. Section 5.3 provides the evaluation of market shares and
the empirical analysis of conditions contributing to successful bids. Section 5.4
concludes.
5.2 Sector and Tenders
5.2.1 Theoretical and Regulatory Framework
Krishna (2002) describes the process of procurement via competitive bidding as
nothing but an auction, except that bidders compete for the right to sell their
products or services. Auctions and competitive tendering are indeed related. The
tender is a public announcement of requirements for which the submission of bids
is expected (Hadeler et al., 2000). Competitive tendering is often used for public
awards of government procurement contracts (Hensher and Wallis, 2005), e. g.,
for the construction of roads and transport services. Hence, they are sometimes
called procurement auctions (Klemperer, 1999). In these cases the objective
is to achieve low prices rather than high prices. Thus, tenders and auctions
are very similar with the difference being that the lowest bid submission wins.
Hence, competitive tendering is also called a “reverse auction” in the literature.
According to West (2007, p. 96), competitive tenderings in public transport can
contain both private and common value elements. In a private value auction,
each operator knows exactly the value of the transport service to itself but not
the valuations of the other bidders. In common value auctions, transport services
being bid have a true value which is the same to all operators, but none knows
it.
The effects of competitive tendering in Hessen and around Mu¨nchen and
Hamburg have been intensively discussed. Based on an anonymous sample of 81
batches, Beck and Wanner (2007, 2008) find that the price per bus-km in the
first tender round is considerably lower than before, up to 40%. The costs of
tendering appear to be only 5% of the realized savings. Wanner and Zietz (2008)
emphasize that at the same time quality has increased. The average vehicle age
in the RMV (Rhein-Main-Verkehrsverbund)3 is 4.4 years on tendered lines and
3One of the largest German public transport associations, located in Hessen around Frank-
furt.
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Figure 5.1: Structure of bus tenders
Source: Own illustration
7.8 on non-tendered lines. Further indicators of improvements are the vehicle
emission and noise standards, the use of low-floor buses, and the percentage
of vehicles with air conditioning. The authors also note the need for further
evaluation of residual costs4, the effects of second and third tender rounds in
particular on the market structure, and the consequences for employees.
5.2.2 Data
Each tender for bus services can contain several batches. These batches are
usually operated by different companies before the tender process and batches
can be assigned to different operators when tendering. In turn, each batch can
be composed of several lines, but all lines of a batch will be operated by the
same company afterwards.5 The analysis is hence based on batches because
they represent the smallest unit of interest when looking at operator changes
and the number of bidders. Figure 5.1 gives an example for a possible tender
structure. I classify lines as either urban or regional. If a batch contains both,
it is a mixed transportation batch.
Table 5.1 shows the descriptive statistics for the data set. The sample includes
196 line bundles tendered by German public transportation associations and
4Costs occurring when a franchise or a license is assigned to a new operator, e. g., the
incumbent must still pay its staff.
5Except that lines or parts of lines can be sub-contracted.
98 OPERATOR CHANGES THROUGH COMPETITIVE TENDERING
authorities. To discover which conditions encourage an operator change I define
three types of variables regarding competition, contract, and geography. I note
that the influence of managerial experience cannot be included in the analysis
because it is difficult to measure and the information is not contained in the data
set. Since I want to predict the probability of an operator change, the variable
to be explained is dichotomous, taking “1” if bus services are awarded to a new
operator and “0” if the incumbent stays in place. The mean operator change is
58.2%. The variables in the competition category contain the number of bidders,
and, as a second tender round has regularly only started in Bayern, tender round
1 in Bayern and tender round 2 in Bayern.
The number of bidders and the probability of an operator change have de-
creased remarkably over time, as shown in Figure 5.2. The development shown is
based on six time categories, 1997-2004, 2005, 2006, 2007, 2008, and 2009 with
an approximately equal number of batches in each period. The high number of
bidders in the beginning may be explained by trial and error strategies by small
private operators without tendering experience and with strategies that aim at
rapidly gaining market shares. The preliminary figures for 2009 (9 observations
so far) show that a further decrease is indicated. I note that the low number
of bidders may also be related to the global financial crisis which makes vehicle
financing more difficult.
For variables tender round 1 in Bayern and tender round 2 in Bayern, a “1”
represents a yes and a “0” represents a no. Outside Bayern, there have only been
three round 2 tenders.
Then, the collected data considers contract conditions such as the operation
period in years. The mean operation period is about six years, and varies between
one and ten years in the sample. To reflect the batch size the data contains
the number of vehicles, with a mean of 11 vehicles. The variable has a strong
influence on assets, bus depots, and maintenance and repair activities provided
or at least organized by the company itself. It gives bidders information about
the attractiveness of the transport in terms of revenue possibilities. The number
of lines, an indicator for the size and the complexity of the batch, varies between
1 and 26. The number of vehicles and the number of lines exhibit a high standard
deviation compared to other variables, shown by the coefficient of variation. As
already indicated, the operation start is classified in six time-dummies.
There are three types of contract : gross-cost, net-cost, and sub-contracts. Sub-
contracts resemble gross-cost contracts with fewer requirements and lower risk
for the operator. Sub-contractor services are included in this study only if they
are published in the TED – Tenders Electronic Daily: Supplement to the Official
Journal of the European Union6. Descriptive analyses reveal that their structure
6URL: http://ted.europa.eu .
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Table 5.1: Descriptive statistics for 196 tendered batches
Mean Std. Coef. Min. Max.
Dependent variable dev. of. var.
Operator change 0.58 0.49 0.79 0 1
Competition variables
No. of bidders 5.14 2.53 0.49 1 14
Tender round 1 in BY 43 observations . 0 1
Tender round 2 in BY 15 observations . 0 1
Contract variables
Operation period in years 6.47 2.12 0.33 0.99 10.01
No. of vehicles 11.35 9.89 0.87 0 58
No. of lines 4.47 4.22 0.94 1 26
Operation start
1997-2004 35 observations . 0 1
2005 35 observations . 0 1
2006 37 observations . 0 1
2007 33 observations . 0 1
2008 47 observations . 0 1
2009 9 observations . 0 1
Type of contract gross-cost: 161; net-cost: 19; sub: 16
Geography variables
Type of transport regional: 80; mixed: 83; urban: 33
Federal state HE: 119; BY: 58; SH: 11; others: 8
Coef. of. var.=Coefficient of variation; HE=Hessen; BY=Bayern; SH=Schleswig-Holstein
Source: Own calculation
is similar to the tenders on the primary level. It is noteworthy that in Germany
net-cost contracts play a minor role, with only 19 observations.
Next, I consider geographical aspects. The spatial type of transport, either
regional, urban, or both (mixed), can also reflect complexity. Handicapped
or school transports are excluded because they are a specialized market seg-
ment. From the variable federal state, it is obvious that most tenders occur
in Hessen (119 observations) and Bayern (58 observations). Schleswig-Holstein
is far behind with 11, representing the services in the Hamburg area. Other
states included are Baden-Wu¨rttemberg with 4 observations, Rheinland-Pfalz
(Rhineland-Palatinate) with 3 observations and Nordrhein-Westfalen with 1 ob-
servation.
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Figure 5.2: Competition intensity over time
Source: Own illustration
5.3 Empirical Analysis
5.3.1 Change in Concession Ownership
Urban public transport is dominated by domestic municipal companies. In nearly
all of the large cities, there is a municipally-owned company. The major player in
regional services is DB Stadtverkehr GmbH, a subsidiary of Deutsche Bahn AG,
organized in 22 major subsidiaries.7 Market concentration and the presence of
multinational companies has not developed as much as in the UK, for example,
although some companies like Arriva and Veolia have entered the market through
acquisitions of local operators.
Usually neither larger municipal companies nor international ones hold ca-
pacities for the entire network for which they are responsible. Therefore, sub-
contracts are negotiated with small-scale private bus companies. These 4992 com-
panies also operate independently and are building more bidding associations.8
7For more information, see Deutsche Bahn AG (2009a).
8See Bundesverband Deutscher Omnibusunternehmer (2009).
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Table 5.2: Batch migration matrix
before tender Winner is*
abs. rel. (1) (2) (3)
after abs.
∑
196 58 15 123
tender rel.
∑
100% 29.6% 7.7% 62.8%
Incumbent is subsidiary of DB 92 46.9% 44.6% 1.1% 54.3%
Municipal incumbent 22 11.2% 13.6% 40.9% 45.5%
Private incumbent 82 41.8% 17.1% 6.1% 76.8%
*Winner is (1) subsidiary of DB, (2) municipal company, (3) private company; Abs. = absolute, rel. = relative
Source: Own calculation
Table 5.2 shows the development for concession ownerships between the three
groups of operators: 1) DB Stadtverkehr, 2) municipal companies, 3) private op-
erators, both SMEs and multinational companies. From 196 tendered batches,
DB Stadtverkehr originally held 92 (46.9%), but is now responsible for only 58
(29.6%). Municipal companies also lose slightly, but private companies increase
their share from 82 (41.8%) to 123 (62.8%). DB Stadtverkehr has a much smaller
market share but mostly their services are tendered out. A closer look at the
migration matrix shows that DB Stadtverkehr regains 44.6% of their services
tendered out, or 3.7% more than municipal incumbents. The corresponding fig-
ure for private incumbents, 76.8%, has to be interpreted with care, because this
could be due to regains of privates or switches from privates to other privates.
The average probability for operator changes of 58.2% reflects the weighted diag-
onal of the batch migration matrix under consideration of switches from privates
to other privates.
The highest switching rate is reached by private operators, gaining 54.3% of
the services formerly provided by DB Stadtverkehr companies. Small private
operators may have cost advantages through lower wages and bus depots in the
center of their operating areas, but economies of scale for larger companies may
be a counter-argument. In the meantime, DB Stadtverkehr faces the competition
with models of cooperation, integration, and joint ventures.9
A similar picture emerges for the vehicle-km migration matrix in Table 5.3,
which shows the distribution of vehicle-km driven per year before and after the
tendering process between the three groups of operators. In contrast to the
batch migration matrix shown in Table 5.2, it becomes evident that batches
with municipal incumbents exhibit higher volumes per batch, and batches with
private incumbents exhibit smaller volumes per batch. Furthermore it shows
the very low regain rate of DB Stadtverkehr in terms of vehicle-km, only 18.7%.
9See Deutsche Bahn AG (2009b, p. 22).
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Table 5.3: Vehicle-km migration matrix
before tender Winner is*
abs.** rel. (1) (2) (3)
after abs.**
∑
111.6 30.2 17.0 64.4
tender rel.
∑
100% 27.1% 15.2% 57.7%
Incumbent is subsidiary of DB 55.1 49.3% 18.7% 1.3% 80.1%
Municipal incumbent 22.4 20.1% 7.9% 56.1% 35.9%
Private incumbent 34.1 30.6% 25.5% 3.3% 71.2%
*(1) Subsidiary of DB, (2) municipal or (3) private company; **In m vehicle-km; Abs. = absolute, rel. = relative
Source: Own calculation
Municipal companies have a much higher rate with 56.1%.
The incumbent is not further considered in the analysis. On the one hand
I apply variables that can serve as proxies for incumbents, e.g., urban batches
are very likely to be operated by municipal operators before the tender. On
the other hand, preferential treatments for some kind of companies are difficult
to implement because the decision on the winner is mainly based on the single
criteria of subsidy requirements.
5.3.2 Probit Estimation
In the following I conduct several econometric probit estimations to detect the
influence of structural variables on the probability of an operator change in com-
petitive tendering.10 The dependent variable in the models shown in Table 5.4
is therefore always operator change, taking “1” if the new operator has not been
the operator before the tender and otherwise “0”.11 I conduct the estimations
with Stata 9.1 using the Newton-Raphson algorithm for maximum likelihood
optimization.12 The Pseudo R2 reported here is defined according to McFadden
(Kohler and Kreuter, 2006, p. 286).
The inclusion order of variables is driven by significant levels and the follow-
10The study design was inspired by Lalive and Schmutzler (2008) who conducted a similar
analysis for regional rail services in Germany.
11If there is more than one operator before the tender, e. g., if several formerly independent
lines have been bundled into a new batch, the variable operator change will take “1” if the new
operator has not been providing any of the old lines, and “0” if the new operator has been pro-
viding some or all lines which have been bundled in the new batch. If the operating subsidiary
in a corporate group has changed, this is not classified as operator change. Furthermore, all
new batches (in the sense of no prior existing services) are excluded to avoid distortions in the
dependent variable.
12I also experimented with the software BIOGEME 1.8 (Bierlaire, 2008) using different algo-
rithms. The results are very similar to those presented here.
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ing rationale: The first simple model uses the number of bidders as the single
independent variable influencing an operator change. The number of bidders is
itself determined by structural conditions of the tender and cannot be considered
simultaneously in a probit estimation.13 In the following models, I hence replace
the number of bidders by structural conditions. First, I consider structural con-
ditions that are exogenous to the transport authorities (start year, spatial type of
transport). Then I turn to variables that are changeable by the authorities (no.
of vehicles, no. of lines, operation period, type of contract). The tender round
variables, combined with the federal state, exhibit a special case, because tender
round is related to start year. I dedicate an extra model to these variables.
The coefficient of the number of bidders is significantly positive at the 1% level.
As a first result, I can state:
Result 1: The more bidders participate in the tender the more likely
is an operator change.
The reasoning is that the number of bidders is an indicator for the attrac-
tiveness of the tender. With an increasing number of bidders, it becomes more
probable that there will be one bidder with a better offering than the incumbent,
leading to an operator change.
The second model introduces a time dimension, represented by time dummies
for the years 2005–2009 with 1997–2004 representing the omitted reference cat-
egory. The coefficients are all significantly negative (except for 2005) with the
magnitude increasing from early to recent years.
Result 2: The later the tender occurs the less likely is an operator
change.
In the late 1990s, competitive tendering was new to the German bus sector,
and many entrepreneurs wanted to try it out. As decision support systems
improved, and in some cases the winner’s curse appeared,14 participation has
declined. Moreover, some batches were tendered for a second time. Increased
market maturity is said to be related to decreased competition intensity, poten-
tially because of increased market concentration, operator resignations, and so
on. This development is similar to the one described for France and London
(Amaral et al., 2009). In Germany, the average number of bidders is 7.6 at
the beginning of competitive tendering (1997–2004), pointing to a “gold rush”
13I also conducted preliminary OLS estimations with the number of bidders as dependent
variable and the structural conditions as independent variables. The coefficient results are
similar to those presented here.
14See Beck (2006) for an example.
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character.
The second model includes the spatial type of transport. In a simple differ-
entiation, I use a dummy for mixed services and a dummy for urban services,
whereas regional services represent the reference category. The coefficients for
mixed and urban services are significantly negative at the 10% level.
Result 3: Tendering regional services more often leads to an oper-
ator change.
One can expect that urban services are less attractive to bidders in compar-
ison to regional services because of the complexities of providing services in
urban areas such as the locations of bus depots, network effects, congestion,
etc. For mixed services, the same argument applies with the additional com-
plexity of providing both regional and urban services. Bus design for example
differs across settlement structures. Low-floor buses are preferred in urban areas
whereas coach-type buses are preferred in rural areas.
The third model includes the number of vehicles required and the number of
lines in the batch. The coefficient of the number of vehicles required is signifi-
cantly positive at the 5% level.
Result 4: The more vehicles required in the tender the more likely is
an operator change.
The number of vehicles required is an indicator for the size of the tender. Large
tenders entail higher revenue potential. Assuming that the effort for the sub-
mission of a bid only increases slightly with larger tenders, large tenders also
involve a better revenue potential to bid effort ratio. Hence, large tenders are
more appealing to local public transport companies.
The number of lines however is significantly negative at the 5% level.
Result 5: The more lines bundled in a batch the less likely an op-
erator change.
Since I include the number of vehicles and the number of lines simultaneously
in the regression, the number of vehicles fully captures the size of the batch, yet
the number of lines on the other hand picks up complexity. More lines make
scheduling and network more complex. Although the true degree of complexity
depends on the network structure (which is difficult to measure), lines may serve
as a good proxy.
The result is emphasized by two additional regressions (Table 5.5). Model A
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Table 5.5: Additional probit regression results with combined variables
Model A B
Variable Estimate Estimate
Start in 2005 -0.56 (0.39) -0.62 (0.39)
Start in 2006 -1.04∗∗∗ (0.37) -1.13∗∗∗ (0.37)
Start in 2007 -1.43∗∗∗ (0.38) -1.47∗∗∗ (0.38)
Start in 2008 -1.54∗∗∗ (0.39) -1.60∗∗∗ (0.36)
Start in 2009 -1.84∗∗∗ (0.58) -2.09∗∗∗ (0.56)
Mixed transport -0.45∗∗ (0.22)
Urban transport -0.39 (0.31)
No. of vehicles per line 0.09∗∗ (0.05)
No. of vehicles 0.03∗∗ (0.01)
Line-category -0.05∗∗∗ (0.02)
Constant 1.23∗∗∗ (0.34) 1.40∗∗∗ (0.32)
Pseudo R2 0.17 0.18
Log-likelihood -109.96 -109.26
χ2 46.55 47.95
Significance level 0.00 0.00
∗∗∗Significant at 1%, ∗∗significant at 5%, ∗significant at 10%; Standard errors in
parentheses; Line-category = no. of lines if urban transport and twice the no. of
lines if mixed or regional transport
Source: Own calculation
resembles Model 3 except that number of vehicles and lines is replaced by the
combined variable number of vehicles per line. The number of vehicles per line
is significantly positive at the 5% level.
I also experiment with a combination of these two variables. The variable line-
category takes the number of lines per batch if the spatial type of transport is
regional and twice the number of lines per batch if the spatial type of transport is
mixed or urban. This complexity measure turns out to be significantly negative
at the 1% level in Model B. It can hence be interpreted as follows. A single
regional line is least complex whereas a high number of lines in urban or mixed
areas indicate the highest network complexity.
The fourth model includes the operation period in years. Its coefficient is
significantly positive at the 10% level.
Result 6: A long operation period increases the chances for an op-
erator change.
The result shows that long operation periods in the sample positively trigger
operator changes in comparison to shorter periods. Longer operation periods
are more attractive to bidders because of planning reliability and lower invest-
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ment risks for the bus fleet. The operation period averages 6.5 years in the
sample and the maximum operation period amounts to 10 years. A short oper-
ation period may not encourage much investment in bids or assets. If a bus life
cycle of eight to twelve years is assumed, longer operation periods in the sample
may represent such life cycles and vehicles can fully amortize during the contract
period. Operation periods that are too long may raise incumbent advantages,
but also introduce new long-term risks for operators. This effect is however not
observable in the samples since the maximum period is 10 years.
The fifth model adds two more aspects, both without any significant influ-
ence. The two dummies that characterize the type of contract are gross-cost
contract and net-cost contract, and sub-contractor gross-cost contracts provides
the omitted reference category. I expect the net-cost contract to have a sig-
nificantly negative influence on the probability of an operator change, since the
operator has to additionally bear the revenue risk. Although this provides added
incentives and the chance for increased demand orientation, the additional risk
should make a tender less attractive. One could argue that it will only be less
attractive if this additional risk is not reflected in higher subsidies. This argu-
ment may also be valid for the complexities that arise with a high number of
lines and mixed or urban operations. As the standard variation for the type of
contract is high, I do not further interpret the coefficient.
The two dummies for Bayern and Hessen characterize the federal state in
which the tender and service takes place, with all other federal states (with the
small minority of tender) providing the omitted reference category. The differ-
ent political frameworks suggest that there are differences between federal states.
Here, I find no significant differences, possibly because the differences have al-
ready been accounted for in the structural variables.
Result 7: The type of contract and the federal state do not show
any significant influence on the probability of an operator change.
The sixth and last model in Table 5.4 adds the federal characteristic again,
in combination with the tender round. As competitive tendering is a relatively
new phenomenon in German local public transport, Bayern is the only state
where tender round 2 has regularly begun. It appears natural to introduce some
combinatorial variables associated with these aspects. I include a dummy for
first round tenders and a dummy for second round tenders in Bayern. I also
include the dummy for Hessen once more, with tenders in all other federal states
providing the omitted reference category. As the tender round contains a tem-
poral aspect, I include the new variables in a modification of the fourth model.
The coefficients for the tender rounds in Bayern are not significant.
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Result 8: The first and second tender round in Bayern show no sig-
nificant influence on an operator change.
I recognize that the coefficients for the first and second tender round in Bay-
ern are positive, with a higher magnitude than the coefficient for Bayern in
Model 5. This may also be related to the to the spatial type of transport which
was excluded from the sixth model. The coefficients of the variables operation
period, number of vehicles, and number of lines are otherwise very similar to the
other models.
5.4 Conclusion
The analysis showed that the focus of competitive tendering in Germany has been
on regional bus services, which led to a loss in market share for DB Stadtverkehr
companies and gains for private companies, whereas municipal services have only
rarely been tendered out.
I identified structural conditions that significantly influence the probability
of an operator change in competitive tendering of local public transport services
in Germany. Whereas a low percentage of operator changes is said to be an
imperfect indicator for the competition intensity, a high percentage of operator
changes appears to be a good sign of competition (Amaral et al., 2009). In the
analysis, 58% of operators have changed, but this value has decreased from 91%
between 1997 and 2004 to 38% in 2008, the last year fully captured.
The number of bidders is dependent on these structural variables. It can
also serve as an indicator for the possible savings from competitive tendering in
comparison to the previous approach of directly awarding concessions for line
services, without competition. Competitive tendering will achieve its targets
only if a sufficient number of bidders participate in the reverse auction. These
targets are an efficient production of services, a bid that corresponds to average
production costs plus an opportunity cost of capital that is normal in the market,
and a quality of services that is at least as good as before (Williamson, 1976).
The concrete monetary effects could not be evaluated, due to data constraints,
but should be subject to further research. It is then interesting to compare the
subsidies paid before the first tender, in the first tender round and in further
tender rounds. It would also be useful to separate those tenders where actual
savings could be realized from those tenders where the successful bidder only
won at the cost of future losses. When comparing the subsidy levels, structural
conditions should be accounted for again.
In detail, the analysis revealed some contractual variables that can be ad-
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justed in further tenders to foster competition. The tender design should not fit
a specific type of company, but encourage competition by providing equal con-
ditions for all bidders. A long operation period and a large volume in terms of
vehicle requirements positively influence operator changes. The number of lines
negatively influences operator changes. Some more structural variables could be
revealed as further determinants, but cannot be changed in a tender process be-
cause they are exogenous. An earlier start of operation and first round of tenders
in Bayern are such positive determinants and urban and mixed transports are
such negative determinants of operator changes. The type of contract did not
show any significant influence, possibly because of the low number of net-cost
contracts to date.
The latter issue highlights the importance of data availability. Whereas the
data set contains rich information about a multitude of tenders, some tenders are
missing and should be included in future analyses. The same applies to other
variables not considered here due to data constraints, such as the number of
batches per auction, the volume in terms of actual vehicle-km, planned timetable-
km, and timetable hours, and bonus-malus-systems and securities. Were desig-
nated information about the bidders available the analyses could be extended to
a multi-nominal system of alternatives.

Chapter 6
Prospects of Express Coach
Services
6.1 Introduction
Express coach services in Germany historically have been heavily restricted by
regulation to protect the national railway from competition. According to the
Passenger Transport Act (§ 13 PBefG), which applies to all public road transport,
new services are only allowed if they can demonstrate significant improvements
in travel and the existing local or long-distance railway operator must first be
asked if it can operate the new service suggested or improve its service. Hence,
the possibilities for market entry have been negligible.1
Recently, the framework for transport provision has changed due to the lib-
eralization of transport markets in general, increased horizontal integration of
international transport companies, more environmental awareness, and demo-
graphics. These and other changes pose the question: From the viewpoint of
economics, is it worthwhile to supply extensive express coach services in Eu-
rope’s largest economy and transport market?
To relate the question to the challenges faced by Germany’s public transport
companies, I review their incentives for entrance to the market. I focus on the
diversification of existing transport operators and their corporate strategies, and
because of the scope of this chapter, omit looking at specialized entrepreneurs.
By providing a comprehensive economic analysis of the express coach market con-
sidering supply and demand, I contribute to the ongoing policy discussion. The
results are relevant for the business community, policymakers, and researchers.
The remainder of this chapter is structured as follows. Section 6.2 describes
1The subsequent chapter is based on Walter et al. (2009b). See also Becker et al. (2008) for
the implementation of the conjoint analysis.
111
112 PROSPECTS OF EXPRESS COACH SERVICES
selected international express coach operations. I review the existing literature
about express coach services and conduct a player analysis of the major firms
operating express coach services with respect to business segments and their
turnover figures. A profitability analysis shows the attractiveness of market
entry. Section 6.3 looks at the regulatory practice in Germany as well as the
major German public transport players that potentially could be interested in
providing express services. Section 6.4 looks at the supply side by comparing
external and internal costs of different modes of transport. Section 6.5 studies
the demand side with a market share estimation derived from a conjoint analysis
based on an extensive survey. Section 6.6 concludes.
6.2 Selected International Express Coach Experience
6.2.1 International Literature on Express Coach Services
The deregulation of express coach services in Britain in 1980 has been inten-
sively analyzed in the international literature (e. g., Cross and Kilvington, 1985,
and Robbins and White, 1986). More recent papers focus on efficiency analy-
sis of coach and bus transportation (Yu and Fan, 2008, for Taiwan, Dalen and
Go´mez-Lobo, 2003, for Norway) and on scheduling express coach services (Yan
and Tang, 2008, and Yan et al., 2007). However, recent literature on the regu-
lation of express coach markets and on the overall perspectives of express coach
services is rare. There are some governmental reports and domestic articles on
the development of services, e. g., Maertens (2006) for Germany, Statens Institut
fo¨r Kommunikationsanalys (2005, 2007) and Banverket (2006) for Sweden, and
Schwieterman et al. (2007) and Transit Cooperative Research Program (1999,
2002) for the US.
6.2.2 Market Shares, Turnover Figures, and Profitability
To study Germany, I first look at domestic express coach activities in the UK,
the US, and Sweden,2 because they have already experienced liberalization (UK
1980, Sweden 1998, US 1982). Their express coach markets are dominated by
integrated transport companies offering mainly train, express coach, and local
bus services (UK and Sweden), and to a lesser extent in the US, where the
market is more diversified.3 Understanding the domestic express coach activities
2An additional consideration of international express coach connections, apart from purely
domestic services, is beyond the scope of this chapter. However, to provide some background,
there is a dense network of international express coach lines connecting Germany with many
destinations throughout Europe.
3This explains why I omit express coach services in Finland, South America, etc.
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in these countries is relevant for Section 6.3 which focuses specifically on the
market opportunities for local public transport companies in Germany.
Player Analysis for Great Britain
National Express is the market leader in Great Britain with a market share of
83% in British express coach services in 2007 (National Express Group, 2008). In
that year National Express generated total revenues of over 3 bn EUR. Its largest
branch is represented by the UK train business with 56% turnover share. Local
buses in Great Britain and the North American student transport division of
National Express generate 12% each of total turnover. Urban and commuter as
well as long distance services in Spain contribute 11% of total turnover, followed
by the British express coach division with a 9% turnover share. Figure 6.1 shows
the normalized operating profit margin4 of National Express’ different business
units from 2003 through 2007. Additionally the operating profit margin of the
company as a whole is given. National Express shows an express coach profitabil-
ity continuously above company average. Profitability of express coach services
is only topped by the profitability of local bus services: 14.2% in comparison to
10.0% for 2007.
The “biggest” rival of National Express’ coach services is Stagecoach with the
coach brands Oxford Tube, megabus.com and Citylink. Stagecoach is another
integrated transport company active in the rail, coach, and bus sectors. While
National Express acts as a franchisor and contracts with local bus companies in
order to keep its express coach business running, Stagecoach manages its own
bus operations. These operations are, as White (2008) points out, mainly based
on pre-booking relying on a yield management system.
Player Analysis for the US
Stagecoach is also active in the US. This market has 3500 providers (Nathan
Associates Inc., 2006), making it far more diversified than any European market.
The market leader, Greyhound, is a subsidiary of another integrated British
transport company, FirstGroup. Greyhound has a share of 37% in the total US
market for express coach services of around 0.95 bn EUR in 2007 (FirstGroup,
2007 and BEA, 2008). For First Group, the adjusted operating profit margin5
of express coach operations is 3.1% in 2007. This relatively low number in
comparison to Great Britain can be explained by the restructuring undertaken
4Profit before tax, goodwill impairment, intangible amortization and exceptional items di-
vided by revenue.
5Profit before amortization charges, non-recurring bid costs, other non-recurring items, and
profit/loss on disposal of properties divided by revenue.
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after the company’s acquisition, by various competing offerings in the market
in general, and by the price wars among competitors particularly on the East
Coast.6
Player Analysis for Sweden
The express coach market in Sweden is dominated by Swebus Express, a sub-
sidiary of Concordia Bus. Concordia Bus is one of Scandinavia’s largest trans-
portation companies with a turnover of more than 0.5 bn EUR in 2007/2008.7
Horizontally integrated as well, Concordia Bus operates only with buses. Rev-
enues from contractual bus services in Sweden amounted to a revenue proportion
of 74%, followed by contract services in Finland (10%) and Norway (9%) and the
express coach revenues of Swebus Express (7%) (Concordia Bus, 2008). Swebus
Express operates mainly on the trunk routes between the domestic urban areas
of Stockholm, Go¨teburg, and Malmo¨, but serves Oslo and København as well.
The main competitor in intermodal transportation is Statens Ja¨rnva¨gar (SJ), the
largest Swedish rail company, which has a market share of 75%, whereas Swebus
Express has a 5% share (Concordia Bus, 2008) in intermodal competition. The
operating profit margin8 of Concordia’s express coach services is superior to its
other business units.
Summary of the International Player Analysis
In Great Britain and Sweden, the express coach markets are dominated by inte-
grated transport companies. In the cases of Concordia in Sweden and Stagecoach
in Great Britain, local bus and express coach services are operated by the same
company. National Express reverts to other local bus companies by their fran-
chising strategy. Although First Group’s US-American Greyhound business is
not directly linked to local services as well, the company still represents a model
of offering all services in one company. The strategies described above could
function as models for German public transport companies to adopt, because
the German firms already own parking and maintenance facilities and employ
driver workforces.
While it can be difficult to directly compare the profitability of companies
across the three countries I have selected, because some are franchisors or fran-
chisees, some offer local and rail services in addition to express coach, and some
operate in more than one country, international experience suggests that express
6The operating profit margins for FirstGroup are only available for 2007, because FirstGroup
acquired Greyhound in early 2007.
7Exchange rate Swedish Krona to EUR (5 December 2008): 0.0945.
8Profit including dissolution of provisions for loss contracts, restructuring expenses, and
reconstruction expenses divided by revenue.
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Figure 6.1: Operating profit margin of express coach market leaders in the UK, Sweden, and
the US
Source: Own illustration derived from annual reports
coach services are not only a reasonable possibility for diversifying transport
activities, but may also improve average profitability.
6.3 German Situation
6.3.1 Regulatory Barriers to Market Entry
To understand the German express coach market, I describe the regulatory
framework set by legislation, and the specific consequences that impact express
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coach services. Domestic express coach services in general are scarce.9 The first
regulatory ordinance and the first law were created in the 1920s and affirmed
forty years later by the enactment of the Passenger Transport Act in 1961. This
law was originally designed to protect Deutsche Bundesbahn, the national rail op-
erator, from Germany’s rapidly expanding bus and coach companies. The PBefG
limits the possibility to set up new services. Existing operators can expand their
services with priority and the 1961 law explicitly prohibits competition among
different operators on a single route.
In recent years, several judiciary appeals by incumbents (i. e., the enterprise
serving a similar or partially parallel route) which were unhappy after a con-
cession was granted to a competitor have produced inconsistent decisions by
German courts.10 Market entrants and established firms and policy-makers have
hence been refused a clear understanding of the law’s application. I note also that
continued political support in Germany for the 1961 law goes against the intent
of the European Union to encourage competitive transport markets throughout
the continent.
6.3.2 Diversification Opportunities for Public Transport Com-
panies
Before analyzing the supply and demand of domestic express coach services in
Germany, I want to show the strategic business options in a deregulated express
coach market. I hereby refer to Figure 1.1 in which I conduct a strategic player
analysis of the German bus market. Four main types are identified: munici-
pally owned local transport companies, state-run public transport companies,
international players, and private SMEs.
For municipally owned local transport companies, there are three strategic
possibilities in a deregulated German express coach market. One is direct en-
try, where economies of scope can be realized for sales and marketing or, most
importantly, for technical divisions such as vehicle maintenance, fuel purchas-
ing, etc. Municipal companies can also utilize their existing depots and service
9Apart from some airport links, most of the few existing routes offer only one daily depar-
ture. Historically, there are various connections from and to Berlin. However, a dense schedule
with hourly departures is only offered on a single route connecting Berlin and Hamburg (Berlin-
LinienBus, 2008).
10Veolia subsidiary NordWestBahn circumvented the introduction of an express coach service
intended by Deutsche Bahn between Bielefeld and Paderborn because of its partially parallel
train services (O¨PNV-Wettbewerb, 2007). Between Frankfurt and Dortmund, Deutsche Touring
was allowed to offer coach services despite existing train connections by Deutsche Bahn (O¨PNV-
Wettbewerb, 2008). This was also the first time a German court accepted the argument that
significant lower prices on the bus route would count as an “improvement” of the transport
service. It is possible that the court’s ruling could be a major turning point for the introduction
of new express coach services in Germany.
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areas as starting points for long-distance routes. To exploit these synergies at
both ends of their routes, local operators can partner or cooperate with simi-
lar companies in other cities and regions. A second strategic possibility is that
local public transport operators or their private subcompanies can act as sub-
contractors that deliver services to the enterprises holding the concession. On
the operational side, the advantages are similar to those resulting from direct
entry, but leave the potential risks arising from a lack of market information in
long-distance traffic to the contractor. A third option is to operate as a fran-
chisee and thus benefit from the experience and reputation of the franchisor.
A natural candidate for a contractor or franchisor is DB Stadtverkehr. An al-
ternative option for DB Stadtverkehr is direct entry without subcontracting or
franchising.
A possible strategy for gaining market share in a deregulated express coach
market for foreign companies is to pursue a franchise strategy. For direct market
entry, most would face the need to cooperate with local partners, however, since
depots and other key infrastructure may be too costly to install in other regions
solely for use by express coach services. In this case more acquisitions may be
expected, although most of the large enterprises’ growth in market share has
been based on winning competitive tenderings in the past.
The strategic options of local SMEs in a deregulated express coach market lie
in subcontracts, franchised operations, or direct entry through co-operation with
similar SMEs like Svenska Buss in Sweden. Their major advantage is experience
with hired coach travel, a business similar to express coach services but with less
regularity and less risk. 2% of these enterprises already offer (on a limited scale)
long-distance scheduled transportation, mainly on less-regulated international
routes (Bundesverband Deutscher Omnibusunternehmer, 2009).
6.4 Analysis of External and Internal Costs
Next, I evaluate the potential supply of and demand for express coach services
in Germany. External and internal costs are significant criteria in comparing
means of transport and both give important evidence about the economic and
environmental effects of intercity bus usage. In 2005, overall external costs for
passenger and goods transportation in Germany totaled 80.4 bn EUR (INFRAS,
2007), which includes the costs resulting from accidents, air pollution (basically
particulate matter), climate (mainly for CO2), noise, up- and downstream pro-
cesses (e. g., energy generation for trains), disruption of the natural environment,
and additional costs for urban areas.
To establish a consistent basis for comparison, I must calculate all costs per
person and per kilometer. Therefore it is necessary to examine capacity utiliza-
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tion for all transport sectors. For trains and airplanes, I use the capacity utiliza-
tion of the market leaders (Deutsche Bahn AG, 2008, and Lufthansa, 2008), and
for passenger cars I use data from the largest German automobile club (ADAC,
2008). Higher petrol prices have made arranged lifts (carpooling) more popular
in Germany.11 A study by Strauß and Stegmu¨ller (2006) has determined a capac-
ity utilization of 3.5 people per passenger car in the case of arranged lifts which
is much higher than the average capacity utilization of 1.5 people per passenger
car in Germany, determined by INFRAS (2007). For hired coach transporta-
tion for tourism purposes, I assume capacity utilization between 60% to 80%
(Umweltbundesamt, 2008, and Maertens, 2006), but these values can not be ap-
plied to express coach services without further study. Due to in-advance booking,
hired coach travel tends to achieve high-capacity utilization. Hence, for express
coach services, I assume the lower boundary of 60% capacity utilization. For a
second scenario, I assume a capacity utilization of 44%, prevailing for intercity
rail transportation in Germany.12 Figure 6.2 shows that express coach services
have the same or lower external costs as all other means of transport. Regular
and non-scheduled bus services feature non-internalized costs of 1.56 EUR per
100 passenger-kilometers for an operating grade of 60%. Even with a capacity
utilization of 44%, express coach services achieve the same level of external costs
as the other means of transport. The highest external cost fraction for express
coaches is represented by accident costs.
Figure 6.3 sets the external costs in relation to internal costs. Data for in-
tercity trains, airplanes, and passenger cars derive from Deutsche Bahn AG
(2008), Lufthansa (2008), and ADAC (2008). To identify internal costs for ex-
press coach transportation I use the proposed costs by Maertens (2006) and
Leuthardt (2008), cost values identified through the Transport Statistics Great
Britain (Department for Transport, 2007)13, and the cost values of the Swedish
market leader Concordia Bus (Concordia Bus, 2008). Despite these different
approaches, I find nearly identical cost values and take the mean of them in
the following. Nonetheless, I note that costs will depend considerably on the
degree of capacity utilization for express coaches as well. Figure 6.3 shows that
the express coach segment is first for both scenarios. Hence, cost advantages on
11Arranged lifts or rides are characterized by informal private agreements to travel to-
gether. In doing so the car owner usually posts the offering on the Internet (e. g., www.
mitfahrgelegenheit.de, retrieved 06 March 2009). Car owners are price-takers due to the
large amount of offerings.
12Information on the capacity utilization of Deutsche Bahn ranges between 42% to 48%
(Handelsblatt.com, 2008, Umweltbundesamt, 2008, and Deutsche Bahn AG, 2008.)
13Regarding the Transport Statistics Great Britain (Department for Transport, 2007) internal
costs are calculated as the ratio of overall transportation revenues and passenger-kilometers
generated by express coach services. To get the costs, revenues are reduced by the 10% profit
margin of National Express in 2007.
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Figure 6.2: External costs in long-distance passenger traffic under consideration of different
operating grades
Source: Own illustration based on INFRAS (2007)
both the external and the internal costs side appear, with a possible internaliza-
tion of external costs leading to increased competition of express coach services,
independent of operating grades.
6.5 Market Share Estimation
6.5.1 Methodology: Conjoint Analysis
Having evaluated the supply side of express coach services, I now turn to demand
estimation, using a conjoint analysis. This method measures the share of single
components to overall utility based on empirically collected total utility values
(Backhaus et al., 2006, pp. 557 ff.). The generated partial utility values are
aggregated to a preference-determining total utility value. Identifying partial
utility values is realized via changing combinations of attribute levels (stimulus).
The recall of the stimuli uses either profile or trade-off methodologies (although
the full profile method is more complex with an increasing number of attributes,
the trade-off method delivers less accurate results, because the customer can only
choose between two attributes). A combination of both methodologies is here
employed.
The attribute levels are typical for the respective products. This leads to
restrictive assumptions, which are to be respected while choosing attributes.
Advantageous for a conjoint analysis, the importance of single attributes is mea-
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Figure 6.3: Internal and external costs in long-distance passenger traffic considering different
operating grades
Source: Own illustration after Becker et al. (2008) and INFRAS (2007)
sured indirectly through the combination of attribute levels. Hence inaccuracies
due to errors of omission and errors of commission (Fujii and Ga¨rling, 2003) are
minimized. Furthermore, there is a possibility to develop or design products,
which in their combination of attribute levels have not existed previously, since
any combination of attributes to a total utility value is possible.14
The first-choice rule, also called the maximum utility rule, is used here to
calculate market shares. The rule implies that each respondent can only choose
one alternative per purchase (obviously true of decision-making about travel).
Following Henrichsmeier (1998), market shares determined by first-choice rule
are the more valid the more extensive the purchase decision. As a majority of
the respondents15 stated that their choice for a means of transport was rethought
before starting their travel, the decision process is proven to be extensive.
However, the first-choice rule is a very restrictive decision. Even when the
difference between utility values is slight, only the alternative with the highest
value is chosen. Therefore, the sample size must be sufficiently large to min-
imize the standard error. Orme (1998) recommends a respondent number of
14For a more detailed description of consumer-choice modeling with a conjoint analysis, see
Green and Srinivasan (1990).
1568.15% of all respondents stated that they consider alternative means of transport before
traveling, 31.85% stated to be determined on a certain means of transport.
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approximately 200 individuals. By transforming product decision probabilities,
the first-choice rule then leads to the generation of market shares.
6.5.2 Questionnaire and Sample
The questionnaire for the conjoint analysis was available on an independent
Web site between 8 April and 30 September 2008 to reach a large number of
respondents. Although internet-based advertising via bulletin boards, news-
groups, newsletters, and online communities was quite successful, I note that
not all of the proportions in the data set were representative of Germany’s ac-
tual population. Therefore statistical loadings were applied in order to receive
representative results. The resulting sets were then classified to find information
on market share by social groups (e. g., home region, age, income, etc.). After
eliminating implausible and incomplete sets, the final sample consisted of 1200
usable observations (respondents), which fulfilled the requirement to apply the
first-choice rule.
Respondents questions were asked about socio-demographic aspects and past
travel behavior for purposes of classification. Four relevant attributes were in-
cluded: travel price, duration of travel, service/comfort, and reliability. The ac-
tual conjoint analysis which required respondents to state their preferences first
presents different levels of only one attribute. In subsequent questions, the set
of alternatives includes up to three attributes with different levels. An example
is to choose between alternative 1 with travel duration of 3 hours, travel price of
20 EUR, and a medium service/comfort level on the one hand and alternative 2
with travel duration of 1:45 hours, travel price of 40 EUR, and a low service/
comfort level. Travel price and duration of travel are objective attributes with
a definite measuring scale. Thus an explicit level can be assigned to each choice
of transport (for Germany’s long-distance traffic they are passenger car, train,
bus, and aircraft). Passenger cars were differentiated by respondent-driven cars
and cars driven by someone else.16 Service/comfort and reliability are subjective
attributes, meaning that the same level of an attribute at the same time can be
perceived differently by different customers. Defining a certain level of service
and explaining it to all respondents would risk introducing irrelevant elements
into the analysis. Hence, for the two subjective attributes each respondent was
required to assign a level (high, medium, low) to the four choices of transport.
Then the individual levels to the utility value calculation were applied.
16The differentiation was introduced to cover the services of agencies for arranged lifts, which
are common in Germany, especially for younger people.
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6.5.3 Market Share Results
In order to receive appropriate market shares, the availability of the different
means of transport must be considered, since not all means of transport are
available for every trip. 77.0% of all Germans have access to a passenger car
(Statistisches Bundesamt, 2007). The availability factors for train respectively
air transport are basically calculated from the structural data of the German
Bundesamt fu¨r Bauwesen und Raumordnung (2006), resulting in 10.0% for air
travel and 63.6% for long-distance train travel.17 Two scenarios for the mar-
ket shares of different transport modes are estimated. In the first scenario, the
availability of express coaches is set equal to the long-distance railway service
availability. This does not imply that coaches only stop at train stations; rather,
it means that express coach stops and rail stations are accessible for the same
number of people. Based on this assumption, Figure 6.4, left, shows the sce-
nario of higher network coverage for express coach services on a representative
300 kilometer long-distance trip.18 I observe a high potential, up to 28%, for
express coaches, compared to trains (19%). Passenger cars retain about 50% of
market share, and air is last at 3.9%. These findings indicate that following ex-
press coach deregulation, passenger cars will likely lose the most market share.19
Additionally, in the highly elastic long-distance market an additional mode could
not only divert trips from other modes, but also stimulate new or more frequent
travel (e. g., making a visiting friends and relatives trip twice instead of once a
year if price were reduced).
Figure 6.4 (right) evaluates a second scenario with lower network and access
point density. Apparently, regarding the few currently existing express coach
routes (and excepting tourist services), only cities with more than 100 000 in-
habitants are served. This matches observations in the deregulated Swedish
17The availability factors for train and aircraft are calculated on the basis of the population
distribution given by Bundesamt fu¨r Bauwesen und Raumordnung (2006) as follows: At a travel
distance of 300 kilometers a maximum access time to long-distance rail stations or airports of
30 minutes is set as acceptable. Ca. 26 m people live in the ambit of these 30 minutes around
all German passenger airports, which in relation to today’s total population of 82.4 m people
leads to an availability factor of 0.3158. Accessibility of long-distance rail stations in the same
radius is calculated analogically to 0.7974. As this considers only the access, but in most
cases destination airport or destination rail station are not the final destination of a trip, the
calculated factors are squared to cover the availability at the destination as well. This results
in a relatively low availability factor of 10% for air travel. However, through the distance
restriction imposed, traveling from and to Berlin is for example not possible by aircraft within
300 kilometers.
18The distance of 300 kilometers was chosen because it is approximately the medium travel
distance in German domestic long-distance traffic (Reim and Reichel, 2005).
19The most recent survey on modal split in German long-distance travel for different distances
(Zumkeller, 2005) results in an empirically determined modal split of approximately 80% for
road transport and 18% for rail transportation.
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Figure 6.4: Market shares in long-distance passenger traffic for routes of 300 km length
Source: Own illustration
market, where most long-distance coach services concentrate on links between
metropolitan areas. Here I have calculated an availability of 8.9%, which pro-
duces a 5.3% market share for express coaches. Even assuming low accessibility,
express coach services are competitive.
The results also reveal interesting correlations between some socio-demograph-
ic criteria and coach affinity. As shown in Figure 6.5, older, younger, albeit to
a lower extent, and low-income individuals tend to use coach services more in-
tensely. Although the lower ticket prices for coach travel partially accounts for
this finding, on the other hand older people may express an unwillingness to
travel long distances by passenger car (their health may be a factor), or do not
hold driving licenses.20
6.6 Conclusion
Currently, the German regulatory regime for long-distance transportation im-
pedes competition and protects monopolistic structures, contradicting the Euro-
pean Union’s intentions to create freely accessible markets. In particular, express
coach services are not allowed to prove their economical and environmental su-
20The socio-demographic results refer to the scenario of low network coverage. The corre-
sponding results for the high network coverage are quite similar.
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Figure 6.5: Market shares for the scenario of lower network coverage differentiated by income
and age
Source: Own illustration
periority. Express coaches have the lowest internal and external costs among
all long-distance transport, and with additional internalization of external costs,
their economic advantages increase.
Due to recent developments, however, regulatory changes can be expected
which encourage more competition in Germany’s long-distance travel sector. The
results predict an express coach market share in national long-distance travel of
at least 5%. I suggest that both seniors and people with lower incomes would
use express coaches more often.
I find that this potential market offers interesting diversification opportunities
for public transport firms. Economies of scope with local bus services can be
expected in various areas, including sales and marketing, vehicle maintenance,
and fuel purchasing. These agglomeration economies are critical success factors
for withstanding competition and ensuring profitability. However, I note that
this may only hold for the scenario of high network coverage, because a critical
volume may be necessary to exploit the potential.
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Appendix A
Program Code
This appendix provides the program code for the econometric and linear pro-
gramming calculations. The reader will find commands provided by the program
in blue letters.
A.1 LIMDEP Code for Chapter 2
? LIMDEP CODE: COST EFFICIENCY AND SOME OF ITS DETERMINANTS
? r e s e t and a f t e rwa r d s s e t range w i th data ( out da ta v04d mw 02092009 . x l s )
r e s e t $
? −−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−?
? v a r i a b l e d e f i n i t i o n
? −−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−?
? t o t a l c o s t s
create ; c1=pe r c o s t+mat cost+dep cos t+oth co s t+i n t c o s t+a s s c o s t $
? sea t−km in buse s
create ; y1=skm bus$
? sea t−km in r a i l−bound v e h i c l e s
create ; y2=skm tra$
? l a b o r p r i c e
create ; w1=pe r c o s t /mak$
? c a p i t a l p r i c e
create ; w2=(c1−pe r c o s t )/ ( s ea t bus+s e a t t r a )
? l i n e a r t ime t r end
create ; z1=t$
? q ua d r a t i c t ime t r end
create ; z1sq=t∗ t$
? t ime dummy 1998
create ; z12=td2$
? t ime dummy 1999
create ; z13=td3$
? t ime dummy 2000
create ; z14=td4$
? t ime dummy 2001
create ; z15=td5$
? t ime dummy 2002
create ; z16=td6$
? t ime dummy 2003
create ; z17=td7$
? t ime dummy 2004
create ; z18=td8$
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? t ime dummy 2005
create ; z19=td9$
? t ime dummy 2006
create ; z10=td10$
? network l e n g t h r a i l−bound
create ; z2=len tram$
? l i n e l e n g t h bus
create ; z3=len bus$
? popu l a t i o n in th e op e r a t i on area
create ; z4=pop area$
? i n v e r s e d e n s i t y index
create ; z5=pop area /( len tram+len bus ) $
? ou t s ou r c i n g share
create ; z6=pur co s t / c1$
? bus u t i l i z a t i o n r a t e
create ; z7=vkm bus/v bus$
? r a i l c a r u t i l i z a t i o n r a t e
create ; z8=vkm tram/v tram$
? r e s i d u a l o u t s ou r c i n g = o v e r a l l o u t s ou r c i n g s e pa r a t e d from bus s e r v i c e s u b c o n t r a c t i n g
create ; z9=z6/z7$
? −−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−?
? c r e a t e by mean d i v i d e d v a r i a b l e s
? −−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−?
? v a r i a b l e d e f i n i t i o n
matrix ; xbrc1 =[0] $
matrix ; xbry1 =[0] $
matrix ; xbry2 =[0] $
matrix ; xbrw1=[0] $
matrix ; xbrw2=[0] $
matrix ; xbrw3=[0] $
matrix ; xbrz1 =[0] $
matrix ; xbrz2 =[0] $
matrix ; xbrz5 =[0] $
matrix ; xbrz6 =[0] $
matrix ; xbrz7 =[0] $
matrix ; xbrz8 =[0] $
matrix ; xbrz9 =[0] $
? mean c a l c u l a t i o n
calc ; xbrc1=xbr ( c1 ) $
calc ; xbry1=xbr ( y1 ) $
calc ; xbry2=xbr ( y2 ) $
calc ; xbrw1=xbr (w1) $
calc ; xbrw2=xbr (w2) $
calc ; xbrw3=xbr (w3) $
calc ; xbrz1=xbr ( z1 ) $
calc ; xbrz2=xbr ( z2 ) $
calc ; xbrz5=xbr ( z5 ) $
calc ; xbrz6=xbr ( z6 ) $
calc ; xbrz7=xbr ( z7 ) $
calc ; xbrz8=xbr ( z8 ) $
calc ; xbrz9=xbr ( z9 ) $
? mean d i v i d e d v a r i a b l e c r e a t i o n
create ; c1xc=c1/xbrc1$
create ; y1xc=y1/xbry1$
create ; y2xc=y2/xbry2$
create ; w1xc=w1/xbrw1$
create ; w2xc=w2/xbrw2$
create ; w3xc=w3/xbrw3$
create ; z1xc=z1/xbrz1$
create ; z2xc=z2/xbrz2$
create ; z5xc=z5/xbrz5$
create ; z6xc=z6/xbrz6$
create ; z7xc=z7/xbrz7$
create ; z8xc=z8/xbrz8$
create ; z9xc=z9/xbrz9$
? −−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−?
? e s t a b l i s h l i n e a r homogenei ty in f a c t o r p r i c e s
? −−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−?
create ; c1 lh=c1xc/w1xc$
create ; w2lh=w2xc/w1xc$
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? −−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−?
? c r e a t e v a r i a b l e s f o r t r a n s l o g f u n c t i o n
? −−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−?
? l o g a r i t hms
create ; l n c1 lh=log ( c1 lh ) $
create ; lny1=log ( y1xc ) $
create ; lny2=log ( y2xc ) $
create ; lnw2lh=log (w2lh ) $
? square terms
create ; y1sq = lny1∗ lny1 ∗0.5 $
create ; y2sq = lny2∗ lny2 ∗0.5 $
create ; w2lhsq = lnw2lh∗ lnw2lh ∗0.5 $
? c r o s s terms
create ; y1y2 = lny1∗ lny2$
create ; y1w2lh = lny1∗ lnw2lh$
create ; y2w2lh = lny2∗ lnw2lh$
? −−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−?
? name l i s t s f o r v a r i a b l e c a l l i n g
? −−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−?
namelist ; xcyw=one , lny1 , lny2 , lnw2lh , y1sq , y2sq , w2lhsq , y1y2 , y1w2lh , y2w2lh$
namelist ; time=z12 , z13 , z14 , z15 , z16 , z17 , z18 , z19 , z10$
? −−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−?
? e s t ima t i on o f Random E f f e c t s models
? −−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−?
frontier ; cost ; lhs=lnc1 lh ; rhs=xcyw , time , z5xc ; panel ; pds=NI ; e f f=ucrem$
calc ; rem=l o g l $
create ; e f f c r em=exp(−ucrem ) $
kernel ; rhs=ef fc rem$
? model o f p u b l i c a t i o n
frontier ; cost ; lhs=lnc1 lh ; rhs=xcyw , time , z5xc ; het ; hfu=one , z8xc ; panel ; pds=ni ;
e f f=ucrem8$
calc ; remz8=l o g l $
create ; e fcrem8=exp(−ucrem8 ) $
kernel ; rhs=efcrem8$
frontier ; cost ; lhs=lnc1 lh ; rhs=xcyw , time , z5xc ; het ; hfu=one , z6xc , z8xc ; panel ; pds=ni ;
e f f=ucrem68$
calc ; remz6z8=l o g l $
create ; e fcrem68=exp(−ucrem68 ) $
kernel ; rhs=efcrem68$
? −−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−?
? e s t ima t i on o f True Random E f f e c t s models
? −−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−?
? model o f p u b l i c a t i o n
frontier ; cost ; lhs=lnc1 lh ; rhs=xcyw , time , z5xc ; par$
frontier ; cost ; lhs=lnc1 lh ; rhs=xcyw , time , z5xc ; hfn=one , z6xc , z8xc ;
pds=ni ; rpm ; fcn=one (n ) ; halton ; pts=1000; e f f=uctre68 ; test :b(21)=0 ,b(22)=0$
create ; e f c t r e 6 8=exp(−uctre68 ) $
kernel ; rhs=e f c t r e 6 8$
? model o f p u b l i c a t i o n ( d i f f e r e n t Wald t e s t than in th e model above )
frontier ; cost ; lhs=lnc1 lh ; rhs=xcyw , time , z5xc ; par$
frontier ; cost ; lhs=lnc1 lh ; rhs=xcyw , time , z5xc ; hfn=one , z6xc , z8xc ;
pds=ni ; rpm ; fcn=one (n ) ; halton ; pts=1000; e f f=uctre68 ; test :b(21)=0$
? model o f p u b l i c a t i o n ( d i f f e r e n t Wald t e s t than in th e model above )
frontier ; cost ; lhs=lnc1 lh ; rhs=xcyw , time , z5xc ; par$
frontier ; cost ; lhs=lnc1 lh ; rhs=xcyw , time , z5xc ; hfn=one , z6xc , z8xc ;
pds=ni ; rpm ; fcn=one (n ) ; halton ; pts=1000; e f f=uctre68 ; test :b(22)=0$
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? −−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−?
? e s t ima t i on o f Random Parameter models
? −−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−?
? model o f p u b l i c a t i o n
frontier ; cost ; lhs=lnc1 lh ; rhs=xcyw , time , z5xc ; par$
frontier ; cost ; lhs=lnc1 lh ; rhs=xcyw , time , z5xc ; hfn=one , z6xc , z8xc ;
pds=ni ; rpm ; fcn=one (n) , lny1 (n) , lny2 (n ) ; halton ; pts=1000; e f f=efcrpm68 ;
test :b(19)=0 ,b(20)=0$
create ; efcrpm68=exp(−ucrpm68 ) $
kernel ; rhs=efcrpm68$
? model o f p u b l i c a t i o n ( d i f f e r e n t Wald t e s t than in th e model above )
frontier ; cost ; lhs=lnc1 lh ; rhs=xcyw , time , z5xc ; par$
frontier ; cost ; lhs=lnc1 lh ; rhs=xcyw , time , z5xc ; hfn=one , z6xc , z8xc ;
pds=ni ; rpm ; fcn=one (n) , lny1 (n) , lny2 (n ) ; halton ; pts=1000; e f f=efcrpm68 ;
test :b(19)=0 $
? model o f p u b l i c a t i o n ( d i f f e r e n t Wald t e s t than in th e model above )
frontier ; cost ; lhs=lnc1 lh ; rhs=xcyw , time , z5xc ; par$
frontier ; cost ; lhs=lnc1 lh ; rhs=xcyw , time , z5xc ; hfn=one , z6xc , z8xc ;
pds=ni ; rpm ; fcn=one (n) , lny1 (n) , lny2 (n ) ; halton ; pts=1000; e f f=efcrpm68 ;
test :b(20)=0 $
? −−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−?
? L i k e l i h ood−Rat io t e s t s f o r Random E f f e c t s
? −−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−?
? same r e s u l t s when us ing f em l r or t a b l e v l u ( s ee be low )
? wi th femlr , each command as stand−a lone
? d e g r e s s o f freedom equa l t o t h e d i f f e r e n c e in d imen s i o n a l i t y
? c a l c u l a t i n g t h e t e s t s t a t i s t i c ?
calc ; l i s t ; l r t e s t = 2 ∗ ( remz8−rem) $
? c a l c u l a t i n g t h e p−v a l u e ?
calc ; l i s t ; pvalue=1−chi ( l r t e s t , 1 ) $
? c a l c u l a t i n g t h e c r i t i c a l t e s t−s t a t i s t i c ?
calc ; l i s t ; f emlr=ctb ( . 9 5 , 1 ) $
? wi th t a b l e v l u , commands summarized ?
calc ; l i s t ; l r t e s t = 2∗( remz8−rem ) ; pvalue=1−chi ( l r t e s t , 1 ) ; t ab l ev lu=ctb ( . 9 5 , 1 ) $
? two more t e s t s
calc ; l i s t ; l r t e s t = 2∗( remz6z8−rem ) ; pvalue=1−chi ( l r t e s t , 2 ) ; t ab l ev lu=ctb ( . 9 5 , 2 ) $
calc ; l i s t ; l r t e s t = 2∗( remz6z8−remz8 ) ; pvalue=1−chi ( l r t e s t , 1 ) ; t ab l ev lu=ctb ( . 9 5 , 1 ) $
? −−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−?
? c a l c u l a t e c o r r e l a t i o n c o e f f i c i e n t s
? −−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−?
? c r e a t e h e l p i n g v a r i a b l e s
create ; egcrem68=groupmean ( efcrem68 , pds=ni ) $
create ; egcrem8=groupmean ( efcrem8 , pds=ni ) $
create ; egc t r e68=groupmean ( e f c t r e68 , pds=ni ) $
create ; egcrpm68=groupmean ( efcrpm68 , pds=ni ) $
create ; rankre68 = rnk ( efcrem68 ) $
create ; rankre68 = 255− rankre68$
create ; rankre8 = rnk ( efcrem8 ) $
create ; rankre8 = 255− rankre8$
create ; ranktr68 = rnk ( e f c t r e 6 8 ) $
create ; ranktr68 = 255− ranktr68$
create ; rankrp68 = rnk ( efcrpm68 ) $
create ; rankrp68 = 255−rankrp68$
create ; rangre68 = rnk ( egcrem68 ) $
create ; rangre68 = 255− rangre68$
create ; rangre8 = rnk ( egcrem8 ) $
create ; rangre8 = 255− rangre8$
create ; rangtr68 = rnk ( egc t r e68 ) $
create ; rangtr68 = 255− rangtr68$
create ; rangrp68 = rnk ( egcrpm68 ) $
create ; rangrp68 = 255− rangrp68$
PROGRAM CODE 131
? Spearman rank f o r a l l o b s e r v a t i o n s
calc ; l i s t ; rkc ( rankre68 , rankre8 ) $
calc ; l i s t ; rkc ( rankre68 , ranktr68 ) $
calc ; l i s t ; rkc ( rankre68 , rankrp68 ) $
calc ; l i s t ; rkc ( rankre8 , ranktr68 ) $
calc ; l i s t ; rkc ( rankre8 , rankrp68 ) $
calc ; l i s t ; rkc ( ranktr68 , rankrp68 ) $
? e f f i c i e n c y c o r r e l a t i o n f o r a l l o b s e r v a t i o n s
calc ; l i s t ; cor ( efcrem68 , efcrem8 ) $
calc ; l i s t ; cor ( efcrem68 , e f c t r e 6 8 ) $
calc ; l i s t ; cor ( efcrem68 , efcrpm68 ) $
calc ; l i s t ; cor ( efcrem8 , e f c t r e 6 8 ) $
calc ; l i s t ; cor ( efcrem8 , efcrpm68 ) $
calc ; l i s t ; cor ( e f c t r e68 , efcrpm68 ) $
? Spearman rank f o r group means
calc ; l i s t ; rkc ( rangre68 , rangre8 ) $
calc ; l i s t ; rkc ( rangre68 , rangtr68 ) $
calc ; l i s t ; rkc ( rangre68 , rangrp68 ) $
calc ; l i s t ; rkc ( rangre8 , rangtr68 ) $
calc ; l i s t ; rkc ( rangre8 , rangrp68 ) $
calc ; l i s t ; rkc ( rangtr68 , rangrp68 ) $
? e f f i c i e n c y c o r r e l a t i o n f o r group means
calc ; l i s t ; cor ( egcrem68 , egcrem8 ) $
calc ; l i s t ; cor ( egcrem68 , egc t r e68 ) $
calc ; l i s t ; cor ( egcrem68 , egcrpm68 ) $
calc ; l i s t ; cor ( egcrem8 , egc t r e68 ) $
calc ; l i s t ; cor ( egcrem8 , egcrpm68 ) $
calc ; l i s t ; cor ( egctre68 , egcrpm68 ) $
? c a l c u l a t e Kruskal−Wal l i s t e s t s in STATA
? end
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A.2 LIMDEP Code for Chapter 3
? LIMDEP CODE: ECONOMIES OF SCALE AND SCOPE
? r e s e t and a f t e rwa r d s s e t range w i th data ( sc sc da ta v30 mw 02062009 . x l s )
r e s e t $
? −−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−?
? v a r i a b l e d e f i n i t i o n
? −−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−?
? t o t a l c o s t s
create ; c1=pe r c o s t+mat cost+dep cos t+oth co s t+i n t c o s t+a s s c o s t $
? sea t−km in buse s
create ; y1=skm bus$
? sea t−km in r a i l−bound v e h i c l e s
create ; y2=skm tra$
? l a b o r p r i c e
create ; w1=pe r c o s t /mak$
? c a p i t a l p r i c e
create ; w2=(c1−pe r c o s t )/ ( s ea t bus+s e a t t r a )
? l i n e a r t ime t r end
create ; z1=t$
? q ua d r a t i c t ime t r end
create ; z1sq=0.5∗ t∗ t$
? t ime dummy 1997
create ; z11=td1$
? t ime dummy 1998
create ; z12=td2$
? t ime dummy 1999
create ; z13=td3$
? t ime dummy 2000
create ; z14=td4$
? t ime dummy 2001
create ; z15=td5$
? t ime dummy 2002
create ; z16=td6$
? t ime dummy 2003
create ; z17=td7$
? t ime dummy 2004
create ; z18=td8$
? t ime dummy 2005
create ; z19=td9$
? t ime dummy 2006
create ; z10=td10$
? network l e n g t h r a i l−bound
create ; z2=len tram$
? l i n e l e n g t h bus
create ; z3=len bus$
? popu l a t i o n in th e op e r a t i on area
create ; z4=pop area$
? d e n s i t y index
create ; z5=pop area /( len tram+len bus ) $
? sum network l e n g t h r a i l−bound and l i n e l e n g t h bus
create ; z6=len tram+len bus$
? −−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−?
? c r e a t e by mean d i v i d e d v a r i a b l e s
? −−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−?
? v a r i a b l e d e f i n i t i o n
matrix ; xbry1 =[0] $
matrix ; xbry2 =[0] $
matrix ; xbrw1=[0] $
matrix ; xbrw2=[0] $
matrix ; xbrz2 =[0] $
matrix ; xbrz5 =[0] $
matrix ; xbrz6 =[0] $
? mean c a l c u l a t i o n
calc ; xbry1=xbr ( y1 ) $
calc ; xbry2=xbr ( y2 ) $
calc ; xbrw1=xbr (w1) $
calc ; xbrw2=xbr (w2) $
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calc ; xbrz2=xbr ( z2 ) $
calc ; xbrz5=xbr ( z5 ) $
calc ; xbrz6=xbr ( z6 ) $
? mean d i v i d e d v a r i a b l e c r e a t i o n
create ; y1xc=y1/xbry1$
create ; y2xc=y2/xbry2$
create ; w1xc=w1/xbrw1$
create ; w2xc=w2/xbrw2$
create ; z2xc=z2/xbrz2$
create ; z5xc=z5/xbrz5$
create ; z6xc=z6/xbrz6$
? −−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−?
? e s t a b l i s h l i n e a r homogenei ty in f a c t o r p r i c e s
? −−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−?
create ; c1 lh=c1/w1xc$
create ; w2lh=w2xc/w1xc$
? −−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−?
? c r e a t e v a r i a b l e s f o r q u a d r a t i c f u n c t i o n
? −−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−?
? square terms
create ; y1sq = y1xc∗y1xc ∗0.5 $
create ; y2sq = y2xc∗y2xc ∗0.5 $
create ; w2lhsq = w2lh∗w2lh ∗0.5 $
? c r o s s terms
create ; y1y2 = y1xc∗y2xc$
create ; y1w2lh = y1xc∗w2lh$
create ; y2w2lh = y2xc∗w2lh$
? −−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−?
? c r e a t e v a r i a b l e s f o r t ime t r end a` l a Saa l e t a l . (2007)
? −−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−?
create ; y1z1 = y1xc∗z1$
create ; y2z1 = y2xc∗z1$
create ; w2z1 = w2lh∗z1$
? −−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−?
? name l i s t s f o r v a r i a b l e c a l l i n g
? −−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−?
namelist ; xcyw=one , y1xc , y2xc , w2lh , y1sq , y2sq , w2lhsq , y1y2 , y1w2lh , y2w2lh$
namelist ; time=z12 , z13 , z14 , z15 , z16 , z17 , z18 , z19 , z10$
namelist ; t ime2006=z11 , z12 , z13 , z14 , z15 , z16 , z17 , z18 , z19$
namelist ; publ=xcyw , time , z2xc$
namelist ; publ2006=xcyw , time2006 , z2xc$
namelist ; pub l l i n e=xcyw , z1 , z2xc$
calc ; k=col ( pub l l i n e )−1$
calc ; l=col ( pub l l i n e ) $
? −−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−?
? e s t ima t i on o f poo l ed models ( c o n s i s t e n c y check )
? −−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−?
? model o f p u b l i c a t i o n
frontier ; cost ; lhs=c1lh ; rhs=pub l l i n e ; e f f=ucpoo$
calc ; l i s t ; aa=b(8 ) $
? a d d i t i o n a l model w i th t ime dummies
frontier ; cost ; lhs=c1lh ; rhs=xcyw , time , z2xc ; e f f=ucpoo$
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? −−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−?
? e s t ima t i on o f Fixed E f f e c t s models
? −−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−?
? model o f p u b l i c a t i o n
y2 i n s i g n i f i c a n t
regress ; cost ; lhs=c1lh ; rhs=pub l l i n e ; panel ; pds=ni ; fixed ; e f f=ucfem$
matrix ; b0=b ( 1 : k ) ; v0=varb$
l i s t ; b0$
? a d d i t i o n a l model w i th t ime dummies , y2 i n s i g n i f i c a n t
regress ; cost ; lhs=c1lh ; rhs=publ ; panel ; pds=ni ; fixed ; e f f=ucfem$
matrix ; b0=b ( 1 : k ) ; v0=varb$
l i s t ; b0$
? −−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−?
? e s t ima t i on o f Random E f f e c t s models
? −−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−?
? model o f p u b l i c a t i o n , e x i t s t a t u s 0 , l i n e a r t ime t r end r e a s ona b l e
frontier ; cost ; lhs=c1lh ; rhs=pub l l i n e ; panel ; pds=ni ; e f f=ucrem$
? a d d i t i o n a l model w i th t ime t r end a` l a Saa l e t a l . (2007)
? r e a s ona b l e bu t mos t l y not s i g n i f i c a n t
frontier ; cost ; lhs=c1lh ; rhs=xcyw , z1 , z1sq , y1z1 , y2z1 , w2z1 , z2xc ; panel ; pds=ni ;
e f f=ucrem$
? a d d i t i o n a l model w i th q u a d r a t i c t ime t r end
frontier ; cost ; lhs=c1lh ; rhs=xcyw , z1 , z2xc ; panel ; pds=ni ; e f f=ucrem$
? a d d i t i o n a l model w i th t ime dummies and r a i l−bound network l e n g t h
frontier ; cost ; lhs=c1lh ; rhs=xcyw , time , z2 ; panel ; pds=ni ; e f f=ucrem$
? a d d i t i o n a l model w i th t ime dummies
frontier ; cost ; lhs=c1lh ; rhs=xcyw , time ; panel ; pds=ni ; e f f=ucrem$
? a d d i t i o n a l model w i th t ime dummies and d e n s i t y index
frontier ; cost ; lhs=c1lh ; rhs=xcyw , time , z5 ; panel ; pds=ni ; e f f=ucrem$
? −−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−?
? Hausman t e s t ( cp . Greene , 2007b , p . R11/30 f )
? −−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−?
matrix ; b1=b ( 2 : l ) ; v1=part (varb , 2 , l , 2 , l ) ; d=b0−b1 ; vd=v0−v1 ; l i s t $
hausman=d ’∗ sinv ( vd)∗d ; l i s t ; b1$
calc ; l i s t ; pvalue=1−chi (hausman , k ) $
? −−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−?
? e s t ima t i on o f True Random E f f e c t s models
? −−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−?
? model o f p u b l i c a t i o n
frontier ; cost ; lhs=c1lh ; rhs=pub l l i n e ; par$
frontier ; cost ; lhs=c1lh ; rhs=pub l l i n e ;
pds=ni ; rpm ; fcn=one (n ) ; halton ; pts=1000; parameters ; matrix ; e f f=uctre$
? a d d i t i o n a l model w i th t ime dummies and d e n s i t y index
? s t r u c t u r a l v a r i a b l e not s i g n f i c a n t and wrong s i g n
frontier ; cost ; lhs=c1lh ; rhs=xcyw , time , z5 ; par$
frontier ; cost ; lhs=c1lh ; rhs=xcyw , time , z5 ;
pds=ni ;rpm ; fcn=one (n ) ; halton ; pts=10; e f f=uctre$
? a d d i t i o n a l model w i th t ime dummies and r a i l−bound network l e n g t h
frontier ; cost ; lhs=c1lh ; rhs=xcyw , time , z2xc ; par$
frontier ; cost ; lhs=c1lh ; rhs=xcyw , time , z2xc ;
pds=ni ; rpm ; fcn=one (n ) ; halton ; pts=10; e f f=uctre$
? a d d i t i o n a l model w i th t ime t r end a` l a Saa l e t a l . (2007)
frontier ; cost ; lhs=c1lh ; rhs=xcyw , z1 , z1sq , y1z1 , y2z1 , w2z1 , z2xc ; par$
frontier ; cost ; lhs=c1lh ; rhs=xcyw , z1 , z1sq , y1z1 , y2z1 , w2z1 , z2xc ;
pds=ni ; rpm ; fcn=one (n ) ; halton ; pts=10; e f f=uctre$
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? a d d i t i o n a l model w i th t ime dummies and r a i l−bound network l eng t h , use o f ” par ”
frontier ; cost ; lhs=c1lh ; rhs=xcyw , time , z2xc ; par$
frontier ; cost ; lhs=c1lh ; rhs=xcyw , time , z2xc ;
pds=ni ; rpm ; fcn=one (n ) ; halton ; pts=10; e f f=uctre$
? a d d i t i o n a l model w i th t ime t r end a` l a Saa l e t a l . (2007) e x c e p t f o r f a c t o r p r i c e
? t ime t r end r e a s ona b l e bu t mos t l y not s i g n i f i c a n t
frontier ; cost ; lhs=c1lh ; rhs=xcyw , z1 , z1sq , y1z1 , y2z1 , z2xc ; par$
frontier ; cost ; lhs=c1lh ; rhs=xcyw , z1 , z1sq , y1z1 , y2z1 , z2xc ;
pds=ni ; rpm ; fcn=one (n ) ; halton ; pts=10; e f f=uctre$
? c a l c u l a t e economies o f s c a l e and scope in EXCEL
? end
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A.3 R Code for Chapter 4
# R CODE: POTENTIAL GAINS FROM MERGERS
# −−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−#
# s p e c i f y commands and data #
# −−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−#
# load DEA commands
l ibrary (FEAR)
# c l e a r memory
rm( l i s t=l s ( ) )
l s ( )
# choose number o f b o o t s t r a p p i n g r e p l i c a t i o n s
arg1=2000
# choose r e t u rn s to s c a l e : 1 f o r v r s OR 3 f o r c r s
arg2=3
# choose o r i e n t a t i o n : 1 f o r i npu t OR 2 f o r ou tpu t
arg3=1
# choose s c a l a r f o r synergy and s i z e d e t e rm ina t i on : 0 .5 OR 1 OR 2
alpha=1
# load data
mref = read . table (”090823 da t a r e f t e c v 6 9 . txt ” , header=T)
# count number o f o b s e r v a t i o n s in t h e r e f e r e n c e t e c hno l o g y
n=nrow( mref )
# s p e c i f y i npu t matr i x o f r e f e r e n c e t e c hno l o g y
# x1=labor , x2=r a i l−bound sea t s , x3=bus s e a t s
x r e f=t (matrix (c (mref$x1 , mref$x2 , mref$x3 ) ,nrow=n , ncol=3))
# s p e c i f y ou tpu t matr i x o f r e f e r e n c e t e c hno l o g y f o r Model 1
# wi t hou t s t r u c t u r a l v a r i a b l e s
y r e f=t (matrix (c (mref$y1 , mref$y2 ) ,nrow=n , ncol=2))
# outpu t matr i x f o r Model 2 w i th i n v e r s e d e n s i t y index
y r e f s 1=t (matrix (c (mref$y1 , mref$y2 , mref$s1 ) ,nrow=n , ncol=3))
# outpu t matr i x f o r Model 3 w i th tram index
y r e f s 2=t (matrix (c (mref$y1 , mref$y2 , mref$s2 ) ,nrow=n , ncol=3))
# outpu t matr i x f o r Model 4 w i th tram and i n v e r s e d e n s i t y index
y r e f s 1 s 2=t (matrix (c (mref$y1 , mref$y2 , mref$s1 , mref$s2 ) ,nrow=n , ncol=4))
# s p e c i f y a u x i l i a r y matr ix f o r r e c a l c u l a t i o n o f tram index
z r e f=t (matrix (c ( mref$z1 , mref$z2 ) ,nrow=n , ncol=2))
# s p e c i f y i npu t matr i x o f o b s e r v a t i o n s from Nordrhein−West fa l en (NRW)
xobs = xr e f [ , − ( 1 : 3 ) ]
# s p e c i f y ou tpu t matr i x o f o b s e r v a t i o n s from NRW fo r Model 1
# wi t hou t s t r u c t u r a l v a r i a b l e s
yobs = yr e f [ , − ( 1 : 3 ) ]
# s p e c i f y ou tpu t matr i x o f o b s e r v a t i o n s from NRW fo r Model 2
# wi th i n v e r s e d e n s i t y index
yobss1 = y r e f s 1 [ , − ( 1 : 3 ) ]
# s p e c i f y ou tpu t matr i x o f o b s e r v a t i o n s from NRW fo r Model 3
# wi th tram index
yobss2 = y r e f s 2 [ , − ( 1 : 3 ) ]
# s p e c i f y ou tpu t matr i x o f o b s e r v a t i o n s from NRW fo r Model 4
# wi th tram and i n v e r s e d e n s i t y index
yobss1s2 = y r e f s 1 s 2 [ , − ( 1 : 3 ) ]
# au x i l i a r y matr ix f o r r e c a l c u l a t i o n o f tram index
zobs = z r e f [ , − ( 1 : 3 ) ]
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# −−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−#
# s p e c i f y mergers ( mergers and companies in no s p e c i f i c order ) #
# −−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−#
# 1) Ko¨ln (25) , Bonn (7 ) , S i egen (38)
# 2) D u¨ s s e l d o r f (13 ) , Kr e f e l d (26 ) , Neuss (35)
# 3) Duisburg (11) , Mu¨lheim (32) , Essen (15) , Oberhausen (36) , Moers (29)
# 4) Dortmund (10) , Hagen (21)
# 5) Bochum (6) , Herne (23)
# 6) Wuppertal ( 43 ) , Ennepe ta l (14)
# 7) Aachen (4 ) , Ge i l e n k i r c h en (18)
# 8) Detmold (8 ) , E x t e r t a l ( 17 ) , B i e l e f e l d (5 )
# 9) Tro i s d o r f (41 ) , Eusk i rchen (16) , Du¨ren (12)
# 10) Gummersbach (19) , Remscheid (37 ) , So l i n g en (40)
# 11) Dormagen (9 ) , Gladbach (30) , Viersen (42)
# 12) Hamm(22) , Kamen(24)
# 13) Monheim (31) , Leverkusen (27)
# 14) G u¨ t e r s l oh (20) , Soe s t (39)
# 15) Duisburg (11) , D u¨ s s e l d o r f (13)
# 16) Duisburg (11) , Kr e f e l d (26)
# 17) D u¨ s s e l d o r f (13 ) , Kr e f e l d (26)
# 18) Essen (15) , Mu¨lheim (32)
# 19) Mu¨lheim (32) , Oberhausen (36)
# 20) Mu¨lheim (32) , Essen (15) , Oberhausen (36)
# 21) Essen (15) , Bochum(6)
# 22) Du¨ren (12) , Eusk i rchen (16)
# 23) Aachen (4 ) , Du¨ren (12) , Eusk i rchen (16)
# 24) Eusk i rchen (16) , T ro i s d o r f (41)
# 25) Ko¨ln (25 ) , Bonn (7 ) , Eusk i rchen (16)
# 26) Ko¨ln (25 ) , Bonn (7 ) , Eusk i rchen (16) , T ro i s d o r f (41)
# 27) Viersen (42) , Gladbach (30)
# 28) Wuppertal ( 43 ) , So l i n g en (40) , Remscheid (37)
# 29) Wuppertal ( 43 ) , Ennepe ta l ( 14 ) , Remscheid (37)
# 30) Dortmund (10) , Herne (23) , Herten (44)
# 31) Dortmund (10) , Hagen (21) , Kamen(24)
# 32) E x t e r t a l ( 17 ) , B i e l e f e l d (5 )
# 33) E x t e r t a l ( 17 ) , B i e l e f e l d ( 5 ) , G u¨ t e r s l oh (20)
# 34) Viersen (42) , Gladbach (30) , Neuss (35)
# 35) Duisburg (11) , Kr e f e l d (26 ) , Neuss (35)
# 36) Monheim (31) , Leverkusen (27) , Ko¨ln (25)
# 37) Monheim (31) , Leverkusen (27) , So l i n g en (40)
# 38) Duisburg (11) , D u¨ s s e l d o r f (13 ) , Kr e f e l d (26)
# 39) L u¨densche id (28 ) , Gummersbach (19) , Remscheid (37)
# 40) L u¨densche id (28 ) , Gummersbach (19)
# 41) Hamm(22) , Kamen(24) , Soe s t (39)
# 42) Wuppertal ( 43 ) , So l i n g en (40)
# 43) Wuppertal ( 43 ) , Remscheid (37)
# 44) Mu¨lheim (32) , Essen (15) , Bochum(6)
# 45) Oberhausen (36) , Moers (29)
# 46) Du¨ren (12) , Eusk i rchen (16) , T ro i s d o r f (41 ) , Ge i l e n k i r c h en (18)
# 47) Gladbach (30) , Neuss (35)
# 48) Gummersbach (19) , Remscheid (37)
# 49) Du¨ren (12) , T ro i s d o r f (41)
# 50) Hamm(22) , Soe s t (39 ) , G u¨ t e r s l oh (20)
# 51) Dortmund (10) , Kamen(24)
# 52) Duisburg (11) , D u¨ s s e l d o r f (13 ) , Kr e f e l d (26 ) , Moers (29)
# 53) Duisburg (11) , D u¨ s s e l d o r f (13 ) , Kr e f e l d (26 ) , Oberhausen (36)
# 54) Bochum (6) , Herne (23) , Herten (44)
# 55) Wuppertal ( 43 ) , Ennepe ta l ( 14 ) , Hagen (21)
# 56) Ennepe ta l ( 14 ) , Hagen (21)
# 57) Ennepe ta l ( 14 ) , Hagen (21) , L u¨densche id (28)
# 58) Ennepe ta l ( 14 ) , L u¨densche id (28)
# 59) Ko¨ln (25 ) , Bonn (7 ) , S i egen (38) , T ro i s d o r f (41)
# 60) Ko¨ln (25 ) , Bonn (7 ) , S i egen (38) , T ro i s d o r f (41 ) , Eusk i rchen (16)
# 61) S iegen (38) , L u¨densche id (28)
# 62) S iegen (38) , Gummersbach (19)
# 63) S iegen (38) , Gummersbach (19) , Remscheid (37)
# 64) Dormagen (9 ) , Monheim (31) , Leverkusen (27)
# 65) Dormagen (9 ) , Monheim (31)
# 66) Dormagen (9 ) , Gladbach (30)
# 67) Dormagen (9 ) , Neuss (35)
# 68) Dormagen (9 ) , Monheim (31) , Neuss (35)
# 69) Detmold (8 ) , E x t e r t a l (17)
# 70) Mu¨nster (RVM,33 ) , Mu¨nster (STW,34 )
# 71) Mu¨lheim (32) , Essen (15) , Oberhausen (36) , Bochum(6)
# 72) Mu¨lheim (32) , Essen (15) , Oberhausen (36) , Bochum (6) , Moers (29)
# 73) Mu¨lheim (32) , Essen (15) , Oberhausen (36) , Duisburg (11)
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# 74) Mu¨lheim (32) , Essen (15) , Duisburg (11)
# 75) D u¨ s s e l d o r f (13 ) , Kr e f e l d (26 ) , Neuss (35 ) , Moers (29)
# 76) D u¨ s s e l d o r f (13 ) , Kr e f e l d (26 ) , Moers (29)
# 77) D u¨ s s e l d o r f (13 ) , Neuss (35)
# 78) D u¨ s s e l d o r f (13 ) , Kr e f e l d (26 ) , Neuss (35)
# 79) Mu¨lheim (32) , Essen (15) , Oberhausen (36) , Moers (29)
# 80) Ko¨ln (25 ) , Bonn (7)
# save t h e merged companies ’ IDs in a merger matr ix
mergers <− matrix (0 , 80 ,5 )
merger1=t (matrix (c ( 2 5 , 7 , 3 8 , 0 , 0 ) ) ) ; mergers [1 , ]= merger1 ; n1=3
merger2=t (matrix (c ( 1 3 , 2 6 , 3 5 , 0 , 0 ) ) ) ; mergers [2 , ]= merger2 ; n2=3
merger3=t (matrix (c ( 11 , 3 2 , 15 , 36 , 2 9 ) ) ) ; mergers [3 , ]= merger3 ; n3=5
merger4=t (matrix (c ( 1 0 , 2 1 , 0 , 0 , 0 ) ) ) ; mergers [4 , ]= merger4 ; n4=2
merger5=t (matrix (c ( 6 , 2 3 , 0 , 0 , 0 ) ) ) ; mergers [5 , ]= merger5 ; n5=2
merger6=t (matrix (c ( 4 3 , 1 4 , 0 , 0 , 0 ) ) ) ; mergers [6 , ]= merger6 ; n6=2
merger7=t (matrix (c ( 4 , 1 8 , 0 , 0 , 0 ) ) ) ; mergers [7 , ]= merger7 ; n7=2
merger8=t (matrix (c ( 8 , 1 7 , 5 , 0 , 0 ) ) ) ; mergers [8 , ]= merger8 ; n8=3
merger9=t (matrix (c ( 4 1 , 1 6 , 1 2 , 0 , 0 ) ) ) ; mergers [9 , ]= merger9 ; n9=3
merger10=t (matrix (c ( 1 9 , 3 7 , 4 0 , 0 , 0 ) ) ) ; mergers [10 , ]= merger10 ; n10=3
merger11=t (matrix (c ( 9 , 3 0 , 4 2 , 0 , 0 ) ) ) ; mergers [11 , ]= merger11 ; n11=3
merger12=t (matrix (c ( 2 2 , 2 4 , 0 , 0 , 0 ) ) ) ; mergers [12 , ]= merger12 ; n12=2
merger13=t (matrix (c ( 3 1 , 2 7 , 0 , 0 , 0 ) ) ) ; mergers [13 , ]= merger13 ; n13=2
merger14=t (matrix (c ( 2 0 , 3 9 , 0 , 0 , 0 ) ) ) ; mergers [14 , ]= merger14 ; n14=2
merger15=t (matrix (c ( 1 1 , 1 3 , 0 , 0 , 0 ) ) ) ; mergers [15 , ]= merger15 ; n15=2
merger16=t (matrix (c ( 1 1 , 2 6 , 0 , 0 , 0 ) ) ) ; mergers [16 , ]= merger16 ; n16=2
merger17=t (matrix (c ( 1 3 , 2 6 , 0 , 0 , 0 ) ) ) ; mergers [17 , ]= merger17 ; n17=2
merger18=t (matrix (c ( 1 5 , 3 2 , 0 , 0 , 0 ) ) ) ; mergers [18 , ]= merger18 ; n18=2
merger19=t (matrix (c ( 3 2 , 3 6 , 0 , 0 , 0 ) ) ) ; mergers [19 , ]= merger19 ; n19=2
merger20=t (matrix (c ( 3 2 , 1 5 , 3 6 , 0 , 0 ) ) ) ; mergers [20 , ]= merger20 ; n20=3
merger21=t (matrix (c ( 1 5 , 6 , 0 , 0 , 0 ) ) ) ; mergers [21 , ]= merger21 ; n21=2
merger22=t (matrix (c ( 1 2 , 1 6 , 0 , 0 , 0 ) ) ) ; mergers [22 , ]= merger22 ; n22=2
merger23=t (matrix (c ( 4 , 1 2 , 1 6 , 0 , 0 ) ) ) ; mergers [23 , ]= merger23 ; n23=3
merger24=t (matrix (c ( 1 6 , 4 1 , 0 , 0 , 0 ) ) ) ; mergers [24 , ]= merger24 ; n24=2
merger25=t (matrix (c ( 2 5 , 7 , 1 6 , 0 , 0 ) ) ) ; mergers [25 , ]= merger25 ; n25=3
merger26=t (matrix (c ( 2 5 , 7 , 1 6 , 4 1 , 0 ) ) ) ; mergers [26 , ]= merger26 ; n26=4
merger27=t (matrix (c ( 4 2 , 3 0 , 0 , 0 , 0 ) ) ) ; mergers [27 , ]= merger27 ; n27=2
merger28=t (matrix (c ( 4 3 , 4 0 , 3 7 , 0 , 0 ) ) ) ; mergers [28 , ]= merger28 ; n28=3
merger29=t (matrix (c ( 4 3 , 1 4 , 3 7 , 0 , 0 ) ) ) ; mergers [29 , ]= merger29 ; n29=3
merger30=t (matrix (c ( 1 0 , 2 3 , 4 4 , 0 , 0 ) ) ) ; mergers [30 , ]= merger30 ; n30=3
merger31=t (matrix (c ( 1 0 , 2 1 , 4 4 , 0 , 0 ) ) ) ; mergers [31 , ]= merger31 ; n31=3
merger32=t (matrix (c ( 1 7 , 5 , 0 , 0 , 0 ) ) ) ; mergers [32 , ]= merger32 ; n32=2
merger33=t (matrix (c ( 1 7 , 5 , 2 0 , 0 , 0 ) ) ) ; mergers [33 , ]= merger33 ; n33=3
merger34=t (matrix (c ( 4 2 , 3 0 , 3 5 , 0 , 0 ) ) ) ; mergers [34 , ]= merger34 ; n34=3
merger35=t (matrix (c ( 1 1 , 2 6 , 3 5 , 0 , 0 ) ) ) ; mergers [35 , ]= merger35 ; n35=3
merger36=t (matrix (c ( 3 1 , 2 7 , 2 5 , 0 , 0 ) ) ) ; mergers [36 , ]= merger36 ; n36=3
merger37=t (matrix (c ( 3 1 , 2 7 , 4 0 , 0 , 0 ) ) ) ; mergers [37 , ]= merger37 ; n37=3
merger38=t (matrix (c ( 1 1 , 1 3 , 2 6 , 0 , 0 ) ) ) ; mergers [38 , ]= merger38 ; n38=3
merger39=t (matrix (c ( 2 8 , 1 9 , 3 7 , 0 , 0 ) ) ) ; mergers [39 , ]= merger39 ; n39=3
merger40=t (matrix (c ( 2 8 , 1 9 , 0 , 0 , 0 ) ) ) ; mergers [40 , ]= merger40 ; n40=2
merger41=t (matrix (c ( 2 2 , 2 4 , 3 9 , 0 , 0 ) ) ) ; mergers [41 , ]= merger41 ; n41=3
merger42=t (matrix (c ( 4 3 , 4 0 , 0 , 0 , 0 ) ) ) ; mergers [42 , ]= merger42 ; n42=2
merger43=t (matrix (c ( 4 3 , 3 7 , 0 , 0 , 0 ) ) ) ; mergers [43 , ]= merger43 ; n43=2
merger44=t (matrix (c ( 3 2 , 1 5 , 6 , 0 , 0 ) ) ) ; mergers [44 , ]= merger44 ; n44=3
merger45=t (matrix (c ( 3 6 , 2 9 , 0 , 0 , 0 ) ) ) ; mergers [45 , ]= merger45 ; n45=2
merger46=t (matrix (c ( 1 2 , 1 6 , 4 1 , 1 8 , 0 ) ) ) ; mergers [46 , ]= merger46 ; n46=4
merger47=t (matrix (c ( 3 0 , 3 5 , 0 , 0 , 0 ) ) ) ; mergers [47 , ]= merger47 ; n47=2
merger48=t (matrix (c ( 1 9 , 3 7 , 0 , 0 , 0 ) ) ) ; mergers [48 , ]= merger48 ; n48=2
merger49=t (matrix (c ( 1 2 , 4 1 , 0 , 0 , 0 ) ) ) ; mergers [49 , ]= merger49 ; n49= 2
merger50=t (matrix (c ( 2 2 , 3 9 , 2 0 , 0 , 0 ) ) ) ; mergers [50 , ]= merger50 ; n50=3
merger51=t (matrix (c ( 1 0 , 2 4 , 0 , 0 , 0 ) ) ) ; mergers [51 , ]= merger51 ; n51=2
merger52=t (matrix (c ( 1 1 , 1 3 , 2 6 , 2 9 , 0 ) ) ) ; mergers [52 , ]= merger52 ; n52=4
merger53=t (matrix (c ( 1 1 , 1 3 , 2 6 , 3 6 , 0 ) ) ) ; mergers [53 , ]= merger53 ; n53=4
merger54=t (matrix (c ( 6 , 2 3 , 4 4 , 0 , 0 ) ) ) ; mergers [54 , ]= merger54 ; n54=3
merger55=t (matrix (c ( 4 3 , 1 4 , 2 1 , 0 , 0 ) ) ) ; mergers [55 , ]= merger55 ; n55=3
merger56=t (matrix (c ( 1 4 , 2 1 , 0 , 0 , 0 ) ) ) ; mergers [56 , ]= merger56 ; n56=2
merger57=t (matrix (c ( 1 4 , 2 1 , 2 8 , 0 , 0 ) ) ) ; mergers [57 , ]= merger57 ; n57=3
merger58=t (matrix (c ( 1 4 , 2 8 , 0 , 0 , 0 ) ) ) ; mergers [58 , ]= merger58 ; n58=2
merger59=t (matrix (c ( 2 5 , 7 , 3 8 , 4 1 , 0 ) ) ) ; mergers [59 , ]= merger59 ; n59=4
merger60=t (matrix (c ( 2 5 , 7 , 3 8 , 4 1 , 1 6 ) ) ) ; mergers [60 , ]= merger60 ; n60=5
merger61=t (matrix (c ( 3 8 , 2 8 , 0 , 0 , 0 ) ) ) ; mergers [61 , ]= merger61 ; n61=2
merger62=t (matrix (c ( 3 8 , 1 9 , 0 , 0 , 0 ) ) ) ; mergers [62 , ]= merger62 ; n62=2
merger63=t (matrix (c ( 3 8 , 1 9 , 3 7 , 0 , 0 ) ) ) ; mergers [63 , ]= merger63 ; n63=3
merger64=t (matrix (c ( 9 , 3 1 , 2 7 , 0 , 0 ) ) ) ; mergers [64 , ]= merger64 ; n64=3
merger65=t (matrix (c ( 9 , 3 1 , 0 , 0 , 0 ) ) ) ; mergers [65 , ]= merger65 ; n65=2
merger66=t (matrix (c ( 9 , 3 0 , 0 , 0 , 0 ) ) ) ; mergers [66 , ]= merger66 ; n66=2
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merger67=t (matrix (c ( 9 , 3 5 , 0 , 0 , 0 ) ) ) ; mergers [67 , ]= merger67 ; n67=2
merger68=t (matrix (c ( 9 , 3 1 , 3 5 , 0 , 0 ) ) ) ; mergers [68 , ]= merger68 ; n68=3
merger69=t (matrix (c ( 8 , 1 7 , 0 , 0 , 0 ) ) ) ; mergers [69 , ]= merger69 ; n69=2
merger70=t (matrix (c ( 3 3 , 3 4 , 0 , 0 , 0 ) ) ) ; mergers [70 , ]= merger70 ; n70=2
merger71=t (matrix (c ( 3 2 , 1 5 , 3 6 , 6 , 0 ) ) ) ; mergers [71 , ]= merger71 ; n71=4
merger72=t (matrix (c ( 3 2 , 1 5 , 3 6 , 6 , 2 9 ) ) ) ; mergers [72 , ]= merger72 ; n72=5
merger73=t (matrix (c ( 3 2 , 1 5 , 3 6 , 1 1 , 0 ) ) ) ; mergers [73 , ]= merger73 ; n73=4
merger74=t (matrix (c ( 3 2 , 1 5 , 1 1 , 0 , 0 ) ) ) ; mergers [74 , ]= merger74 ; n74=3
merger75=t (matrix (c ( 1 3 , 2 6 , 3 5 , 2 9 , 0 ) ) ) ; mergers [75 , ]= merger75 ; n75=4
merger76=t (matrix (c ( 1 3 , 2 6 , 2 9 , 0 , 0 ) ) ) ; mergers [76 , ]= merger76 ; n76=3
merger77=t (matrix (c ( 1 3 , 3 5 , 0 , 0 , 0 ) ) ) ; mergers [77 , ]= merger77 ; n77=2
merger78=t (matrix (c ( 1 3 , 2 6 , 3 5 , 0 , 0 ) ) ) ; mergers [78 , ]= merger78 ; n78=3
merger79=t (matrix (c ( 3 2 , 1 5 , 3 6 , 2 9 , 0 ) ) ) ; mergers [79 , ]= merger79 ; n79=4
merger80=t (matrix (c ( 2 5 , 7 , 0 , 0 , 0 ) ) ) ; mergers [80 , ]= merger80 ; n80=2
# save th e number o f merged companies per merger in v e c t o r nx
nx1=c (n1 , n2 , n3 , n4 , n5 , n6 , n7 , n8 , n9 , n10 , n11 , n12 , n13 , n14 , n15 , n16 , n17 , n18 , n19 , n20 , n21 )
nx2=c ( n22 , n23 , n24 , n25 , n26 , n27 , n28 , n29 , n30 , n31 , n32 , n33 , n34 , n35 , n36 , n37 , n38 , n39 , n40 )
nx3=c ( n41 , n42 , n43 , n44 , n45 , n46 , n47 , n48 , n49 , n50 , n51 , n52 , n53 , n54 , n55 , n56 , n57 , n58 , n59 , n60 )
nx4=c ( n61 , n62 , n63 , n64 , n65 , n66 , n67 , n68 , n69 , n70 , n71 , n72 , n73 , n74 , n75 , n76 , n77 , n78 , n79 , n80 )
nx=c ( nx1 , nx2 , nx3 , nx4 )
# d i s p l a y v e c t o r nx ( c on s i s t e n c y check )
nx
# count number o f e v a l u a t e d mergers
n=nrow( mergers )
# d i s p l a y number o f e v a l u a t e t d mergers ( c on s i s t e n c y check )
n
# −−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−#
# c a l c u l a t e i n pu t s and ou t pu t s o f p o t e n t i a l mergers , w i t h ou t any s a v i n g s r e a l i z e d #
# −−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−#
# s e t i npu t and ou tpu t v e c t o r s to 0
mergerx1 <− 0
mergerx2 <− 0
mergerx3 <− 0
mergery1 <− 0
mergery2 <− 0
# z1=s e a t s in trams ( a u x i l i a r y v a r i a b l e )
mergerz1 <− 0
# z2=s e a t s in trams , l i g h t r a i lway s , and metros ( a u x i l i a r y v a r i a b l e )
mergerz2 <− 0
# z3 f o r r e c a l c u l a t i n g s2 ( tram index )
mergerz3 <− 0
mergerx1 <− matrix (mergerx1 , 1 , n)
mergerx2 <− matrix (mergerx2 , 1 , n)
mergerx3 <− matrix (mergerx3 , 1 , n)
mergery1 <− matrix (mergery1 , 1 , n)
mergery2 <− matrix (mergery2 , 1 , n)
mergerz1 <− matrix ( mergerz1 , 1 , n)
mergerz2 <− matrix ( mergerz2 , 1 , n)
mergerz3 <− matrix ( mergerz3 , 1 , n)
for ( i in 1 : n ) {
mergerx1 [ 1 , i ] = 0
mergerx2 [ 1 , i ] = 0
mergerx3 [ 1 , i ] = 0
mergery1 [ 1 , i ] = 0
mergery2 [ 1 , i ] = 0
mergerz1 [ 1 , i ] = 0
mergerz2 [ 1 , i ] = 0
for ( j in 1 : nx [ i ] ) {
# # fo r t h e i−t h merger , i n pu t s and ou t pu t s are summed f o r a l l j f i rms
mergerx1 [ 1 , i ] = mergerx1 [ 1 , i ] + x r e f [ 1 , mergers [ i , j ] ]
mergerx2 [ 1 , i ] = mergerx2 [ 1 , i ] + x r e f [ 2 , mergers [ i , j ] ]
mergerx3 [ 1 , i ] = mergerx3 [ 1 , i ] + x r e f [ 3 , mergers [ i , j ] ]
mergery1 [ 1 , i ] = mergery1 [ 1 , i ] + y r e f [ 1 , mergers [ i , j ] ]
mergery2 [ 1 , i ] = mergery2 [ 1 , i ] + y r e f [ 2 , mergers [ i , j ] ]
mergerz1 [ 1 , i ] = mergerz1 [ 1 , i ] + z r e f [ 1 , mergers [ i , j ] ]
mergerz2 [ 1 , i ] = mergerz2 [ 1 , i ] + z r e f [ 2 , mergers [ i , j ] ]
}
# # r e c a l c u l a t e tram index
i f ( mergerz1 [ 1 , i ]>0) mergerz3 [ 1 , i ] = mergerz1 [ 1 , i ] / mergerz2 [ 1 , i ]
else mergerz3 [ 1 , i ]=0
}
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# −−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−#
# c a l c u l a t e i n d i v d u a l and mean t e c h n i c a l e f f i c i e n c i e s f o r 41 companies from NRW #
# −−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−#
# Model 1 s tandard DEA
indm1she <− dea (XOBS=xobs ,YOBS=yobs ,RTS=arg2 ,ORIENTATION=arg3 ,XREF=xre f ,YREF=yr e f )
# trans form Shepard i n t o F a r r e l l e f f i c i e n c y e s t ima t e s
indm1far <− 1/ indm1she
# c a l c u l a t e mean o f i n d i v i d u a l e f f i c i e n c y s c o r e s
meanindm1=mean( indm1far )
# Model 2 s tandard DEA
indm2she <− dea (XOBS=xobs ,YOBS=yobss1 ,RTS=arg2 ,ORIENTATION=arg3 ,XREF=xre f ,YREF=yr e f s 1 )
indm2far <− 1/ indm2she
meanindm2=mean( indm2far )
# Model 3 s tandard DEA
indm3she <− dea (XOBS=xobs ,YOBS=yobss2 ,RTS=arg2 ,ORIENTATION=arg3 ,XREF=xre f ,YREF=yr e f s 2 )
indm3far <− 1/ indm3she
meanindm3=mean( indm3far )
# Model 4 s tandard DEA
indm4she <− dea (XOBS=xobs ,YOBS=yobss1s2 ,RTS=arg2 ,ORIENTATION=arg3 ,XREF=xre f ,
YREF=yr e f s 1 s 2 )
indm4far <− 1/ indm4she
meanindm4=mean( indm4far )
# Model 1 b ia s−c o r r e c t e d DEA
i nd i v i dua l s h e <− boot . sw98(XOBS=xobs ,YOBS=yobs ,NREP=arg1 ,RTS=arg2 ,
ORIENTATION=arg3 , alpha=0.05 ,CI .TYPE=2,XREF=xre f ,YREF=yr e f )
i n d i v i d u a l f a r <− 1/ ind iv idua l she$dhat .bc
meanindm1boot=mean( i n d i v i d u a l f a r )
# d i s p l a y b ia s−c o r r e c t e d mean e f f i c i e n c y ( c on s i s t e n c y check )
meanindm1boot
# Model 2 b ia s−c o r r e c t e d DEA
indm2sheboot <− boot . sw98(XOBS=xobs ,YOBS=yobss1 ,NREP=arg1 ,RTS=arg2 ,
ORIENTATION=arg3 , alpha=0.05 ,CI .TYPE=2,XREF=xre f ,YREF=yr e f s 1 )
indm2farboot <− 1/ indm2sheboot$dhat .bc
meanindm2boot=mean( indm2farboot )
# Model 3 b ia s−c o r r e c t e d DEA
indm3sheboot <− boot . sw98(XOBS=xobs ,YOBS=yobss2 ,NREP=arg1 ,RTS=arg2 ,
ORIENTATION=arg3 , alpha=0.05 ,CI .TYPE=2,XREF=xre f ,YREF=yr e f s 2 )
indm3farboot <− 1/ indm3sheboot$dhat .bc
meanindm3boot=mean( indm3farboot )
# Model 4 b ia s−c o r r e c t e d DEA
indm4sheboot <− boot . sw98(XOBS=xobs ,YOBS=yobss1s2 ,NREP=arg1 ,RTS=arg2 ,
ORIENTATION=arg3 , alpha=0.05 ,CI .TYPE=2,XREF=xre f ,YREF=yr e f s 1 s 2 )
indm4farboot <− 1/ indm4sheboot$dhat .bc
meanindm4boot=mean( indm4farboot )
# −−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−#
# c a l c u l a t e p a r t i a l p r o d u c t i v i t y measures ( a d d i t i o n a l ana l y s e s ) #
# −−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−#
# c a l c u l a t e unnormed l a b o r p r o d u c t i v i t y
l abor prod=(yobs [1 , ]+ yobs [ 2 , ] ) / xobs [ 1 , ]
# norm l a b o r p r o d u v t i v i t y
max labor prod=max( l abor prod )
labor prod norm=labor prod /max labor prod
mean labor prod norm=mean( labor prod norm )
# c a l c u l a t e unnormed c a p i t a l p r o d u c t i v i t y
c ap i t a l p r od=(yobs [1 , ]+ yobs [ 2 , ] ) / ( xobs [2 , ]+ xobs [ 3 , ] )
# norm c a p i t a l p r o d u v t i v i t y
max capi ta l prod=max( c ap i t a l p r od )
cap i ta l prod norm=cap i t a l p r od /max capi ta l prod
mean capita l prod norm=mean( cap i ta l prod norm )
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# −−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−#
# d i s p l a y p a r t i a l p r o d u c t i v i t y measures and average e f f i c i e n c i e s #
# −−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−#
# cr e a t e t a b l e o f b ia s−c o r r e c t e d i n d i v i d u a l e f f i c i e n c i e s and p a r t i a l p r o d u c t i v i t i e s
i n d i v i d u a l e f f i c i e n c i e s=cbind ( i nd i v i dua l f a r , labor prod norm , capita l prod norm ,
indm2farboot , indm3farboot , indm4farboot )
# choose w r i t e . t a b l e f o r d e s k t op or l a p t o p use
# wr i t e . t a b l e ( i n d i v i d u a l e f f i c i e n c i e s , f i l e =”V:/mw/ i n d i v i d u a l e f f i c i e n c i e s . c s v ” , sep =” ,”)
write . table ( i n d i v i d u a l e f f i c i e n c i e s , f i l e=”C: / a1/ i n d i v i d u a l e f f i c i e n c i e s . csv ” , sep=” ,”)
# cr e a t e t a b l e s o f rounded mean e f f i c i e n c i e s
a v e r a g e e f f i c i e n c i e s=cbind (round(meanindm1 ,3) ,”&” ,round( mean labor prod norm ,3) ,”&” ,
round( mean capital prod norm ,3) ,”&” ,round(meanindm2 ,3) ,”&” ,
round(meanindm3 ,3) ,”&” ,round(meanindm4 , 3 ) )
average boots t rapped=cbind (round(meanindm1boot ,3) ,”&” ,”/” ,”&” ,”/” ,”&” ,
round(meanindm2boot ,3) ,”&” ,round(meanindm3boot ,3) ,”&” ,
round(meanindm4boot , 3 ) )
averages=rbind ( a v e r a g e e f f i c i e n c i e s , average boots t rapped )
# wr i t e . t a b l e ( averages , f i l e =”V:/mw/ ave ra g e s . c s v ” , sep =” ,”)
write . table ( averages , f i l e=”C: / a1/ averages . csv ” , sep=” ,”)
# −−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−#
# c a l c u l a t e o v e r a l l p o t e n t i a l merger ga in s ( b ia s−c o r r e c t e d ) #
# −−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−#
# Model 1
xover=t (matrix (c (mergerx1 , mergerx2 , mergerx3 ) ,nrow=n , ncol=3))
yover=t (matrix (c (mergery1 , mergery2 ) ,nrow=n , ncol=2))
o v e r a l l s h e <− boot . sw98(XOBS=xover ,YOBS=yover ,NREP=arg1 ,RTS=arg2 ,
ORIENTATION=arg3 , alpha=0.05 ,CI .TYPE=2,XREF=xre f ,YREF=yr e f )
o v e r a l l f a r <− 1/ ove ra l l she$dhat .bc
# Model 3 ( z r e f e r r i n g to z−v a r i a b l e s )
zover=t (matrix (c (mergery1 , mergery2 , mergerz3 ) ,nrow=n , ncol=3))
o v e r a l l s h e z <− boot . sw98(XOBS=xover ,YOBS=zover ,NREP=arg1 ,RTS=arg2 ,
ORIENTATION=arg3 , alpha=0.05 ,CI .TYPE=2,XREF=xre f ,YREF=yr e f s 2 )
o v e r a l l f a r z <− 1/ ove ra l l she z$dhat .bc
# −−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−#
# c a l c u l a t e t e c h n i c a l e f f i c i e n c y ga in s ( b ia s−c o r r e c t e d ) #
# −−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−#
# c a l c u l a t e i n pu t s and ou t pu t s o f merged companies ,
# wi th i n d i v i d u a l t e c h n i c a l e f f i c i e n c y ga in s a l r e a d y r e a l i z e d
# show xobs ( c on s i s t e n c y check )
xobs
# cr e a t e matr i x f o r 3 i n pu t s and 41 f i rms , f i l l e d w i th 0 s
xtec <− matrix (0 , 3 , 41 )
# con t r a c t f i r s t i npu t by i n e f f i c i e n c y
xtec [ 1 , ] = i n d i v i d u a l f a r ∗xobs [ 1 , ]
# con t r a c t second inpu t by i n e f f i c i e n c y
xtec [ 2 , ] = i n d i v i d u a l f a r ∗xobs [ 2 , ]
# con t r a c t t h i r d inpu t by i n e f f i c i e n c y
xtec [ 3 , ] = i n d i v i d u a l f a r ∗xobs [ 3 , ]
# show x t e c ( c on s i s t e n c y check )
xtec
# s e t i npu t and ou tpu t v e c t o r s to 0
mertecx1 <− 0
mertecx2 <− 0
mertecx3 <− 0
mertecy1 <− 0
mertecy2 <− 0
mertecx1 <− matrix ( mertecx1 , 1 , n)
mertecx2 <− matrix ( mertecx2 , 1 , n)
mertecx3 <− matrix ( mertecx3 , 1 , n)
mertecy1 <− matrix ( mertecy1 , 1 , n)
mertecy2 <− matrix ( mertecy2 , 1 , n)
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for ( i in 1 : n ) {
mertecx1 [ 1 , i ] = 0
mertecx2 [ 1 , i ] = 0
mertecx3 [ 1 , i ] = 0
mertecy1 [ 1 , i ] = 0
mertecy2 [ 1 , i ] = 0
for ( j in 1 : nx [ i ] ) {
# # fo r t h e i−t h merger , c on t r a c t e d i n pu t s and ou t pu t s are summed f o r a l l j f i rms
# # f i r s t t h r e e i t ems o f x t e c matr i x are used f o r BVG, HHA, and MVG
mertecx1 [ 1 , i ] = mertecx1 [ 1 , i ] + xtec [ 1 , ( mergers [ i , j ]−3)]
mertecx2 [ 1 , i ] = mertecx2 [ 1 , i ] + xtec [ 2 , ( mergers [ i , j ]−3)]
mertecx3 [ 1 , i ] = mertecx3 [ 1 , i ] + xtec [ 3 , ( mergers [ i , j ]−3)]
mertecy1 [ 1 , i ] = mertecy1 [ 1 , i ] + yobs [ 1 , ( mergers [ i , j ]−3)]
mertecy2 [ 1 , i ] = mertecy2 [ 1 , i ] + yobs [ 2 , ( mergers [ i , j ]−3)]
}
}
# Model 1 : c a l c u l a t i o n o f r e a l merger ga in s to s e p a r a t e from t e c h n i c a l e f f i c i e n c y ga in s
xtecm=t (matrix (c ( mertecx1 , mertecx2 , mertecx3 ) ,nrow=n , ncol=3))
ytecm=t (matrix (c ( mertecy1 , mertecy2 ) ,nrow=n , ncol=2))
rea lmerger she <− boot . sw98(XOBS=xtecm ,YOBS=ytecm ,NREP=arg1 ,RTS=arg2 ,
ORIENTATION=arg3 , alpha=0.05 ,CI .TYPE=2,XREF=xre f ,YREF=yr e f )
r e a lme rg e r f a r <− 1/ rea lmergershe$dhat .bc
# Model 3 :
ztecm=t (matrix (c ( mertecy1 , mertecy2 , mergerz3 ) ,nrow=n , ncol=3))
rea lmerger shez <− boot . sw98(XOBS=xtecm ,YOBS=ztecm ,NREP=arg1 ,RTS=arg2 ,
ORIENTATION=arg3 , alpha=0.05 ,CI .TYPE=2,XREF=xre f ,YREF=yr e f s 2 )
r e a lme rg e r f a r z <− 1/ rea lmergershez$dhat .bc
# −−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−#
# c a l c u l a t e synergy ga in s ( b ia s−c o r r e c t e d ) #
# −−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−#
# s e t i npu t and ou tpu t v e c t o r s to 0
mersynx1 <− 0
mersynx2 <− 0
mersynx3 <− 0
mersyny1 <− 0
mersyny2 <− 0
mersynz3 <− 0
mersynx1 <− matrix (mersynx1 , 1 , n)
mersynx2 <− matrix (mersynx2 , 1 , n)
mersynx3 <− matrix (mersynx3 , 1 , n)
mersyny1 <− matrix (mersyny1 , 1 , n)
mersyny2 <− matrix (mersyny2 , 1 , n)
mersynz3 <− matrix (mersynz3 , 1 , n)
# p o t e n t i a l merger o f s i z e a l pha /n , t e c h n i c a l e f f i c i e n c y ga in s a l r e a d y r e a l i z e d
for ( i in 1 : n ) {
mersynx1 [ 1 , i ] = mertecx1 [ 1 , i ]∗ ( alpha/nx [ i ] )
mersynx2 [ 1 , i ] = mertecx2 [ 1 , i ]∗ ( alpha/nx [ i ] )
mersynx3 [ 1 , i ] = mertecx3 [ 1 , i ]∗ ( alpha/nx [ i ] )
mersyny1 [ 1 , i ] = mertecy1 [ 1 , i ]∗ ( alpha/nx [ i ] )
mersyny2 [ 1 , i ] = mertecy2 [ 1 , i ]∗ ( alpha/nx [ i ] )
mersynz3 [ 1 , i ] = mergerz3 [ 1 , i ]∗ ( alpha/nx [ i ] )
}
# Model 1 : a c t u a l c a l c u l a t i o n o f synergy ga in s
xsynm=t (matrix (c (mersynx1 , mersynx2 , mersynx3 ) ,nrow=n , ncol=3))
ysynm=t (matrix (c (mersyny1 , mersyny2 ) ,nrow=n , ncol=2))
synergyshe <− boot . sw98(XOBS=xsynm ,YOBS=ysynm ,NREP=arg1 ,RTS=arg2 ,
ORIENTATION=arg3 , alpha=0.05 ,CI .TYPE=2,XREF=xre f ,YREF=yr e f )
syne rgy fa r <− 1/ synergyshe$dhat .bc
# Model 3 : a c t u a l c a l c u l a t i o n o f synergy ga in s
zsynm=t (matrix (c (mersyny1 , mersyny2 , mersynz3 ) ,nrow=n , ncol=3))
synergyshez <− boot . sw98(XOBS=xsynm ,YOBS=zsynm ,NREP=arg1 ,RTS=arg2 ,
ORIENTATION=arg3 , alpha=0.05 ,CI .TYPE=2,XREF=xre f ,YREF=yr e f s 2 )
syne rgy fa r z <− 1/ synergyshez$dhat .bc
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# −−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−#
# c a l c u l a t e s i z e ga in s ( b ia s−c o r r e c t e d ) #
# −−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−#
# s e t i npu t and ou tpu t v e c t o r s to 0
mersizx1 <− 0
mers izx2 <− 0
mers izx3 <− 0
mers izy1 <− 0
mers izy2 <− 0
mers izz3 <− 0
mers izx1 <− matrix ( mersizx1 , 1 , n)
mers izx2 <− matrix ( mersizx2 , 1 , n)
mers izx3 <− matrix ( mersizx3 , 1 , n)
mers izy1 <− matrix ( mersizy1 , 1 , n)
mers izy2 <− matrix ( mersizy2 , 1 , n)
mers izz3 <− matrix ( mersizz3 , 1 , n)
# p o t e n t i a l merger o f s i z e a l pha /n , t e c h n i c a l e f f i c i e n c y and synergy ga in s r e a l i z e d
for ( i in 1 : n ) {
mersizx1 [ 1 , i ] = mertecx1 [ 1 , i ]∗ syne rgy fa r [ i ]
mers izx2 [ 1 , i ] = mertecx2 [ 1 , i ]∗ syne rgy fa r [ i ]
mers izx3 [ 1 , i ] = mertecx3 [ 1 , i ]∗ syne rgy fa r [ i ]
mers izy1 [ 1 , i ] = mertecy1 [ 1 , i ]
mers izy2 [ 1 , i ] = mertecy2 [ 1 , i ]
mers izz3 [ 1 , i ] = mergerz3 [ 1 , i ]
}
# Model 1 : a c t u a l c a l c u l a t i o n o f s i z e ga in s
xsizm=t (matrix (c ( mersizx1 , mersizx2 , mers izx3 ) ,nrow=n , ncol=3))
ysizm=t (matrix (c ( mersizy1 , mers izy2 ) ,nrow=n , ncol=2))
s i z e s h e <− boot . sw98(XOBS=xsizm ,YOBS=ysizm ,NREP=arg1 ,RTS=arg2 ,
ORIENTATION=arg3 , alpha=0.05 ,CI .TYPE=2,XREF=xre f ,YREF=yr e f )
s i z e f a r <− 1/ s i z e she$dhat .bc
# Model 3 : a c t u a l c a l c u l a t i o n o f s i z e ga in s
zsizm=t (matrix (c ( mersizy1 , mersizy2 , mers izz3 ) ,nrow=n , ncol=3))
s i z e s h e z <− boot . sw98(XOBS=xsizm ,YOBS=zsizm ,NREP=arg1 ,RTS=arg2 ,
ORIENTATION=arg3 , alpha=0.05 ,CI .TYPE=2,XREF=xre f ,YREF=yr e f s 2 )
s i z e f a r z <− 1/ s i z e shez$dhat .bc
# −−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−#
# d i s p l a y r e s u l t s #
# −−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−#
# Model 1
# con s i s t e n c y check s
t e c h n i c a l f a r=o v e r a l l f a r / r ea lme rg e r f a r
ad j ov e r f a r=synergy fa r ∗ s i z e f a r
check r ea l=r ea lme rg e r f a r / ad j ov e r f a r
# cr e a t e t a b l e o f p o t e n t i a l merger ga in s
po t en t i a l me r g e r g a i n s=cbind (nx ,”&” ,round( o v e r a l l f a r ,5) ,”&” ,round( r ea lmerge r f a r , 5 ) ,
”&”,round( t e c hn i c a l f a r ,5) ,”&” ,round( synergyfar ,5) ,”&” ,
round( s i z e f a r ,5) ,”&” ,round( checkrea l , 5 ) )
# wr i t e . t a b l e ( p o t e n t i a l m e r g e r g a i n s , f i l e =”V:/mw/ p o t e n t i a l m e r g e r g a i n s . c s v ” ,
# sep =” ,”)
write . table ( po t en t i a l me rg e r ga in s , f i l e=”C: / a1/ po t en t i a l me r g e r g a i n s . csv ” , sep=” ,”)
# Model 3
t e c h n i c a l f a r z=o v e r a l l f a r z / r e a lme rg e r f a r z
ad j ov e r f a r z=syne rgy fa r z ∗ s i z e f a r z
check r ea l z=r ea lme rg e r f a r z / ad j ov e r f a r z
po t en t i a l me rg e r ga i n z=cbind (nx ,”&” ,round( o v e r a l l f a r z ,2) ,”&” ,round( r ea lmerge r f a r z , 2 ) ,
”&”,round( t e c hn i c a l f a r z ,2) ,”&” ,round( synergy farz ,2) ,”&” ,
s i z e f a r z ,”&” , check r ea l z )
# wr i t e . t a b l e ( p o t e n t i a l m e r g e r g a i n s , f i l e =”V:/mw/ p o t e n t i a l m e r g e r g a i n z . c s v ” ,
# sep =” ,”)
write . table ( po t en t i a l me rg e r ga in s , f i l e=”C: / a1/ po t en t i a l me rg e r ga i n z . csv ” , sep=” ,”)
# end
144 PROGRAM CODE
A.4 STATA Code for Chapter 5
∗∗∗ STATA CODE: OPERATOR CHANGES THROUGH COMPETITIVE TENDERING
∗∗∗ c l e a r s t a t a memory
clear
∗∗∗ s p e c i f y path f o r data s e t and ou tpu t and name o f data f i l e
∗∗∗ de s k t op path ( comment path not in use out )
∗∗∗ cd ”C:\ Users\Matth ias Walter\Desktop\Data\03 EE2\A5 Succes s Cond i t i ons . . .
∗∗∗ . . . Compe t i t i v e Tendering Bus S e r v i c e s \”
∗∗∗ l a p t o p path
cd ”R:\ p r o j e c t s c u r r e n t \ct−t r \02 Competit ive Tendering\”
dir
use sample . dta , clear
∗∗∗ −−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−∗∗∗
∗∗∗ c r e a t e v a r i a b l e s from raw data s e t
∗∗∗ −−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−∗∗∗
∗∗∗ g ene ra t e v a r i a b l e o p e r a t i on pe r i od in year s
∗∗∗ can be nec e s sa r y to ensure t h a t da t e s p e c i f i c a t i o n s come in numbers from EXCEL
gen per iod = ( ( end date − s t a r t d a t e )/365)
∗∗∗ g ene ra t e numeric v a r i a b l e s from s t r i n g v a r i a b l e s f o r s p a t i a l ca t egory , . . .
∗∗∗ . . . f e d e r a l s t a t e , and t ype o f c on t r a c t
encode cat , generate ( cat1 )
encode s tate , generate ( s t a t e1 )
encode contract , generate ( cont rac t1 )
∗∗∗ g ene ra t e c a t e g o r i a l v a r i a b l e s from s t r i n g v a r i a b l e s
tabulate cat , generate ( cat2 )
tabulate s tate , generate ( s t a t e2 )
tabulate contract , generate ( cont rac t2 )
∗∗∗ group ope r a t i on s t a r t
xt i le s t a r t y e a r = s ta r t da t e , nquantiles (6 )
∗∗∗ g ene ra t e o f y e a r l y dummies
gen s t a r t 9704 = ( s t a r t y e a r == 1)
gen s t a r t 2005 = ( s t a r t y e a r == 2)
gen s t a r t 2006 = ( s t a r t y e a r == 3)
gen s t a r t 2007 = ( s t a r t y e a r == 4)
gen s t a r t 2008 = ( s t a r t y e a r == 5)
gen s t a r t 2009 = ( s t a r t y e a r == 6)
∗∗∗ g ene ra t e t ende r round
drop i f round ==.
gen round1 = ( round == 2)
∗∗∗ combine t ende r round wi th s t a t e Bayern
gen round1 BY = ( s ta t e22 == 1 & round == 1)
gen round2 BY = ( s ta t e22 == 1 & round == 2)
∗∗∗ combine v e h i c l e ( t ende r s i z e ) w i th l i n e ( t ende r c omp l e x i t y )
gen ad j s i z e = ( v eh i c l e / l i n e )
∗∗∗ g ene ra t e f u r t h e r c omp l e x i t y i n d i c a t o r
gen cat223 = ( cat22 == 1 | cat23 == 1)
gen l i n e c a t = l i n e + l i n e ∗ cat223
∗∗∗ −−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−∗∗∗
∗∗∗ l a b e l v a r i a b l e s
∗∗∗ −−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−∗∗∗
label variable change ”Operator change”
label variable bidder ”No.\ o f b idder s ”
label variable per iod ”Operation per iod ”
label variable v eh i c l e ”No.\ o f v e h i c l e s ”
label variable l i n e ”No.\ o f l i n e s ”
label variable s t a r t d a t e ” Star t date ”
label variable end date ”End date ”
label variable s t a r t 9704 ” Star t in 1997−2004”
label variable s t a r t 2005 ” Star t in 2005”
label variable s t a r t 2006 ” Star t in 2006”
label variable s t a r t 2007 ” Star t in 2007”
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label variable s t a r t 2008 ” Star t in 2008”
label variable s t a r t 2009 ” Star t in 2009”
label define c a t l b 1 ”Regional t ranspor t ” 2 ”Mixed t ranspor t ” 3 ”Urban t ranspor t ”
label variable cat1 ”Type o f t r an spo r t a t i on ”
label value cat1 c a t l b
label variable cat21 ”Regional t ranspor t ”
label variable cat22 ”Mixed t ranspor t ”
label variable cat23 ”Urban t ranspor t ”
label define c o n t r a c t l c 1 ”Gross−co s t cont rac t ” 2 ”Net−co s t cont rac t ” ///
3 ”Sub−cont rac t ”
label variable cont rac t1 ”Type o f cont rac t ”
label value cont rac t1 c on t r a c t l b
label variable contract21 ”Gross−co s t cont rac t ”
label variable contract22 ”Net−co s t cont rac t ”
label variable contract23 ”Sub−cont rac t ”
label define s t a t e l b 1 ”Baden−Wu¨rttemberg” 2 ”Bayern” 3 ”Hessen” ///
4 ”Niedersachsen ” 5 ”Nordrhein−Westfalen ” 6 ”Rheinland−Pfa l z ” 7 ” Schleswig−Hol s t e in ”
label variable s t a t e1 ”Federa l s t a t e ”
label value s t a t e1 s t a t e l b
label variable s ta t e21 ”Baden−Wu¨rttemberg”
label variable s ta t e22 ”Bayern (BY)”
label variable s ta t e23 ”Hessen”
label variable s ta t e24 ”Niedersachsen ”
label variable s ta t e25 ”Nordrhein−Westfalen ”
label variable s ta t e26 ”Rheinland−Pfa l z ”
label variable s ta t e27 ” Schleswig−Hol s t e in ”
label variable round1 BY ”Tender round 1 in BY”
label variable round2 BY ”Tender round 2 in BY”
label variable ad j s i z e ”No.\ o f v e h i c l e s per l i n e ”
label variable l i n e c a t ”Line−category ”
∗∗∗ −−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−∗∗∗
∗∗∗ drop o b s e r v a t i o n s w i th mi s s ing v a l u e s
∗∗∗ −−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−∗∗∗
drop i f bidder ==.
drop i f round ==.
drop i f per iod ==.
drop i f s t a t e1 ==.
drop i f cont rac t1 ==.
drop i f cat1 ==.
drop i f l i n e ==.
drop i f v eh i c l e ==.
drop i f change ==.
∗∗∗ −−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−∗∗∗
∗∗∗ c a l c u l a t e d e s c r i p t i v e and v i s u a l s t a t i s t i c s
∗∗∗ −−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−∗∗∗
tabulate change s ta r tyea r , column
mean bidder i f s t a r t y e a r == 1
mean bidder i f s t a r t y e a r == 2
mean bidder i f s t a r t y e a r == 3
mean bidder i f s t a r t y e a r == 4
mean bidder i f s t a r t y e a r == 5
mean bidder i f s t a r t y e a r == 6
∗∗∗ −−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−∗∗∗
∗∗∗ c a l c u l a t e t r i a n g l e o f p r o b i t e s t ima t i o n s
∗∗∗ −−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−∗∗∗
∗∗∗ 09 September 2009 , t r i a n g l e
probit change bidder
probit change s ta r t 2005−s t a r t 2009 cat22 cat23
probit change s ta r t 2005−s t a r t 2009 cat22 cat23 v eh i c l e l i n e //mixed s i g n i f i c a n t
probit change s ta r t 2005−s t a r t 2009 cat22 cat23 v eh i c l e l i n e per iod
probit change s ta r t 2005−s t a r t 2009 cat22 cat23 v eh i c l e l i n e per iod ///
contract21 contract22 s ta t e22 s ta t e23
probit change per iod v eh i c l e l i n e s ta t e23 round1 BY−round2 BY
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∗∗∗ 10 September 2009 , a d d i t i o n a l models w i th combined v a r i a b l e s
probit change s ta r t 2005−s t a r t 2009 cat22 cat23 ad j s i z e
probit change s ta r t 2005−s t a r t 2009 v eh i c l e l i n e c a t
∗∗∗ model 1−6 ou tpu t f o r LaTeX
e s t s t o : quietly probit change bidder
e s t s t o : quietly probit change s ta r t 2005−s t a r t 2009 cat22 cat23
e s t s t o : quietly probit change s ta r t 2005−s t a r t 2009 cat22 cat23 v eh i c l e l i n e
e s t s t o : quietly probit change s ta r t 2005−s t a r t 2009 cat22 cat23 v eh i c l e l i n e per iod
e s t s t o : quietly probit change s ta r t 2005−s t a r t 2009 cat22 cat23 v eh i c l e l i n e ///
per iod contract21 contract22 s ta t e22 s ta t e23
e s t s t o : quietly probit change per iod v eh i c l e l i n e s ta t e23 round1 BY−round2 BY
est tab using t ende r t ab prob i t . tex , b(%−12.2 f ) pr2(%−12.2 f ) scalars ( l l ch i2 p) ///
noobs label star (∗ 0 .10 ∗∗ 0 .05 ∗∗∗ 0 . 01 ) se wide onecell nolines compress ///
alignment ( l ) t i t l e (Probit r e g r e s s i o n r e s u l t s o f s t r u c t u r a l v a r i a b l e s on operator ///
changes \ label{ tendertab : probit }) nodepvars nonumbers ///
mtitles (”1” ”2” ”3” ”4” ”5” ”6”) nonotes
∗∗∗ nece s sa r y manual ad ju s tmen t s :
∗∗∗ r e p l a c e ” t a b l e ” tw i c e by ” s i d ew a y s t a b l e ”
∗∗∗ i n c l u d e ”\ b e g in { sma l l }” & ”\ end{ sma l l }
∗∗∗ add b e f o r e \end{ t a b u l a r } :
∗∗∗ \mult ico lumn {7}{ l }{\ t i n y \emph{$ ˆ{∗∗∗} $ S i g n i f i c a n t a t 1\%,
∗∗∗ $ ˆ{∗∗} $ s i g n i f i c a n t a t 5\%, $ ˆ{∗} $ s i g n i f i c a n t a t 10\%;
∗∗∗ Standard e r r o r s in paren the s e s , Log− l i k e l i h o o d cons tan t−on ly = ???}}
∗∗∗ add \ h l i n e a f t e r con s t an t row and a f t e r s i g n i f i c a n c e l e v e l row
∗∗∗ r e p l a c e s c a l a r names : l l −> Log−l i k e l i h o o d , ch i 2 −> $\ ch i ˆ{2}$ ,
∗∗∗ p −> S i g n i f i c a n c e l e v e l
∗∗∗ emphas ize a l l v a r i a b l e s
∗∗∗ r e p l a c e f i r s t row by ( w i t hou t ∗∗∗)
∗∗∗ \ h l i n e
∗∗∗ \ t e x t b f {Model} & \mult ico lumn {1}{ c}{\ t e x t b f {1}} & \mult ico lumn {1}{ c}{\ t e x t b f {2}}
∗∗∗ & \mult ico lumn {1}{ c}{\ t e x t b f {3}} & \mult ico lumn {1}{ c}{\ t e x t b f {4}}
∗∗∗ & \mult ico lumn {1}{ c}{\ t e x t b f {5}} & \mult ico lumn {1}{ c}{\ t e x t b f {6}}\\
∗∗∗ \ h l i n e
∗∗∗ \mbox{Var i a b l e } & \mult ico lumn {1}{ c}{\mbox{Est imate }}
∗∗∗ & \mult ico lumn {1}{ c}{\mbox{Est imate }} & \mult ico lumn {1}{ c}{\mbox{Est imate }}
∗∗∗ & \mult ico lumn {1}{ c}{\mbox{Est imate }} & \mult ico lumn {1}{ c}{\mbox{Est imate }}
∗∗∗ & \mult ico lumn {1}{ c}{\mbox{Est imate }}\\
∗∗∗ \ h l i n e
∗∗∗ model A B ou tpu t f o r LaTeX
e s t s t o : quietly probit change s ta r t 2005−s t a r t 2009 cat22 cat23 ad j s i z e
e s t s t o : quietly probit change s ta r t 2005−s t a r t 2009 v eh i c l e l i n e c a t
e s t tab using tendertab add . tex , b(%−12.2 f ) pr2(%−12.2 f ) scalars ( l l ch i2 p) ///
noobs label star (∗ 0 .10 ∗∗ 0 .05 ∗∗∗ 0 . 01 ) se wide onecell nolines compress ///
alignment ( l ) t i t l e ( Addi t iona l probit r e g r e s s i o n r e s u l t s with combined va r i a b l e s ///
\ label{ tendertab : add}) nodepvars nonumbers mtitles (”A” ”B”) ///
nonotes
∗∗∗ nece s sa r y manual ad ju s tmen t s :
∗∗∗ i n c l u d e ”\ b e g in { sma l l }” & ”\ end{ sma l l }
∗∗∗ add b e f o r e \end{ t a b u l a r } :
∗∗∗ \mult ico lumn {3}{ l }{\ t i n y \emph{$ ˆ{∗∗∗} $ S i g n i f i c a n t a t 1\%,
∗∗∗ $ ˆ{∗∗} $ s i g n i f i c a n t a t 5\%, $ ˆ{∗} $ s i g n i f i c a n t a t 10\%;
∗∗∗ Standard e r r o r s in }} \\
∗∗∗ \mult ico lumn {3}{ l }{\ t i n y \emph{ pa r en t h e s e s ; Line−c a t e g o r y = no .\ o f l i n e s
∗∗∗ i f urban t r a n s p o r t and tw i c e t h e no .\ o f }} \\
∗∗∗ \mult ico lumn {3}{ l }{\ t i n y \emph{ l i n e s i f mixed or r e g i o n a l t r a n s p o r t }}
∗∗∗ add \ h l i n e a f t e r con s t an t row and a f t e r s i g n i f i c a n c e l e v e l row
∗∗∗ r e p l a c e s c a l a r names : l l −> Log−l i k e l i h o o d , ch i 2 −> $\ ch i ˆ{2}$ ,
∗∗∗ p −> S i g n i f i c a n c e l e v e l
∗∗∗ emphas ize a l l v a r i a b l e s
∗∗∗ r e p l a c e f i r s t row by ( w i t hou t ∗∗∗)
∗∗∗ \ h l i n e
∗∗∗ \ t e x t b f {Model} & \mult ico lumn {1}{ c}{\ t e x t b f {A}}
∗∗∗ & \mult ico lumn {1}{ c}{\ t e x t b f {B}} \\ \ h l i n e
∗∗∗ \mbox{Var i a b l e } & \mult ico lumn {1}{ c}{\mbox{Est imate }}
∗∗∗ & \mult ico lumn {1}{ c}{\mbox{Est imate }} \\
∗∗∗ \ h l i n e
∗∗∗ end
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